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Abstract 
Since 2000, swathes of energy experts, government officials, industry representatives and journalists 
have predicted the emergence of a global ‘nuclear renaissance.’ Nuclear energy was said to be on the 
precipice of a new era of development, characterised by widespread construction of new nuclear 
reactors and a concomitant increase in global nuclear capacity. Despite this expectation, there is little 
evidence to date which suggests that a revival of nuclear power has taken place in the regions of Western 
Europe and North America in the way that the rhetoric depicted. This thesis therefore seeks to firstly 
establish that there is a disjuncture between the rhetoric and reality of the nuclear renaissance in Western 
Europe and North America, and secondly, to explain why this disjuncture exists.  
Academic and journalistic debate over recent developments in civil nuclear energy policy has tended to 
focus on two key reasons for why there has not been a widespread expansion of nuclear energy in these 
regions. Firstly, that the nuclear disaster at Fukushima in 2011 reignited concerns over nuclear safety, 
thereby eroding public and political support for nuclear new build. Secondly, that the economic 
problems facing nuclear development continued to act as a major disincentive to the construction of 
new nuclear power plants. However, the global applicability of these two issues means that neither of 
these explanations can explain why the nuclear renaissance appears to have failed in Western Europe 
and North America, while nuclear new build is expanding in other parts of the world. Moreover, the 
revival of safety concerns post-Fukushima fails to explain why there was little evidence of a nuclear 
renaissance taking place prior to March 2011. 
This thesis provides a contribution to knowledge by adopting a more holistic and inductive approach 
for understanding why there is a disjuncture between the expectation and reality of the nuclear 
renaissance in Western Europe and North America. It challenges existing explanations for the failure 
of the nuclear renaissance as being simplistic, mono-causal and a-historical. This thesis disputes the 
idea that the absence of a widespread expansion of nuclear energy and the apparent failure of the nuclear 
renaissance can be attributed to any one problem or event. Instead, it embraces the simple premise that 
a broad range of contextual factors must be explored in order to fully understand why the rhetoric of a 
nuclear renaissance has not become a reality. 
An extensive analysis of government, industry and media documents published from 1945 onwards, as 
well as interviews with experts in nuclear energy policy, was undertaken in order to establish a better 
understanding of how and why nuclear energy development changes over time. Through this process, 
it became clear that the reasons typically cited for explaining changes in nuclear development are 
‘nuclear-specific factors’. That is, factors relating directly to the construction and operation of nuclear 
power plants – such as the economics of nuclear energy, the safety of nuclear power plants, and the 
storage and disposal of nuclear waste. While these factors undeniably play an important role in 
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influencing nuclear new build, focusing solely on these nuclear-specific factors obscures the impact of 
broader social, political, and contextual changes on nuclear energy development. 
This thesis draws upon political science literature to argue that the changing trajectory of nuclear energy 
development has also been influenced by broader contextual shifts in the post-war era. The impact of 
four ‘contextual factors’ on nuclear power are examined: the rise of environmentalism, the decline in 
public trust in government, changes in risk perception, and the rise of neoliberalism. Each of these 
contextual shifts have changed the way in which agents think about and respond to the issue of nuclear 
power. Consequently, this thesis argues that both nuclear-specific factors and contextual factors are 
important in explaining change in civil nuclear energy development. All of these factors are dynamic 
and interactive, mutually shaping and influencing one another. Moreover, both of these groups of 
factors have contributed to the failure of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America. 
The ongoing presence of these challenges will continue to hamper the future success of civil nuclear 
energy development, and prevent a nuclear renaissance from taking place. 
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1 .  INTRODU CTIO N  
THE NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE 
Nuclear energy has immense potential for addressing two of the most pressing policy problems for 
governments across the globe – ensuring security of energy supply in the face of rising demand and 
growing geopolitical tensions, and reducing greenhouse gas emissions to combat the onset of global 
warming. As the need to address these problems has grown, an increasingly favourable political 
environment for the use and development of nuclear power emerged throughout much of the world. In 
particular, from the early 2000s onwards, a growth in public and political support for nuclear power led 
to the emergence of a widespread expectation that a ‘nuclear renaissance’ was about to take place. This 
was significant given that the construction of new nuclear power plants had experienced a global decline 
since the mid-1970s. 
At first it appeared that the advocates of a nuclear renaissance were correct in their predictions. 
Throughout Western Europe and North America, governments announced plans to expand their nuclear 
industries. Several countries which had policies in place to phase-out existing nuclear power plants, or 
which opposed the development of nuclear power in the country altogether, began to re-evaluate or 
reverse their policy positions. Figures from the International Atomic Energy Agency (2010) indicated 
that, in 2010, over forty-five countries worldwide that did not use nuclear energy were seriously 
considering the development of a domestic nuclear power program. Enthusiasm for the nuclear 
renaissance grew as numerous political leaders, nuclear industry representatives, and even notable 
environmental activists, made public statements in support of nuclear new build. In Western Europe 
and North America, these statements were made by the highest levels of political leaders. The shared 
political enthusiasm for nuclear energy was a stark contrast to the previous two and a half decades where 
nuclear energy had largely been kept off the political agenda. 
The term ‘nuclear renaissance’ had become commonplace in media reporting by the mid-2000s. 
However, exactly what the nuclear renaissance was, or what would constitute a renaissance taking place, 
was rarely – if ever – defined. Rather, the term was broadly used to refer to a change in nuclear energy 
development that was defined by two key facets: 
1. That there would be a significant increase in the number of nuclear power plants being built. 
2. That this increase in nuclear power plant construction would be a global phenomenon. New 
nuclear build would take place in first-timer nuclear countries, as well as in countries with 
established nuclear programmes, many of which had long-suffered from stagnation and decline. 
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This second facet is crucial to understanding why the emergence of the expectation of a nuclear 
renaissance was so significant, but is frequently overlooked in existing discussions and analysis of the 
nuclear renaissance. The significance of the nuclear renaissance was that much of the new nuclear 
growth was expected to take place in countries whose nuclear industries were suffering from stagnation 
and decline. The vast majority of nuclear growth that occurred during the 1980s and 1990s was located 
in newly established or emerging ‘first-timer’ nuclear industries – countries that were only just 
beginning their civil nuclear energy programmes. These countries were primarily located in the regions 
of Asia and Central and Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, nuclear new build in Western Europe and North 
America – the regions that had driven the early development of nuclear power – was limited. 
Consequently, the expectation of a nuclear renaissance was significant because it was based not just on 
the assumption that the growth in Asia and Central and Eastern Europe would continue, but that a rapid 
expansion of new growth would also occur in Western Europe and North America. This new growth in 
more well-established nuclear industries that had been suffering from a prolonged decline is what made 
the expectation of a nuclear renaissance so significant, and a stark turning point from the previous two 
and a half decades of nuclear history. 
Over time, however, it became increasingly clear that the reality of nuclear energy development was a 
far cry from what the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance had promised. Already from 2010, social and 
political commentators began pronouncing the nuclear renaissance to have failed, or to never have 
existed at all. Headlines described the nuclear renaissance as a “myth” (Financial Chronicle, 2010: 1) 
and as having “failed to materialize” (Wald, 2010: 1). The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013 
described the nuclear renaissance as “all in ruins now” (Schneider et al., 2013: 4). A presentation by 
the International Energy Agency on the World Energy Outlook 2014 declared there is “no nuclear 
renaissance in sight” (IEA 2014: 11). The World Energy Resources 2013 Survey stated that “globally, 
the nuclear industry is in decline” (World Energy Council, 2013: 4.6). The 2014 World Energy 
Resources Issue Monitor highlighted the absence of a nuclear renaissance in the regions of Europe and 
North America. Specifically, the report noted that “we currently do not see signals for short-term 
investment in new nuclear projects” for the European region (World Energy Council, 2014: 27), and 
that the North American region is “unlikely to see new coal or nuclear plants until 2025” (World Energy 
Council, 2014: 33). 
Even though the reality of nuclear development in Western Europe and North America has not reflected 
the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance, this should not obscure the fact that some degree of nuclear new 
build has taken place during the renaissance period. From 2000 to 2015, construction began on 94 new 
nuclear reactors worldwide (OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, 2015: 17). However, this construction has 
been heavily concentrated in a small number of countries. In 2014, there were 67 reactors under 
construction across 14 different countries, but these reactors were predominantly located in the regions 
of Asia and Central and Eastern Europe. Over 75 percent of the reactors under construction in 2014 
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were located in only five countries – China (28 reactors), Russia (9 reactors), India (6 reactors), the US 
(5 reactors), and South Korea (5 reactors) (Schneider et al., 2014: 155). While there has been evidence 
of some new reactor construction starts elsewhere in Western Europe and North America (such as plans 
for the construction of a reactor at Hinkley Point in the UK), this only accounts for a small portion of 
global nuclear new build. 
The puzzle therefore remains: Why is there a disjuncture between the rhetoric and reality of a nuclear 
renaissance in Western Europe and North America? Why is there a nuclear expansion taking place in 
regions such as Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, and the Middle East, but not in the regions of Western 
Europe and North America, where the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance was so widespread?  The failure 
of the nuclear renaissance in some regions but not in others is particularly puzzling given that the 
arguments supporting a nuclear renaissance have global appeal – they are not region-specific. For 
example, the need for cost-effective, secure, and low-emissions energy sources has underpinned the 
arguments for new nuclear development across all the regions of the world. Yet it is only the regions of 
Asia and Central and Eastern Europe that show evidence of large-scale nuclear expansion. So why is 
there little evidence a nuclear renaissance taking place in Western Europe and North America? 
Existing explanations for the disconnection between the rhetoric and reality of the nuclear renaissance 
tend focus on two main arguments. Firstly, that the nuclear disaster at Fukushima in 2011 reignited 
concerns over nuclear safety, thereby eroding public and political support for nuclear new build. 
Secondly, that the economic problems facing nuclear development continued to act as a major 
disincentive to the construction of new nuclear power plants. However, there has not yet been a 
systematic analysis into why the renaissance did not amount to what it promised. Assuming that the 
renaissance has failed in Western Europe and North American simply because of the Fukushima nuclear 
disaster, or because of the economics of nuclear power, is problematic for several reasons. Firstly, the 
global applicability of the safety and cost arguments for the failure of the renaissance means that neither 
argument is sufficient for explaining the regional differences in nuclear energy development since 2000. 
Neither argument provides sufficient explanation for why some countries – primarily those located in 
Asia and Central and Eastern Europe – have expanded their civil nuclear energy capacities since 2000, 
while other countries – primarily those located in Western Europe and North America – have not. The 
high capital costs required for constructing nuclear power plants is a problem that faces all new nuclear 
projects, and yet this has not deterred some countries from continuing to expand their civil nuclear 
energy programmes. News of the Fukushima nuclear disaster reignited public concerns over nuclear 
safety throughout the globe. Some countries have responded to these concerns by abandoning their 
plans for nuclear new build, while others have not. Even prior to Fukushima, there was little evidence 
of widespread construction of new nuclear reactors that would have justified the expectation of a nuclear 
renaissance. Consequently, an alternative explanation is needed, one that goes beyond simply pointing 
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the finger at finances or Fukushima, for why there is a disconnection between the expectation and reality 
of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America. 
Furthermore, the safety and cost arguments explaining the absence of a nuclear renaissance are 
problematic in that they are mono-causal, failing to consider the various causal factors that could 
potentially influence nuclear energy development. Moreover, these arguments are problematic as they 
are a-historical, failing to locate recent changes in nuclear development within its broader historical 
context. The Fukushima argument in particular does not explain why there was so little evidence of 
countries expanding their civil nuclear energy programmes throughout the globe prior to March 2011. 
Consequently, neither Fukushima nor the economics explanations for the failure of the nuclear 
renaissance are sufficient to explain the regional variations in nuclear development since 2000. A 
systematic analysis into the factors influencing the absence of a nuclear renaissance in Western Europe 
and North America is therefore required. 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND QUESTIONS 
The objective of this thesis is therefore to examine why there is a disconnection between the expectation 
and reality of a nuclear renaissance in the regions of Western Europe and North America. In order to 
fulfil this objective, this thesis answers two core research questions: 
1. What factors have influenced the changing trajectory of civil nuclear energy development in 
the past? 
2. Can the factors which explain the changing fortunes of nuclear energy in the past explain the 
disconnection between the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance and the reality of civil nuclear 
energy development in Western Europe and North America since 2000? 
RESEARCH APPROACH 
This thesis adopts what is defined by Shapiro (2005) as a “problem-centred” research approach. The 
core feature of a problem-centred research approach is an absence of commitment to any pre-determined 
theory or paradigm. The problem-centred approach is unique in that it begins by locating an empirical 
puzzle, rather than a theoretical framework, as its starting point. In accordance with the problem-centred 
approach, this thesis has started with the identification of an empirical problem – understanding why 
there is a disjuncture between the expectation and reality of a nuclear renaissance in the regions of North 
America and Western Europe. The absence of a renaissance in these regions is an empirical puzzle 
given that the arguments underpinning the case for nuclear new build appeared to be widely accepted. 
Governments worldwide are faced with the same problem of needing to ensure security of energy supply 
in a cost-effective manner, while also needing to reduce their carbon emissions to combat climate 
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change. This meant that the case for new nuclear development had global appeal. The nuclear industry 
capitalised on this by marketing nuclear power as a secure, cost-effective and low-carbon source of 
energy. At first, this strategy appeared to have worked, with governments around the world invoking 
the same energy security and climate change arguments in order to convince the public of the need for 
nuclear new build. The widespread ambitions for a nuclear renaissance suggested that a resurgence of 
global nuclear capacity was imminent. Yet an examination of the empirical data on nuclear growth as 
well as an analysis of nuclear energy policy making in North America and Western Europe since 2000 
evinces little evidence of nuclear growth, yet alone a nuclear renaissance. There is a disconnection 
between the widely-held expectations and ambitions about the prospects of nuclear energy and the 
reality of what has actually occurred in these regions. Consequently, the failure of the nuclear 
renaissance in Western Europe and North America remains as an empirical problem, one which is 
particularly puzzling given that the arguments underpinning nuclear new build appeared to be so widely 
accepted by policymakers and politicians in these regions. 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
This thesis adopts ‘Agents in Context Historical Institutionalism’ (AiC-HI) as an analytical framework 
to help guide the analysis of the research questions. AiC-HI was developed by Bell (2011, 2012) and 
Bell and Hindmoor (2014) as an expansive and flexible version of historical institutionalism, which 
integrates a broad range of causal variables. It recognises the importance of formal and informal 
institutions, agents, ideas, contexts and structures in explaining change over time, but crucially does not 
privilege any one of these variables over another. This perspective departs from the traditional historical 
institutionalist assumption that institutions determine the behaviour of agents. Instead, institutionally-
situated agents are perceived as being able to actively negotiate and exert influence over their reality, 
and thereby take part in reproducing or reshaping institutions. Agents and institutions are therefore 
perceived as “mutually shaping” one another over time, without one ever wholly determining the 
behaviour or outcomes of the other. The ability for institutions and agents to shape one another is also 
mediated by ideas, as ideational contexts can shape agents’ interests and preferences, and incentivise 
particular behaviours and actions. Agents are also seen to be operating within broader contextual and 
structural environments which can be both constraining and empowering. The broad political, economic 
or social environment can influence the preferences of agents, the resources and opportunities that are 
available, and can establish costs and benefits to encourage agents to act in a particular way. Agents in 
Context Historical Institutionalism therefore rebukes the ‘stickiness’ of earlier institutional theories by 
incorporating a wider range of potential causal variables into its analysis. AiC-HI is also an appropriate 
complement to a problem-based approach to research, as it typically focuses on addressing real-world 
empirical questions that have a practical relevance for policymakers and the general public as well as 
academia.  
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METHODOLOGY 
The methodology adopted in this thesis is a comparatively informed historical analysis. One of the 
major strengths of comparative historical analysis is its ability to learn lessons from the past in order to 
better understand policy problems of the present. It facilitates deeper, empirically-driven insights into 
issues that are commonly taken for granted or clouded in broad-based assumptions – a problem which 
plagues existing explanations for the failure of the nuclear renaissance. 
Qualitative research methods are employed in order to build an understanding of both how and why 
nuclear energy development has changed over time. A wide-ranging document analysis of documents 
relating to nuclear energy policy and development published from 1945 to the present day formed the 
core data source for this project1. The documents analysed were drawn from a broad range of academic 
disciplines, including literature from the fields of law, policy, political science, psychology and history. 
The documents included government policy documents, legislation, parliamentary debates, press 
releases, political speeches, non-government organisation and industry reports and statements, and 
newspaper articles from 1945 to the present day. The purpose of the document analysis is two-fold. 
Firstly, it is used in a purely descriptive manner in order to build a historical narrative of how nuclear 
energy development had changed over time, from 1945 until the present day. Secondly, the data is 
analysed thematically in order to allow factors which appeared to influence nuclear energy development 
and the failure of the nuclear renaissance to emerge inductively through the research. As the potential 
causal variables emerge, comparisons are drawn between the experiences of individual countries and 
across the experiences within countries over time. 
The data gathered from the document analysis was then supplemented by other quantitative and 
qualitative data sources. Quantitative data on the construction and operation of nuclear power reactors 
was referred to in order to better understand the way in which nuclear development has changed at a 
national, regional, and global scale from 1945 to the present day. Semi-structured interviews were also 
conducted with experts in nuclear energy development and policy in order to corroborate the findings 
of the document analysis, and help identify factors which appear to influence the changing trajectory of 
nuclear energy development over time. The experts interviewed included academics, government 
officials, and nuclear industry representatives, each of whom were questioned on their views on the 
outcome of the nuclear renaissance, the reasons for this outcome, the challenges facing nuclear power 
and the future of civil nuclear energy. 
                                                     
1 While an exact number of documents examined cannot be provided, over one thousand documents relating to 
civil nuclear energy policy and development were consulted, roughly three-quarters of which were news articles 
published from 1945 to the present day. 
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CORE ARGUMENT 
This thesis develops two core arguments. Firstly, this thesis argues that there is a disconnection between 
the expectation of a nuclear renaissance and the reality of nuclear new build in Western Europe and 
North America since 2000. In short, there has not been a nuclear renaissance in the regions of Western 
Europe or North America. Secondly, this thesis argues that the failure of the nuclear renaissance in 
Western Europe and North America cannot be fully understood without considering the way in which 
broader institutional, structural and ideational contextual shifts affect nuclear energy development. 
Argument 1: There has not been a nuclear renaissance in Western Europe or North America. 
This thesis argues that the development of civil nuclear energy in the regions of Western Europe and 
North America since 2000 does not reflect the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance. This is because: 
 there has not been a significant increase in the number of new nuclear reactor construction starts 
across these regions since 2000; 
 many of the countries in these regions which showed signs of starting a nuclear power 
programme or expanding their existing nuclear programmes have failed to undertake real action 
towards these goals or have reversed their policy positions on the issue; 
 there has been a distinct absence of nuclear growth in many of the countries in Western Europe 
and North America which were expected to drive the nuclear renaissance; and 
 nuclear energy as a share of total electricity produced has decreased throughout many countries 
in Western Europe and North America from 2000 onwards. 
Put simply, the reality of nuclear development in Western Europe and North America since 2000 is far 
less than what the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance promised. Instead, the growth that has taken place 
in nuclear energy industries since 2000 has been focused in a very small number of countries, located 
primarily in the regions of Asia and Central and Eastern Europe. Consequently, there is a clear 
disconnection between the expectation and reality of a nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North 
America. This argument is constructed by drawing upon the findings of a widespread academic and 
policy literature review, statistical data on nuclear energy growth and nuclear power construction starts, 
as well as the findings from expert interviews. 
Argument 2: The absence of a nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America cannot be 
fully understood without considering broader institutional, structural and ideational contextual shifts. 
This thesis argues that the absence of a nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America 
cannot be fully understood without accounting for broader institutional, structural, ideational and 
contextual shifts over time. Since the 1980s, there has been a growing recognition in the academic 
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literature that political, social and economic factors are just as relevant as technical factors in explaining 
why and how nuclear energy development takes place. For example, Rüdig (1987) highlights the 
influence of political styles on the outcome of nuclear technology policies, Cohen et al. (1995) examine 
the influence of constitutional structures and electoral systems on nuclear energy policies, and  
Campbell (1988) focuses on the way in which political and economic institutions have constrained the 
development of the nuclear energy industry. Jasper (1990) outlines the weaknesses of a purely structural 
approach to examining nuclear energy by insisting that explanations of nuclear policy outcomes need 
to account for cultural and ideological factors as well. More recently, Sovacool and Valentine (2012) 
highlight the influence of the broader social, economic, political and technological environment on 
nuclear energy development. This thesis builds upon the growing recognition that a broader approach 
to understanding nuclear energy development is needed. 
Existing explanations for the absence of a nuclear renaissance tend to focus on two main arguments. 
Firstly, that the Fukushima nuclear disaster reignited public concerns over the safety of nuclear energy, 
and governments – fearful of angering voters – tapered their enthusiasm for nuclear power. Secondly, 
some commentators have argued that the ongoing financial problems faced by nuclear new build has 
stopped the expectation of a renaissance from becoming a reality. The high construction costs of nuclear 
power plants – a problem which has plagued the industry throughout its history – continue to impede 
new nuclear growth. Both of these explanations for the absence of a nuclear renaissance focus on 
‘nuclear-specific’ factors. That is, problems relating directly to the construction, operation and 
management of nuclear power plants. This thesis acknowledges that nuclear-specific factors – such as 
cost of construction, the safety of nuclear reactors, and the management of nuclear waste – are important 
factors influencing the outcome of the nuclear renaissance throughout the globe. However, focusing on 
these factors alone provides too narrow an interpretation of the reasons why there is so little evidence 
of a nuclear renaissance. The global applicability of the safety and cost arguments for the disconnection 
between the rhetoric and reality of the renaissance means that neither argument is sufficient for 
explaining the regional differences in nuclear energy development since 2000. Neither argument 
provides sufficient explanation for why some countries – primarily those located in Asia and Central 
and Eastern Europe – have expanded their civil nuclear energy capacities 2000, while other countries – 
primarily those located in Western Europe and North America – have not. Consequently, an alternative 
explanation is needed for why there is a disconnection between the rhetoric and reality of the nuclear 
renaissance in Western Europe and North America. 
This thesis challenges existing explanations for the disconnection between the rhetoric and reality of 
the nuclear renaissance that are overly concerned with nuclear-specific factors. It argues that the absence 
of a nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America cannot be fully understood without 
examining broader changes in the institutional, structural and ideational context over time. When a 
historical perspective is applied to the development of nuclear power, it becomes clear that since the 
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first steps were taken towards establishing civil nuclear energy programmes in the post-war era, there 
have been broad institutional, structural, ideational and contextual shifts taking place in Western Europe 
and North America which have created a far more challenging social, political and economic 
environment for nuclear power development to take place. Many of the factors which supported and 
encouraged the post-war boom in nuclear energy in these regions have gradually been eroded over time. 
For example, the emergence of the environmental movement has raised public and political awareness 
of the environmental hazards associated with the use of nuclear energy and nuclear waste, making it 
more difficult for governments to convince the public of the need for nuclear energy. The early 
development of nuclear energy was supported by high levels of public trust in government – but this 
trust has been gradually eroded over time, resulting in a ‘trust deficit’. This has created a political 
environment whereby citizens are far more sceptical of government and industry claims about the 
benefits of nuclear power. Furthermore, in the 1950s and 1960s, the risks associated with nuclear power 
were largely overlooked, with little public or political concern over the possible dangers. However, the 
growth of a ‘risk society’, combined with the increasing visibility of the risks associated with nuclear 
power, has contributed to greater public opposition to nuclear development. Finally, the early 
development of nuclear energy was facilitated by high levels of direct government involvement in 
policy development and implementation. Yet the rise of neoliberal ideas have made governments much 
less willing to directly develop and fund nuclear energy programmes themselves, thereby reducing the 
support available for nuclear new build. Each of these contextual shifts have contributed to the creation 
of a political, institutional and ideational environment which is far more problematic for nuclear 
development.  
This thesis argues that the failure of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America 
cannot be fully understood without accounting for both nuclear-specific factors (such as cost, safety 
concerns and nuclear waste), as well as these broad contextual shifts. Both types of factors are mutually 
dynamic and interactive, and have contributed to the failure of the nuclear renaissance in these regions. 
This thesis does not claim to have compiled a complete list of reasons for why the nuclear renaissance 
appears to have failed in Western Europe and North America. Instead, it challenges the existing 
explanations for the failure of the nuclear renaissance for being a-historical, mono-causal, and overly-
concerned with nuclear-specific factors alone. It broadens the debate over the nuclear renaissance by 
drawing attention to the influence of structural, institutional and ideational contextual shifts on nuclear 
energy development. It highlights the way in which these shifts have affected the behaviour of agents 
responsible for nuclear energy development.  
Furthermore, this thesis highlights the continuity that exists between the issues that caused the nuclear 
industries of Western Europe and North America to stagnate and decline in the 1970s and 1980s, and 
the issues that have hindered the success of a nuclear renaissance in these regions. The idea of a nuclear 
renaissance was premised upon the claim that the arguments for nuclear power had fundamentally 
10 
  
changed – for example, that the policy problems of energy security and climate change were so pressing 
that policymakers would inevitably support a revival of nuclear power. However, this thesis argues that 
this expectation failed to recognise that many of the problems which have hindered the construction of 
new nuclear facilities in the past have not been resolved. Very little has changed in the arguments used 
to support and oppose nuclear power. Consequently, a nuclear renaissance is unlikely to take place until 
these issues are resolved. 
CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
This thesis provides several contributions to knowledge. Firstly, this research project contributes to 
knowledge by addressing the lack of social-science based research investigating nuclear energy policy 
and development, as well as the lack of social science research investigating energy policy more 
broadly. In recent years there has been a growing recognition of the valuable contribution that social 
science theories and methodologies can make to energy policy research (see Sovacool, 2014b; Stern, 
2014; Sovacool et al., 2015; Rochlin, 2014; Ryan et al., 2014; Spreng, 2014). Despite this recognition, 
there continues to be a notable imbalance between social science accounts of energy policy compared 
to research focusing solely on the economic aspects of energy policy. Sovacool (2014a, 2014b), for 
example, highlights the lack of diverse approaches to energy studies outside of science, engineering and 
economics within leading energy journals. This thesis therefore contributes to knowledge by helping to 
fill the gap in energy policy research that is grounded in social science theories and methodologies. 
Secondly, this thesis addresses the existing dearth of academic research into the reasons for the failure 
of the nuclear renaissance. There is a substantial body of academic work investigating the reasons why 
nuclear energy development has changed over time in different countries. This work has identified a 
range of explanatory factors. For example, previous research has investigated the role of different actors 
in influencing the rise or decline of nuclear energy, such as the role of the state (Camilleri, 1984; 
Fuhrmann, 2012; Lester and Rosner, 2009), corporate and industry representatives (Hertsgaard, 1983), 
and the anti-nuclear movement (Herring, 2010; Joppke, 1993; Kitschelt, 1986). Since the late 1980s, 
there has been a growing recognition that nuclear energy development is influenced by the broader 
political, economic, social and cultural environment (Cohen et al., 1995; Campbell, 1988; Jasper, 1990; 
Sovacool and Valentine, 2012; Rüdig, 1987).  Other explanatory factors that have been explored in 
connection to nuclear energy development include the impact of focusing events such as nuclear 
disasters (Wittneben, 2012; Elliott, 2013; Thomas, 2012c), the evolution of reactor technology (Burn, 
1978), and the economics involved in nuclear projects (Mullenbach, 1966).  
These studies provide valuable insight into the many different factors that can influence how and why 
civil nuclear energy programmes are formed and change over time. However, this body of work is 
limited in two key ways. Firstly, this literature has not yet investigated whether or to what extent these 
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factors have played a role in influencing the failure of the nuclear renaissance in particular. This thesis 
therefore contributes to knowledge by explicitly investigating which factors have played a direct or 
indirect role in influencing the failure of the nuclear renaissance. Secondly, the existing body of 
literature into the factors influencing changes in nuclear energy development over time is limited in that 
these studies tend to adopt a singular focus on a particular type of explanatory factor which informs 
their analysis of nuclear industry development. Moreover, these studies are overly concerned with 
investigating factors specifically related to the construction, operation and management of nuclear 
power plants. In doing so, much of the existing literature on nuclear energy development fails to account 
for the many different political, social, cultural, structural, institutional, and ideological factors that are 
occurring at any one time, and which interplay with one another to influence the development of nuclear 
energy policy. 
This thesis therefore makes a third contribution to knowledge through its use of a problem-centred 
approach to research, and its application of Agents in Context Historical Institutionalism (AiC-HI). 
Through adopting a problem-centred approach to research, and thereby foregoing a pre-determined 
paradigmatic approach, this research expands on previous studies by providing a more holistic and 
inductive approach to understanding nuclear energy development, using a wide variety of explanatory 
contexts. This provides a more comprehensive and synthesised explanation for why nuclear energy 
development changes over time, and why the nuclear renaissance has not materialised in Western 
Europe and North America. This holistic approach to investigating the reasons for the failure of the 
nuclear renaissance is further complemented by the use of AiC-HI as an analytical framework. AiC-HI 
allows for a broad range of causal variables – institutions, agency, ideas, structures, and context – and 
their interdependencies to be included in the analysis, without privileging any one of these variables 
over another. This further enhances the holistic and inductive perspective that this thesis adopts to 
understanding why the nuclear renaissance failed. 
While this is the first time that an approach identifying both nuclear-technological specific factors as 
well as broader contextual factors has been applied specifically to the area of nuclear energy 
development, a similar approach has been adopted in academic literature investigating the area of 
sustainability transitions more broadly. For example, Geels and Schot (2007) highlight the importance 
of recognising the influence of factors ‘internal’ to a particular technology, the ‘external’ contextual 
factors (such as the socio-technical landscape), as well as the role of individual agency. This research 
reflects Geels & Schot’s conclusion that the interactions between all of these factors are crucial to 
understanding how and why technologies and technological policies develop over time. 
Furthermore, this thesis provides a contribution to knowledge by challenging existing explanations for 
the failure of the nuclear renaissance. The failure of the nuclear renaissance is commonly attributed to 
either the disaster at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant in March 2011, or the high capital costs 
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involved in nuclear new build. Commentators suggest that the Fukushima nuclear disaster eroded public 
confidence in the nuclear industry, reigniting long-held concerns over safety and regulation. In 
response, governments abandoned plans for nuclear expansion, evidenced by the introduction of a 
nuclear phase-out in Germany, and the decisions by the Swiss and Italian governments to ban further 
nuclear development. An alternative argument is that the high capital costs which have always plagued 
the nuclear industry have not been resolved, and these costs have prevented new nuclear construction 
projects from being completed. This thesis disputes this idea that the absence of substantial growth in 
nuclear energy and the failure of the nuclear renaissance can be attributed to any one action or event, 
such as the crisis at Fukushima or the high capital costs involved. Instead, it embraces the simple 
premise that a broad range of contextual factors must be explored in order to fully explain the failed 
renaissance. 
Finally, this thesis provides a contribution to knowledge through developing a rigorously detailed, 
empirical account of changes in nuclear energy policy from 1945 until the present day, with a particular 
focus on countries located in the regions of Western Europe and North America. A considerable amount 
of research has already focused on charting the history of nuclear energy programmes, documenting 
why and how civilian nuclear energy industries have developed.  While some studies have focused on 
investigating these issues at a global scale (Scurlock, 2010; Walls, 2011; Damian, 1992; Hammond, 
1996), the majority have focused on either one or a small number of case-study countries2. However, 
most of these studies were conducted prior to 1990, and therefore do not consider the many changes in 
nuclear energy policy that occurred over the past two decades3. One notable exception to this is recent 
work by Sovacool and Valentine (2012) into a comparative case-study analysis of the nuclear 
programmes of eight different countries across the globe. However, Sovacool and Valentine have only 
limited engagement with the nuclear renaissance as a phenomenon. In their aim to identify common 
factors which facilitate nuclear development, they pay less attention to the factors which contribute to 
the failure of civil nuclear energy programmes more broadly, or the failure of the nuclear renaissance 
in particular. 
                                                     
2 Previous research has contributed to charting the history of nuclear energy development in specific countries, 
such as the UK (Williams, 1980; Hall, 1986; Pocock, 1977; Gowing, 1974a; Gowing, 1974b; Parker and Surrey, 
1995), France (Scheinman, 1965; Fagnani and Moatti, 1984), Sweden (Nordhaus, 1997; Kåberger, 2007; James, 
1979; Wikdahl, 1991), Germany (Winnacker and Wirtz, 1979), Japan (Tolliday, 2012; Lesbirel, 1990; Pickett, 
2002), the US (Campbell, 1988), Turkey (Erdogdu, 2007), Republic of Korea (Park, 1992; Choi et al., 2009), 
Belgium (Laes et al., 2007), Finland (Litmanen, 2010; Kojo and Litmanen, 2009), and Ireland (Baker, 1988). 
Others have focused on charting and comparing the history of nuclear power across a small number of case study 
countries (DeLeon, 1980; Poneman, 1982; Goldemberg, 2009). 
3 While there are some exceptions to this, more recent studies have tended to focus on nuclear energy in developing 
countries and emerging nuclear markets, particularly the Middle East and Asia (Yi-chong, 2008; Ebinger and 
Squassoni, 2011; Erdogdu, 2007; Choi et al., 2009; Goldemberg, 2009). 
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This research therefore addresses this knowledge gap by providing an updated account of changes in 
nuclear energy policy from 1945 until the present day. These changes are primarily documented for the 
regions of Western Europe and North America, but contrasts are also be drawn with changes in nuclear 
energy policy over time in recent nuclear growth regions such as Asia and Central and Eastern Europe. 
In doing so, this thesis develops a more comprehensive understanding of how current nuclear energy 
policies have been developed and changed over time and between countries. 
THESIS STRUCTURE 
Following on from the Introduction, Chapter 2 of this thesis provides an overview of the three historical 
phases of global nuclear energy development. Chapter 3 outlines the research approach, analytical 
framework, methodology and methods that this thesis is based upon. Chapters 4-6 identify a range of 
‘nuclear-specific’ factors that have influenced the changing trajectory of nuclear energy development 
in the past, and that have contributed to the failure of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and 
North America. These are factors that relate specifically to the way in which agents think about and 
respond to the generation of nuclear power and the construction, operation and management of nuclear 
power facilities. For example, Chapter 4 argues that the costs and financial risks involved in 
constructing, operating and maintaining nuclear power plants has hindered the success of the nuclear 
renaissance. Chapter 5 argues that the disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear 
renaissance can be explained by an ideational shift whereby the ideas of nuclear power plant safety have 
become central to determining agents’ support or opposition for nuclear energy development. Similarly, 
Chapter 6 argues that an ideational shift in the way in which nuclear waste is perceived and prioritised 
as a policy problem has contributed to the failure of the nuclear renaissance. 
Chapters 7-10 identify a range of broader contextual shifts that help to explain why there has been a 
disconnection between the expectation and failure of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and 
North America. These contextual shifts do not relate specifically to nuclear development, but are instead 
broad changes that have fundamentally transformed the way in which agents think about and respond 
to the world around them. However, as these contextual shifts have shaped the way in which agents 
think and behave at a broad level, they have also in turn led to a shift in agents’ perceptions and 
behaviour towards nuclear energy in particular. These contextual shifts are not, however, directly or 
solely related to or emerging from the issue of nuclear power. While the thesis categorises and separates 
each explanatory factor for the sake of readability, given the mutually dynamic and interactive nature 
of both the nuclear-specific and the contextual factors that influence nuclear development, there is some 
degree of overlap in the content matter of these chapters. Wherever possible, links are drawn within 
each chapter between the way in which factors influence one another and the overarching trajectory of 
civil nuclear energy development. 
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Chapter 7 examines the rise of environmentalism as a broad contextual shift, and argues that the growing 
importance of environmental issues has created an ideational and institutional environment which 
hinders the expansion of civil nuclear energy programmes. Chapter 8 argues that a gradual decline in 
public trust in government has taken place throughout much of Western Europe and North America in 
the post-war era, and that this contextual shift has hindered the success of a nuclear renaissance by 
making it more challenging for governments to gain public approval for the construction of new nuclear 
reactors. Chapter 9 argues that the disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear 
renaissance in Western Europe and North American can be explained by an ideational shift whereby 
agents have become increasingly aware of and averse to the idea of ‘risk’. This has amplified public 
awareness of and opposition to the risks posed by nuclear power, and made it more difficult for the 
nuclear industry to gain a social license to operate. Chapter 10 details the growing influence of 
neoliberalism on government policy-making, and argues that the rise of neoliberal ideas has made 
governments less willing to directly fund and support nuclear energy development. This has impeded 
the success of a nuclear renaissance as the financial support that nuclear development has historically 
depended upon is no longer as forthcoming. Chapter 11 concludes the thesis by restating the major 
research findings, the limitations of the study, and providing recommendations for future research. Each 
of the nuclear-specific and contextual factors identified in this thesis as influencing civil nuclear energy 
development are listed in the table below, in addition to the relevant chapter in which the factor is 
discussed. 
Table 1: Factors Influencing the Changing Trajectory of Civil Nuclear Power 
FACTOR CHAPTER 
Nuclear-Specific Factors 
Economics of Nuclear Power Chapter 4 
Safety of Nuclear Power Chapter 5 
Nuclear Waste Chapter 6 
Contextual Factors 
Environmentalism Chapter 7 
Public Trust in Government Chapter 8 
Risk Perceptions Chapter 9 
Neoliberalism Chapter 10 
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2 .  TH E RISE ,  FA LL AN D  RENAIS SAN CE 
O F N U CLEA R ENERGY  
This thesis develops two core arguments. Firstly, that a nuclear renaissance has not taken place in 
Western Europe and North America. Secondly, that the failure of the nuclear renaissance in Western 
Europe and North America cannot be fully understood without examining the influence of wider 
institutional, ideational and contextual shifts over time. In order to develop both of these arguments, the 
purpose of this chapter is to provide a historical overview of the way in which civil nuclear energy 
programmes have been developed over time across the globe.   
The chapter begins by providing an overview of how nuclear energy development has changed from 
1945 until the present day. It delineates the history of nuclear energy into three phases: a rise, fall and 
expected renaissance of nuclear energy. Each phase is then explored in detail to examine when and 
where changes in the growth of civil nuclear energy have taken place. The third phase of nuclear energy 
development – the nuclear renaissance – is explored to the greatest extent in this chapter. This chapter 
speaks to the first argument of this thesis by establishing that there was in fact a widespread expectation 
that a nuclear renaissance would occur from 2000 onwards, and that much of this growth was expected 
to take place in the regions of Western Europe and North America. This is done by detailing statements 
made by members of the media, government, and the nuclear industry which indicated that a revival of 
nuclear power was imminent or already underway. Following this, the factors which caused the 
widespread belief in a nuclear renaissance to emerge are documented, as well as the changes which 
suggested that a nuclear renaissance was taking place. 
The changing trajectory of nuclear energy development from 2000 onwards is then examined to 
determine to what extent the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance has become a reality. From this analysis 
it becomes clear that there have been significant regional differences in nuclear new build since 2000. 
In particular, the majority of new nuclear development that has occurred since 2000 has been located 
in the regions of Asia and Central and Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, the regions that were expected to 
drive the nuclear renaissance – Western Europe and North America – have experienced only limited 
new nuclear development since 2000. Consequently, this chapter supports the first argument of this 
thesis by evidencing the disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance 
in Western Europe and North America. 
Furthermore, this chapter identifies and challenges the arguments that are often put forward for the 
reason as to why the nuclear renaissance appears to have failed in Western Europe and North America. 
Namely, that the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011 provoked rising public and political concerns over 
nuclear safety, or, that the high capital costs involved in developing nuclear facilities have prevented 
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nuclear new build from taking place. This chapter speaks to the second argument of this thesis by 
identifying the limitations of the existing explanations for the failure of the nuclear renaissance, and 
establishing the need for a more holistic examination of the nuclear renaissance that considers the 
influence of wider institutional, ideational and contextual shifts over time. 
THREE PHASES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 
The history of civil nuclear energy development can be delineated into three phases: a rise, fall, and 
expected renaissance of nuclear energy. The first phase, the rise of nuclear energy, began with the end 
of the Second World War in 1945 and continued to the mid-1970s. The second phase, the fall of nuclear 
energy, took place from the mid-1970s to the late 1990s. The final stage, the expected renaissance of 
nuclear energy, has occurred from 2000 onwards. A brief overview of each of these phases is provided 
in Table 1 below. 
Table 2: The Three Phases of Nuclear Energy Development 
Phase Year Key Events 
The Rise of 
Nuclear 
Energy 
1945 – 
mid-1970s 
 Military concerns drive early research into nuclear power 
 Civil applications of nuclear power gain attention in 1950s 
 First full-scale commercial nuclear power station opens in UK in 
1956 
 Widespread expansion of nuclear power begins in late 1950s and 
continues for two decades 
 Early expansion driven mainly by nuclear new build in Western 
Europe and North America 
The Fall of 
Nuclear 
Energy 
Mid-1970s – 
late 1990s 
 Global nuclear reactor construction starts peak in 1976, then 
steadily decline for two decades 
 Several countries in Western Europe implement bans on nuclear 
construction 
 Major nuclear disasters occur at Three Mile Island (1979) and 
Chernobyl (1986) 
 Nuclear reactor construction projects increasingly run over-budget 
and over-time 
 Increasing number of temporary suspensions, permanent 
shutdowns and cancellations of civil nuclear projects 
 Nuclear new build driven mainly by ‘first timer’ nuclear countries 
in Asia and Central and Eastern Europe 
The Nuclear 
Renaissance 
2000 onwards 
 Predictions of a ‘nuclear renaissance’ become increasingly pervasive 
in academic, political and journalistic discourse 
 Political support for nuclear power grows in Western Europe and 
North America 
 However, nuclear new build remains concentrated in the regions of 
Asia and Central and Eastern Europe 
 Fukushima nuclear disaster occurs in March 2011 
 Nuclear new build remains limited in Western Europe and North 
America 
 Disconnection between rhetoric and reality of a nuclear renaissance 
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For this thesis, the decision to classify nuclear energy development into the three stages of a rise, fall, 
and expected renaissance is derived from a wide-ranging literature review of documents detailing broad 
changes in policies and attitudes towards nuclear energy over time, as well as quantitative data from the 
International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Power Reactor Information System on global nuclear 
reactor construction starts over time4. As displayed in Figure 1 below, the number of global reactor 
construction starts from 1954 to 2011 reflects the three phases of a rise, fall, and apparent renaissance 
of nuclear energy. Each of these three phases are now explored in detail. 
Figure 1: Global Nuclear Reactor Construction Starts, 1954-2014 
 
Chart compiled using data from the IAEA (2014c) Power Reactor Information System 
THE RISE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY 
The first phase of nuclear energy development, the rise of nuclear energy, began with the detonation of 
the atomic bomb in 1945, and lasted until the mid-1970s. Although research into nuclear energy had 
                                                     
4 Data on global nuclear reactor construction starts has been chosen as the best indicator to demonstrate when 
changes in nuclear energy development took place. This is because, of the historical data available for nuclear 
development, nuclear reactor construction starts most closely represents the point in time at which decisions to 
build nuclear reactors are made. Alternative measures of nuclear energy development, such as the number of 
nuclear reactors in operation worldwide, are less effective at demonstrating when changes in nuclear energy 
development took place due to the significant time lag between the beginning of reactor construction and the point 
at which a nuclear reactor actually enters operation. This means that many of the nuclear reactors that entered 
operation in the mid-1980s emerged from policy decisions that had actually been made in the mid-1970s. For this 
reason, nuclear reactor construction starts has been chosen as the best available indicator for changes in nuclear 
energy development over time. While other measures of nuclear energy development, such new construction 
applications or approvals, would be useful in understanding changes in nuclear energy over time, global historical 
data for these measures is not publically available. 
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taken place since the early twentieth century, the bombing of Hiroshima dwarfed any previous attempt 
at harnessing the technology, revealing to the world the devastating potential of nuclear power to 
fundamentally alter human history. Nuclear power quickly became the quintessential symbol of 
modernity and scientific accomplishment, with governments scrambling to become leaders in nuclear 
research and technology. These research endeavours initially focused on military applications of atomic 
energy, with the first nuclear reactors in the US, the UK, China and the Soviet Union all constructed for 
the purpose of making weapons-grade plutonium used in atomic bombs (Scurlock, 2010: 24). The 
militaristic origins of nuclear power meant that early nuclear technologies were developed in an 
environment that was uniquely protected and supported. Countries competed to become world leaders 
in nuclear technology, in a race to dominate in the terrain of nuclear weapons systems. In the US, for 
example, the US Navy was committed to developing nuclear powered submarines. This ambition helped 
nuclear technologies to be developed quickly after the war (Cowan, 1990: 559). This militaristic origin 
of nuclear power had flow on-effects in terms of achieving technological advancements that would 
subsequently benefit the development of civil nuclear energy programmes. Only a handful of European 
countries, including Belgium, Norway, the Netherlands, and Sweden, initiated a nuclear research 
program without a specific military purpose (Camilleri, 1984: 8).   
By the early 1950s, the focus of nuclear power programmes was beginning to shift, with the potential 
for civil applications of nuclear technology receiving increasing attention. In 1951, the British 
government announced that it was changing its nuclear research program to emphasise the possibilities 
of nuclear energy for power generation (The New York Times, 1951: 5). Similar changes began to 
emerge in the US where, although the vast majority of atomic research was still focused on military 
applications, the potential for non-violent uses of nuclear power began to gain greater recognition. At 
the United Nations General Assembly in December 1953, US President Eisenhower delivered a speech 
on “Atoms for Peace”, urging the international community to switch their focus from military to 
peaceful uses of atomic energy. 
In 1954, the first instance of electricity produced from nuclear power to enter a power grid took place 
at the Obninsk Nuclear Power Plant in the former Soviet Union. Two years later, the first full-scale 
commercial nuclear power station, Calder Hall, was opened at Sellafield in England.  This was followed 
by the opening of the first full-scale commercial nuclear power plant constructed purely for civil 
purposes at Shippingport in the US in 1957. By the end of the 1950s, construction had begun on 43 
commercial nuclear power reactors worldwide (IAEA, 2014c). These reactors were primarily located 
in Western Europe and North America, with commercial reactors under construction in Belgium, 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Slovakia, Sweden, the UK, and the US. Nuclear reactors used 
purely for research purposes were also established in countries such as Denmark and Norway. By the 
end of the 1960s, the number of nuclear power reactors under construction had more than tripled, with 
139 reactor construction starts throughout the decade (IAEA, 2014c). During this time, construction on 
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commercial nuclear power reactors had also begun in Argentina, Armenia, India, Japan, Kazakhstan, 
the Netherlands, Pakistan, Spain, and Switzerland. Work began on constructing a nuclear power plant 
in Australia, but the project was abandoned only two years later. The exponential growth in nuclear 
development continued throughout the 1970s, with another 306 nuclear power reactor construction 
starts (IAEA, 2014c). This included new commercial nuclear power reactors under construction for the 
first time in Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Iran, Lithuania, Mexico, 
South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Ukraine (Eskom, 2014; IAEA, 2014c; WNA, 2014c; WNA, 
2014d; WNA, 2014f). The number of new reactor starts in a single year peaked at 42 in 1976, before 
entering a period of prolonged decline, never again coming close to this historical record (IAEA, 
2014c). By the end of 1976, of the 186 reactors that were in operation worldwide, 61 were located in 
the US, 33 in the UK, 16 in Russia, 15 in Germany, 13 in Japan, and 10 in France (IAEA, 2014c)5. 
THE FALL OF NUCLEAR ENERGY 
From the mid-1970s to the late 1990s, the growth of domestic civil nuclear energy programmes 
stagnated and declined. During this period, several countries that had been world leaders in developing 
the first civil nuclear energy programmes stopped approving new reactor construction sites (Küpper, 
2006: 156). Austria, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Sweden, and Switzerland decided to abandon their nuclear power programmes altogether, placing bans 
on new reactor construction, and either phasing out or immediately decommissioning existing reactors 
(Darst and Dawson, 2010; WNA, 2012b). Spain and the UK placed moratoriums on new reactor 
construction (Nuclear Industry Association, 2013; WNA, 2013d). Plans for the construction of nuclear 
reactors and power plants were cancelled in Azerbaijan, Belgium, Cuba, Egypt, Iran, the Philippines, 
Poland and Syria (WNA, 2013c; Tyler, 2000; Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2014; WNA, 2013a; The 
Economist, 2014; McGeown, 2011). In 1977, the West German state of North Rhine-Westphalia, 
implemented the equivalent to a moratorium on the construction of nuclear reactors until a safe method 
of nuclear waste disposal was discovered (Nossiter, 1977: 21). Following this, the West German Energy 
Minister, Hans Matthöfer, announced that the country’s nuclear energy programme would undergo a 
three to five year slowdown (Walter, 1977: 7). In July 1981, the French Government reduced the 
country’s nuclear power programme by one quarter (Webster, 1981: 5). 
The stagnating growth of nuclear energy programmes is evident in the steady decrease in nuclear reactor 
construction starts worldwide from the mid-1970s until the late 1990s (see Figure 1 above). After the 
peak of 42 reactor construction starts in 1976, this number steadily declined over the following two 
                                                     
5 The remaining reactors in operation were located in Canada (8), Sweden (5), Belgium (4), India (3), Italy (3), 
Spain (3), Switzerland (3), Bulgaria (2), The Netherlands (2), Argentina (1), Armenia (1), Kazakhstan (1), 
Pakistan (1), and Slovakia (1). 
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decades. The first year that construction did not begin on any new nuclear reactors worldwide was in 
1995. The total number of nuclear reactors connected to the grid globally from the mid-1980s onwards 
was only slightly larger than the number of reactors being retired (Walls, 2011: 13). In the US, no 
construction licenses were granted for nuclear reactors from 1978 until early 2012 (Marshall, 2012). In 
1979, the British government announced plans to order ten nuclear reactors over the period from 1982 
until 1992. However, the first reactor was not ordered until 1987, and plans to order the remaining 
reactors were cancelled two years later (Thomas, 2008: 13). From 1988-2002, France was the only 
country in Western Europe to begin construction on a new nuclear reactor (Darst and Dawson, 2010: 
51). The nuclear industry did, however, show some signs of life with construction beginning on the first 
nuclear reactors in Romania in 1982 and China in 1985 (IAEA, 2014c). 
In countries that did continue to maintain some form of nuclear power programme during this period, 
reactors frequently suffered construction delays and increased project lead times. As displayed in Figure 
2 below, the median construction time for nuclear reactors steadily increased from the mid-1960s 
onwards. Throughout the world, the median construction time of nuclear reactors almost doubled from 
57 months (almost 5 years) in the early 1960s, to 121 months (just over 10 years) in the late-1990s. This 
trend was evident in the US, where the amount of time it took to construct a nuclear reactor increased 
steadily from the 1970s through to the 1990s (Cooper, 2010: 18). Nuclear power plants constructed in 
the US that had received permits in the 1960s had an average lead time of roughly 6 years (Campbell, 
1988: 5). In comparison, US nuclear power plants that were issued with permits between 1971 and 1974 
experienced average lead times of almost 10 years (Campbell, 1988: 5). Examples of nuclear power 
plants which took far longer to construct than originally expected include the second nuclear unit at the 
Enrico Fermi Nuclear Generating Station, which was still not finished more than nine years after its 
scheduled completion date (The New York Times, 1980: D2). In 1968, the Long Island Lighting 
Company announced that it was applying for a construction permit for its planned Shoreham Nuclear 
Power Plant. Construction on the plant began five years later, but was not completed until the mid-
1980s – almost two decades after the initial construction application was lodged (Fagin, 2007).  
Similarly, an operating license was granted for the Seabrook nuclear plant almost seventeen years after 
utilities first sought permission for construction (Lippman, 1990: A11). 
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Figure 2: Median Construction Time For Nuclear Reactors Worldwide, 1961-2000 
 
Chart compiled using data from the IAEA (2014c) Power Reactor Information System 
In the UK, construction on four nuclear power stations ran a combined total of more than twenty-six 
years behind schedule (Cook, 1978: 17). The Dungeness B reactor entered commercial operation 
twenty-four years after construction began (Thomas, 2005: 7). In 1979, the British Government 
endorsed a plan to build a nuclear reactor at Sizewell, but construction did not begin until 1987, and the 
plant only entered commercial operation in 1995 (Thomas, 2005: 14). The Kalkar reactor in Germany 
was meant to be finished in 1979 but was not completed until 1985 (Done, 1982: 3). Even then, the 
reactor never became fully operational and was subsequently decommissioned (Mez and Doern, 2009: 
130). Reactor construction times in France remained at approximately five to six years from 1970 to 
1985, but then doubled from the mid-1980s onwards (Cooper, 2010: 18). 
Numerous nuclear plants that were under construction or already in operation were affected by 
temporary suspensions, permanent shutdowns and project cancellations. From 1970 to the late-1990s, 
more than two-thirds of all nuclear power plant orders were cancelled (Cohn, 1997: 127). The first 
cancellation of a nuclear reactor in the US took place in 1972 (US Department of Energy, 1983: 4). By 
1983, roughly 100 nuclear units had been cancelled at 56 sites – almost half of all orders placed (US 
Department of Energy, 1983: x). Throughout 1975, for every new reactor order placed in the US, there 
was the equivalent of approximately 25 cancellations or suspensions of other orders for nuclear projects 
(Tucker, 1976a: 3). In some instances, reactor orders were cancelled even after construction was more 
than 90 percent complete (Scurlock, 2010: 30). The Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant was permanently 
closed only five years after construction was completed, having never started commercial operations 
(Long Island Power Authority, 2013). After fifteen years of construction and at 85 percent complete, 
the Midland Nuclear Power Plant was converted to a gas-fired cogeneration plant (Ahearne et al., 2012: 
57 56
60
74
99
95
103
121
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
1961-1965 1966-1970 1971-1975 1976-1980 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000
M
ed
ia
n
 C
o
n
st
ru
ct
io
n
 T
im
e 
S
p
an
 (
m
o
n
th
s)
22 
  
52). In Germany, plans for nuclear reactors at Breisach and Wyhl were abandoned in the face of 
sustained public opposition (Surrey and Huggett, 1976: 298). The German government abandoned plans 
to build its first large nuclear fuel reprocessing plant at Wackersdorf in 1989, despite construction on 
the plant already being half-way completed (New Scientist, 1989). Germany’s Hamm-Uentrop nuclear 
reactor entered operation in 1983, but was shut down only six years later (Mez and Doern, 2009: 130). 
THE NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE 
This section establishes that there was a widespread expectation that a nuclear renaissance would occur 
from 2000 onwards, and that much of this growth was expected to take place in the regions of Western 
Europe and North America. It details the reasons why this expectation emerged, as well as the changes 
which suggested that a nuclear renaissance was taking place. Changes in nuclear energy development 
since 2000 are then examined to illustrate the absence of a nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and 
North America. Existing explanations for the failure of the nuclear renaissance in these regions are 
identified and challenged. 
A RENAISSANCE IS ANNOUNCED 
From 2000 onwards, an expectation emerged across the globe that nuclear energy was on the verge of 
entering a new phase of development. The potential for a resurgence of interest in nuclear energy was 
raised in the media intermittently throughout the 1980s and 1990s6. However, it was not until 2000 that 
the expectation of a nuclear renaissance gained momentum and entered government and industry 
discourse. The expectation of a nuclear renaissance is evident in statements made by members of the 
media, industry, government and academia, which increasingly referred to a ‘nuclear renaissance’ that 
was either about to begin or that was already underway. However, exactly what the nuclear renaissance 
was, or what would constitute a renaissance taking place, was rarely – if ever – defined in these 
statements. Rather, the term was broadly used to refer to a change in nuclear energy development that 
was defined by two key facets: 
1. That there would be a significant increase in the number of nuclear power plants being built. 
2. That this increase in nuclear power plant construction would be a global phenomenon. New 
nuclear build would take place in first-timer nuclear countries, as well as in countries with 
established nuclear programmes, many of which had long-suffered from stagnation and decline. 
                                                     
6 Nuttall (2008: 1) states that the term ‘nuclear renaissance’ was first used in an article by Charles Venyvesi in the 
US News and World Report in 1990, but that the phrase gained traction after it was used in an article in the Wall 
Street Journal in 1999. However, the idea of a nuclear renaissance can be traced back further to an article in The 
New York Times in 1981, which announced the Reagan administration’s plans for a ‘revival of nuclear power’ 
(Hershey Jr, 1981: A1). 
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This second facet is crucial to understanding why the emergence of the expectation of a nuclear 
renaissance was so significant, but is frequently overlooked in existing discussions and analysis of the 
nuclear renaissance. The significance of the nuclear renaissance was that much of the new nuclear 
growth was expected to take place in countries whose nuclear industries had been suffering from 
stagnation and decline. The vast majority of nuclear growth that had occurred during the 1980s and 
1990s was located in newly established or emerging ‘first-timer’ nuclear industries – countries that were 
only just beginning their civil nuclear energy programmes. These countries were primarily located in 
the regions of Asia and Central and Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, nuclear new build in Western Europe 
and North America – the regions that had driven the early development of nuclear power – was limited. 
Consequently, the expectation of a nuclear renaissance was significant because it was based not just on 
the assumption that the growth in Asia and Central and Eastern Europe would continue, but that new 
growth would also occur in Western Europe and North America. This new growth in more well-
established nuclear industries that had suffered a prolonged decline is what made the expectation of a 
nuclear renaissance so significant, and a stark turning point from the previous two and a half decades 
of nuclear history. 
The expectation that the nuclear renaissance was a global phenomenon, driven by growth in both first-
timer nuclear countries as well as countries with long-established nuclear programmes, was evident in 
numerous news articles. These articles varied in their assumption that the nuclear phenomenon was 
either just about to happen, had just started, or had already been underway for some time throughout 
the world. An article in The Economist (2006: 77) reported that “all over the world governments are 
rethinking the politics and economics of nuclear power. Energy analysts are speaking of a nuclear 
renaissance”. Journalists reported that “the world is on the brink of a second nuclear renaissance” (The 
Japan Times, 2008), that “the nuclear renaissance is spreading across the world” (RIA Novosti, 2008), 
the “global renaissance in nuclear energy is gaining momentum” (Ritch, 2005: A15), and that “the 
worldwide nuclear renaissance is gathering steam” (Hore-Lacy, 2006: 25). Others announced the 
imminent arrival of the nuclear renaissance with headlines such as “a nuclear renaissance dawns” 
(Business Korea, 2009), the “nuclear renaissance is alive” (Kansler, 2009), and that “nuclear power is 
ready for take-off” (Warren, 2006).  
Other news articles highlighted the presence of a nuclear renaissance in specific regions or countries, 
particularly in Europe and North America. Headlines announced that “Europe pioneers renaissance of 
nuclear power” (Emling, 2005) and “European nuclear industry in grip of revival” (Bream, 2009), while 
another article reported that “there is much evidence of renewed interest in nuclear power throughout 
the EU” (Berger, 2006). The presence of the renaissance in the UK was noted by headlines such as 
“Energy worries fuel UK nuclear renaissance” (New Zealand Herald, 2008), “UK’s nuclear renaissance 
takes another step forward” (ICIS, 2008), and “UK, US both advancing toward nuclear renaissance” 
(World Gas Intelligence, 2008). Similar statements were made about the renaissance in the US, with 
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headlines such as “Companies in race to provide fuel for US ‘nuclear renaissance’” (San Jose Mercury 
News, 2008). Articles reported that “the [nuclear] industry is enjoying a renaissance in the United 
States” (O'Reilly, 2009: 63) and that “the new enthusiasm for building reactors means America’s long-
awaited ‘nuclear renaissance’ is about to become reality” (The Economist, 2007: 81). The nuclear 
renaissance was said to be emerging in Canada, according to headlines such as “Canada is ready to ride 
the nuclear renaissance wave” (Canada NewsWire, 2009), and statements such as “the first tangible 
signs of the much-heralded renaissance are appearing in Canada” (Uranium Intelligence Weekly, 2008: 
1). 
Furthermore, enthusiasm for the nuclear renaissance was driven by numerous political leaders, nuclear 
industry representatives, and even notable environmental activists who made public statements in 
support of increased nuclear energy development. In Western Europe and North America, these 
statements were made by the highest levels of political leaders across the political spectrum. In the UK, 
successive Prime Ministers across both party lines have spoken in favour of nuclear power since the 
mid-2000s. Former Prime Minister Tony Blair advised the G8 industrialised nations that a “substantial 
renaissance of nuclear power” was necessary to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Del Buono, 2008: 
1), while his successor, Prime Minister Gordon Brown, was “convinced that we need a renaissance of 
nuclear power” (World Nuclear News, 2008: 1). More recently, Prime Minister David Cameron 
described the development of the Hinkley Point C nuclear power station as “a very big day for our 
country”, declaring that it would be the first of many new nuclear power stations in the UK (The Daily 
Mail, 2013: 1). The UK Energy Minister, Charles Hendry, announced that “we are on the brink of the 
biggest nuclear renaissance since the 1950s” (Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2011: 1). The 
UK Business Secretary, John Hutton, declared that Britain could become “the gateway to a new nuclear 
renaissance across Europe” (Sparrow and Wintour, 2008: 1). Elsewhere in Western Europe, the 
expectation of a nuclear renaissance was evident when French President Nicolas Sarkozy hosted an 
International Conference on Access to Civil Nuclear Energy in 2010. A conference press release stated 
that the “international ‘nuclear renaissance’ calls for resolute action by those States who, like France, 
believe that nuclear energy can provide a sustainable solution for their growing energy needs” 
(Ministère de l'Écologie du Développement durable et de l'Énergie, 2010). 
Similar enthusiasm for the nuclear renaissance was evident in statements made by government 
representatives and political leaders in North America. During his Presidency, George W. Bush 
indicated his support for a nuclear renaissance, stating that “nuclear power is going to be an essential 
source…of future electricity for the United States” (Manor, 2006: 1). Chair of the Senate Energy 
Committee, Pete Domenici, announced that the “nuclear renaissance is alive in America” (US Senate 
Committee on Energy & Natural Resources, 2006: 1), while the Chairman of the US Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Dale E. Klein, proclaimed that the “nuclear renaissance is here” (Baltimore, 2007: 1). 
Dennis Spurgeon, the US Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy stated that “the prospects for nuclear 
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energy are more promising today than at any time since its development” (Lovell, 2007: 1). In a report 
on Securing America’s Energy Future, the Committee on Government Reform of the US House of 
Representatives asserted that “nuclear energy must become the primary generator of baseload 
electricity” (US House of Representatives, 2006: 3). In Canada, the former Natural Resources Minister, 
Gary Lunn, announced that “we’ve seen a nuclear renaissance around the globe” (Geddes, 2007: 1). 
Statements by nuclear industry representatives demonstrated an equal level of enthusiasm for a nuclear 
renaissance. In 2002, the Chairman of the World Nuclear Association (WNA) stated that “a [nuclear] 
renaissance has been underway for a year or so” (MacLachlan, 2002: 1). The Chief Executive of 
France’s AREVA Nuclear Plants asserted that “we are convinced about the nuclear renaissance” 
(Pagnamenta, 2009: 1), while the President of AREVA UK stated that “the UK is now a key market, 
both for new build and waste management, as the international nuclear renaissance gets under way” 
(AREVA, 2008: 1). When discussing the construction of the first Generation III EPR nuclear reactor in 
Finland, the CEO of AREVA SA stated that the reactor’s construction “turns into reality the nuclear 
renaissance” (Erkheikki, 2005: 1). The CEO of Duke Energy declared that “we’re going to have a 
renaissance, no matter what” (Hiltzik, 2012: 1). The President of USEC Inc., a global supplier of nuclear 
fuel, stated that “a renaissance is underway in the nuclear power industry” (USEC, 2006: 1). The latest 
reactor design from Westinghouse, the AP1000 nuclear reactor, was marketed with the slogan “the 
renaissance starts here” (Westinghouse Electric Company, 2007).  
The President of the Nuclear Energy Institute proclaimed that “we are in every sense experiencing a 
nuclear renaissance in the United States” (Nuclear Energy Institute, 2002: 1). The Director General of 
the World Nuclear Association declared that a “nuclear renaissance is now gearing up everywhere in 
the world” (Tagliabue, 2007: 1). The Vice President for Business Development at Cameco, the world’s 
largest publicly traded uranium company, stated that “the nuclear renaissance is gaining momentum” 
(Broad and Sanger, 2006: 1). The Vice President of the American Nuclear Society asserted that “the 
renaissance of nuclear power in the United States is inevitable” (Foulke, 2002: 2). The Chairman of the 
World Association of Nuclear Operators wrote that the “nuclear renaissance is under way” (Cavanaugh, 
2006: 10). The President of the Canadian Nuclear Association lobby group stated that “we are seeing a 
renaissance in the building of nuclear reactors” (McKenna, 1992: B2). Westinghouse, an American 
nuclear power company, issued a statement announcing its intentions for “playing a major part in the 
UK’s nuclear renaissance” (Lancashire Evening Post, 2006: 1). A representative for General Electric’s 
nuclear division in the US stated that the “success of the nation’s current operating fleet is responsible 
for today’s nuclear renaissance” (Hansen, 2006: 18). The Chief Executive of EDF Energy described the 
British government’s announcement of a new generation of nuclear power stations as “an opportunity 
for the UK to be at the vanguard of the nuclear renaissance” (Crooks, 2008: 1). 
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It is important to note, however, that there was not an entirely universal consensus that a renaissance 
was going to occur. In 2003, the International Energy Agency produced their World Energy Outlook, 
which stated that there is “a limited role for nuclear power over the next thirty years” because of 
“unfavourable economics” and governments unwilling to support nuclear power due to ongoing public 
opposition (International Energy Agency, 2003: 429). The World Energy Outlook 2004 continued with 
this prediction, warning that nuclear energy “will decline progressively” because it cannot compete with 
other energy technologies (International Energy Agency, 2004: 61). A World Nuclear Industry Status 
Report has been released by independent consultants on a regular basis from 1992 until 2015. 
Throughout each of these publications, the authors have maintained a consistent argument that the 
reality of global nuclear energy development does not match the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance7. The 
authors cite multiple factors which have prevented a nuclear expansion from taking place, including 
ongoing public opposition to nuclear power, declining economic conditions, rising costs of constructing 
nuclear power plants, an inability to compete with other energy sources, reduced electricity demand, 
and supply chain issues (including manufacturing bottlenecks and lack of a skilled workforce). Yet 
despite these warnings, media, government and industry discourse was heavily dominated by the 
assumption that a nuclear renaissance was inevitable. 
WHY THE EXPECTATION EMERGED 
The expectation of an oncoming nuclear renaissance emerged as a result of several factors which created 
a more favourable political environment for nuclear energy. These factors were also invoked by 
advocates of nuclear energy to justify the need for and inevitability of a nuclear renaissance. These 
factors include: 
a) The emergence of climate change onto the global policy agenda and the reframing of nuclear 
power as a ‘green’ and sustainable source of energy; 
b) Growing concerns around ensuring security of energy supply; 
c) Increasing global energy demands; 
d) Improvements in nuclear reactor designs; 
e) Sustained improvements in nuclear power plant safety and operating performance; and 
f) Lobbying and public relation efforts by the nuclear industry to increase public and political 
support for nuclear energy. 
                                                     
7 The World Nuclear Industry Status Report (1992: 2, 18) predicted that “worldwide nuclear expansion will slow 
to a trickle”, and that “nuclear power is fading, slowly but surely, as a realistic future energy option”. The World 
Nuclear Industry Status Report (2004: 9) concluded that there is “still no sign of a ‘nuclear revival’”. The World 
Nuclear Industry Status Report (2007: 10) predicted that “the number of nuclear power plants operating in the 
world will most likely decline over the next two decades with a rather shaper decline to be expected after 2020”. 
The World Nuclear Industry Status Report (2009: 7) stated that “there is as yet no obvious sign that the 
international nuclear industry could eventually turn the empirically evident decline into a promising future”. 
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CLIMATE CHANGE AND ‘GREEN’ ENERGY 
Since the early 1990s, climate change has emerged as one of the most pressing environmental issues on 
the global policy agenda, and subsequently became one of the primary justifications for a revival of 
interest in nuclear energy. The most significant international agreement to combating climate change, 
the Kyoto Protocol, stipulates mandatory targets for its signatories to reduce their greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions. With over fifty countries ratifying the protocol, a global demand was created for 
affordable, low carbon-emitting fuel sources that would still be capable of meeting ever-increasing 
predictions of energy consumption. Advocates of nuclear energy capitalised on this demand by 
deliberately reframing and promoting nuclear power as a clean, efficient, and sustainable source of 
electricity generation (Bickerstaff et al., 2008; Doyle, 2011). In particular, they emphasise the low GHG 
emissions of nuclear power which can assist governments with meeting their emissions targets. When 
the entire lifecycle of nuclear power plants is considered, the GHG emissions produced per unit of 
electricity are at least two orders of magnitude below corresponding emissions from fossil fuel energy 
chains, and are comparable to most renewables at almost zero (Sims et al., 2003: 1317). The 
contribution of nuclear power to reducing GHG emissions is said to have already been proven, with the 
operation of nuclear power plants to date having saved roughly 10 percent of total carbon emissions 
from world energy use (Adamantiades and Kessides, 2009: 5151). The issue of climate change and the 
‘green’ credentials of nuclear power were invoked by governments worldwide as a justification for 
investment in the nuclear energy sector (see Chapter 7 for a detailed discussion of the statements made 
by policymakers invoking climate change as a key justification for a nuclear renaissance). 
ENERGY SECURITY 
A key factor which influenced the emergence of expectations that a nuclear renaissance would occur 
was a growing concern over security of energy supply. While energy security is by no means a new 
issue confronting governments, geo-political instability and potential disruption of supply has 
highlighted the complexity and vulnerability of energy systems when dependent on foreign fuel sources. 
In particular, the oil crises of 1973 and 1979 caused oil prices to sky-rocket, demonstrating to 
governments the necessity of diversifying fuel sources and reducing dependence on fuel imports. For 
countries with limited indigenous energy reserves, such as France and Japan, the oil crises were 
fundamental to the rapid development of their nuclear industries (Walls, 2011: 10). More recently, 
political turmoil in Russia and its effects on natural gas imports to Europe has similarly prompted 
countries to revisit nuclear power as an alternative, more secure form of energy. In 2006 and 2009, 
fragile relations between Russia and its neighbours resulted in interruptions in the flow of natural gas 
to several countries in Europe (Pirani et al., 2009: 8). Then, in 2010, Russian gas exports to Europe 
were again curtailed due to severe cold weather conditions increasing Russia’s domestic demand 
(Torello and Robinson, 2012). Growing concerns over dependence on Russian gas supplies have since 
28 
  
prompted several countries to consider diversifying their energy portfolios by developing their nuclear 
industries, including Lithuania, Ukraine, Turkey, and Belarus (The Baltic Times, 2012; WNA, 2014k; 
Peker, 2011; Ram, 2007). In Finland, fears of over-reliance on Russian gas imports led the government 
to consider plans to double the country’s nuclear capacity (Pohjanpalo and ben-Aaron, 2010). The 
British Government’s long-term nuclear energy strategy described nuclear power as “vital for our 
energy security” (Department of Energy and Climate Change [DECC], 2013: 18). In the US, President 
George W. Bush stated that “for the sake of economic security and national security, the United States 
must aggressively move forward with construction of nuclear power plants” (Baker and Mufson, 2006). 
ENERGY DEMAND 
Reports of rising global energy demands contributed to an increasingly favourable political climate for 
a revival of nuclear energy. In 2001, the US Energy Secretary, Spencer Abraham, warned that the 
country was “on the brink of the greatest energy crisis we’ve had in the last twenty years” (Elliott, 
2001). Global oil and gas giant ExxonMobil (2012: 7) predicted that world energy demand will increase 
by about 30 percent from 2010 to 2040, with non-OECD energy demand rising by nearly 60 percent. 
Similar projections have been released by the International Energy Agency (2012: 49), indicating that 
global energy demand would increase by over one-third by 2035. In the face of escalating demands, 
countries are considering nuclear power as a source of reliable, large-scale civilian electricity 
generation. In 2007, Egypt announced that it would build several nuclear power plants to meet the 
growing energy demands of its citizens (Fleishman, 2007). The British government placed nuclear 
power at the centre of its plans to solve a looming energy crisis in 2006 (Gardiner, 2006). In a speech 
outlining the economic and energy challenges facing the country, US President George W. Bush 
highlighted the need for an expanded role for nuclear power in order to meet growing energy demands, 
stating that “our Nation will need more electricity—more safe, clean, reliable electricity. It is time for 
this country to start building nuclear powerplants again” (Bush, 2005b). 
NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND REACTOR DESIGNS 
Contributing to the growing expectations of a nuclear renaissance were promises of a new range of 
nuclear reactor designs and technologies that would be safer, more efficient and more affordable than 
existing models. Nuclear reactor technologies have evolved from Generation I reactors through to 
Generation IV. The majority of reactors presently in use are either Generation II or III. Generation III+ 
reactors were developed as an improved version of the Generation III reactors. Generation IV reactors 
are currently being researched and developed and will not be available for commercial construction at 
least until 2020-30 (Grimston and Beck, 2002: 191). It is the Generation III+ and IV reactors that 
multinational nuclear vendors have advertised as being key to the future of nuclear power. These 
systems are expected to offer a range of advantages over previous generations of reactors through 
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innovations with alternative fuel cycles (Hultman, 2011: 400). It is these potential advantages of a new 
generation of reactors that have been influential in sparking enthusiasm for a nuclear renaissance, 
promising to address the health and safety concerns that have plagued the industry since the disasters 
at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl (Adamantiades and Kessides, 2009: 5157). In 2002, the US 
government launched its Nuclear 2010 programme on the basis that Generation III+ reactor designs 
would “result in lower and more predictable construction and operating costs” (Thomas, 2012a: 52). 
France and the US have plans to construct Generation IV systems (Van Goethem, 2008: 9). Statements 
made by political leaders in support of a nuclear renaissance on the grounds of improved reactor designs 
are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
The revival of interest in nuclear energy has also been influenced by the development of small and 
medium nuclear reactors, including small modular reactors. Smaller nuclear reactor units are expected 
to overcome many of the problems plaguing nuclear energy development through lower capital costs, 
simpler designs, shorter construction periods, reduced siting costs, and enhanced levels of safety (IAEA, 
2014b). Small reactors offer flexibility for smaller or growing electricity grids, as they can be built 
independently or as modules within a larger complex, where individual reactors can be added 
incrementally as required (WNA, 2014m). 
IMPROVED SAFETY AND OPERATING PERFORMANCE 
An increasingly favourable political environment for nuclear energy was created as a result of improved 
safety and operating performance of nuclear power plants. As a result of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, 
the World Association of Nuclear Operators was created to foster a global safety culture, and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency’s approach to plant safety underwent significant reforms 
(Adamantiades and Kessides, 2009: 5154). These organisations have since worked to improve plant 
safety by creating transnational networks and exchanges for continuous and results-oriented peer review 
of plant safety practices (WNA, 2013h). Significant improvements have also occurred in the operating 
performance of nuclear reactors, making plants more productive and increasing their annual revenues. 
US nuclear plants have significantly improved their performance over the past 25 years, achieving 
record figures for production and efficiency (Howard, 2006). Meanwhile, the average capacity factor 
(a measure of plant efficiency) for nuclear power plants in the US has risen from 56.3 percent in 1980 
to 86.4 percent in 2012 (Nuclear Energy Institute, 2013; WNA, 2014j). In comparison, the leading 
source of US electricity generation, coal, recorded a capacity factor of 55.3 percent in 2012. These 
improvements in production and efficiency have contributed to making nuclear power an increasingly 
attractive energy option. 
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LOBBYING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS CAMPAIGNS 
The expectation of a nuclear renaissance was encouraged by lobbying and public relations campaigning 
conducted by the nuclear industry. From the late 1990s onwards, pro-nuclear companies and lobby 
groups invested in extensive marketing campaigns to convince voters and politicians of the need for a 
nuclear renaissance. The US nuclear industry is reported to have invested over $600m from 2000-2010 
in lobbying efforts to convince the government of the need for nuclear energy, in addition to a further 
$63m spent on campaign contributions (Sovacool, 2011: 259). Energy Solutions, a nuclear waste 
management companies in the US, ran television advertisements targeted at the general public which 
portrayed nuclear energy as safe and environmentally friendly (Daley, 2006). In 2006, a ‘nuclear 
renaissance’ themed advertising campaign was run by the US nuclear industry to support President 
Bush’s nuclear energy initiative and to increase public support for nuclear new build (Fialka, 2006). 
The Nuclear Energy Institute launched a newspaper, radio, and web-based campaign to convince the 
public and politicians of nuclear energy’s economic value, its contribution to the country’s energy 
security, and its environmental credentials (Nuclear Energy Institute, 2010). In Germany, multiple 
nuclear companies ran full-page newspaper advertisements to convince voters that the nuclear industry 
was necessary for Germany’s energy security (Dempsey, 2010). 
FROM EXPECTATION TO REALITY? 
The idea that a nuclear renaissance was about to become a reality became increasingly credible as 
political and public support for nuclear energy strengthened. Advocates of the nuclear renaissance 
pointed to the following changes as indicators that the nuclear renaissance was about to take place: 
a) Eleven countries with existing nuclear power programmes set targets to rapidly expand their 
nuclear power generating capacities; 
b) Six countries which had previously agreed to terminate their usage of nuclear power began to 
reconsider or reverse their policy positions; 
c) At least forty-five countries which did not yet have any operating nuclear reactors demonstrated 
interest in developing a civil nuclear power programme; and 
d) Opinion polls suggested possible growth in public support for nuclear power. 
EXPANSION OF EXISTING NUCLEAR PROGRAMMES 
The expectation of a nuclear renaissance emerged not just from rhetoric, but from countries undertaking 
steps to increase their civil nuclear energy capacities. Ambitious growth targets and expansion plans 
were set for several countries with existing civil nuclear power programmes. China expected to extend 
its nuclear power production from 2 percent of total electricity capacity in 2009 to 5 percent by 2020, 
and then to 10 percent by 2040 to 2050 (Ebinger and Squassoni, 2011: 105). South Korea planned to 
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increase its nuclear capacity to 59 percent of electricity generation by 2030, with eleven new reactors 
to come online from 2012 to 2021 (WNA, 2014h). India aimed to grow its nuclear capacities to provide 
25 percent of electricity from nuclear power by 2050 (WNA, 2014e). Russia set an ambitious growth 
target of 50 percent increased nuclear outputs by 2020, with ten reactors currently under active 
construction (WNA, 2013g). In 2010, the Japanese government planned to build eight new nuclear 
reactors by 2020 (Cyranoski, 2010). Construction approval was granted for nuclear reactors in several 
countries where the nuclear industry had been in decline for decades, such as the US, UK, France and 
Finland (Reuters, 2007; Lester and Rosner, 2009; Erlanger, 2008; BBC News, 2013d). Kazakhstan 
considered constructing a new nuclear power plant, where the country’s only nuclear plant was closed 
in 1999 (World Nuclear News, 2012b). In the Ukraine, an intergovernmental agreement was made with 
Russia to finish construction of a nuclear reactor that had previously been abandoned (WNA, 2014k). 
RE-EVALUATION OF ANTI-NUCLEAR POLICIES 
From 2000 onwards, several countries which had existing nuclear phase-out policies, or which opposed 
the development of nuclear power altogether, began to reconsider or reverse their policy positions. Italy, 
a country which had closed down all its nuclear plants in the aftermath of Chernobyl, witnessed a change 
in policy direction with the new pro-nuclear government announcing plans for a substantial new nuclear 
build program in 2008 (WNA, 2012a). In Belgium, a planned phase-out of nuclear energy was 
postponed for ten years (World Nuclear News, 2009b). Sweden’s parliament voted to overturn a ban on 
construction of new nuclear power plants which had been in place since 1980 (Harrell, 2010). A 
moratorium had been placed on new nuclear plants in Spain since 1994, yet license renewals continued 
to be granted for existing nuclear power plants (WNA, 2013d). The Netherlands had previously decided 
to close its only nuclear power plant by 2003. However, during 2003, the Dutch government decided to 
change the plant’s closure date to 2013, effectively abandoning the phase-out plan (WNA, 2012b). Even 
Germany, which was committed to phasing-out nuclear energy by 2023, looked like it could potentially 
reverse its position. The German coalition government that was elected in September 2009 was heavily 
committed to rescinding the existing phase-out policy, and successfully negotiated for license 
extensions to be granted to the plants currently in operation (Connolly, 2010). 
POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENT OF NEW NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMMES 
The expectation of a nuclear renaissance was also supported by figures from the WNA (2013a) which 
indicated that over forty-five countries that did not use nuclear energy were seriously considering the 
development of a domestic nuclear power program. In Asia, plans for the establishment of a civil 
nuclear power programme were being considered in the Philippines and Thailand  (France-Presse, 2010; 
Thongrung, 2013), and in-principle approval for developing nuclear power was been granted in 
Malaysia (Nuclear Power Daily, 2010). More definitive plans for the establishment of a civil nuclear 
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energy programme were announced in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Mongolia, and Vietnam (Shen, 2011; 
Energy Daily, 2007; Antara News, 2011; Dawson, 2011). In South America, the establishment of civil 
nuclear power was being considered in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Suriname and 
Uruguay (Mallén, 2014: 1; Campbell, 2010; Crooks, 2007; Squassoni, 2009a; Reuters, 2009d; Cairo, 
2007). Plans for the establishment of nuclear power were announced in Brazil and Venezuela (Xinhua, 
2008; Cancel, 2009). In the Middle East, Israel, Jordan and Syria were considering the use of nuclear 
power (Horner, 2010; Kennedy, 2011; Dahl, 2011). Plans for the construction of the first nuclear 
reactors were announced in Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (BBC News, 2006; 
Bitar, 2010; Reuters, 2011; Inajima and Okada, 2010). In Africa, the use of nuclear power was being 
considered in Angola, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, 
Tunisia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe (Reuters, 2009c; World Nuclear News, 2007b; de Queiroz, 2007; 
Reuters, 2010; Sisay, 2013; Mushekwe, 2013; Modern Ghana, 2008; Reuters, 2009b; Balile, 2003). 
Plans for the establishment of a nuclear programme were announced in Algeria and South Africa 
(Reuters, 2009a; Flak, 2011). In Europe, plans for the establishment of a civil nuclear energy 
programme were being considered in Moldova (New Europe, 2003), and were announced in Albania, 
Belarus, Croatia, Estonia, Poland, and Turkey (WNA, 2014g; Tere, 2009; WNA, 2013b; World Nuclear 
News, 2009a).   
INCREASED PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY 
Advocates of the nuclear renaissance argued that global opinion polls were demonstrating growing 
public acceptance and support for nuclear energy (Blowers, 2010: xii). A survey conducted for the 
International Atomic Energy Agency in 2005 found that the majority (62 percent) of respondents 
support the continued use of existing nuclear power plants, but an almost equal amount of respondents 
(59 percent) do not favour new nuclear plants being built (Globescan Incorporated, 2005: 6). A survey 
conducted in 2009 by the management company Accenture of more than 10,000 people in 20 different 
countries found that over two-thirds of the respondents believe their countries should start using or 
increase their use of nuclear energy (Nuclear Energy Institute, 2009: 1). However, attitudes towards 
nuclear power continue to differ greatly by region and by country, with support for nuclear power 
increasing over the past decade primarily in Europe, Japan and the United States (OECD Nuclear 
Energy Agency, 2010c). Public opinion on nuclear power is explored in more detail in Chapters 5, 6 
and 8 of this thesis. 
THE FAILED RENAISSANCE 
While there was clearly a widespread resurgence of interest in nuclear energy from 2000 onwards, 
interest alone is not enough to constitute a nuclear renaissance taking place. An examination of the 
degree of growth in nuclear energy development from 2000 onwards suggests that, in spite of the 
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rhetoric, a global nuclear renaissance did not take place. Since nuclear energy was first commercialised, 
the total installed nuclear capacity worldwide has decreased only six times, and all within the past 15 
years (in 1997, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2011) (Schneider et al., 2012: 13). Similarly, since the first 
nuclear plant began operating, 2008 was the only year where there has been no new nuclear power 
plants connected to the grid (IAEA, 2014c). While there has been some growth in global nuclear 
capacity, the amount of growth has been marginal at best, and has not reached anywhere near the various 
optimistic predictions made in the early 2000s. Indeed, the rate of growth has been so small that nuclear 
energy as a portion of commercial electricity generation worldwide has decreased from 17 percent in 
1993 to 11 percent in 2011 (Schneider et al., 2012: 10). In addition, the increase in global nuclear 
generation has been sustained primarily due to technical alterations, productivity improvements and 
lifetime extensions at existing nuclear power plants, rather than new reactors entering operation 
(Schneider et al., 2012: 10, 13; Heffron, 2013: 255). 
Furthermore, the growth that has taken place in nuclear energy since 2000 has primarily occurred in the 
regions of Far East Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, and the Middle East and South Asia. This is 
illustrated in Figure 3 below, which details the number of nuclear power reactors under construction by 
region from 1954-2014 (excluding cancelled or suspended projects). As illustrated in Figure 3, the 
height of civil nuclear expansion occurred in 1979, when there were 185 nuclear reactors under 
construction worldwide. Of these reactors, 68 were located in Western Europe, and 62 in North 
America. The remaining reactors were located in Central and Eastern Europe (31), Far East Asia (12), 
Latin America (5), Middle East and South Asia (5), and Africa (2). However, to date, the construction 
of nuclear reactors during the renaissance period has not come close to these figures. The highest 
number of reactors under construction in any one year from 2000 onwards was in 2013, when there 
were 72 reactors under construction worldwide. Moreover, the regional dispersion of the nuclear new 
build undertaken in 2013 is far different from the record number of reactors under construction in 1979. 
More than half of the nuclear reactors under construction in 2013 were located in Far East Asia (38). 
The remainder were located in Central and Eastern Europe (15), Middle East and South Asia (10), North 
America (5), Latin America (2), and Western Europe (2). 
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Figure 3: Nuclear Power Reactors Under Construction by Region, 1954-2014 
 
Chart compiled using data from the IAEA (2014c) Power Reactor Information System 
 
Several conclusions can be drawn from these figures. Firstly, new nuclear build that has taken place 
since 2000 has not yet come close to the levels of expansion that were present in the 1960s and 1970s, 
nor is there little indication that this will occur in future. The International Energy Agency has halved 
their predictions for the world’s nuclear generating capacity by 2035 (The Economist, 2011a). In spite 
of all the interest expressed by non-nuclear countries in developing a nuclear program, only one 
previously non-nuclear country – Iran – has actually started a commercial nuclear power program, with 
one reactor that had been in construction since 1975 (Schneider et al., 2012: 4). This suggests that the 
rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance – a widespread expansion of nuclear power akin to that experienced in 
the early period of civil nuclear energy development – has not become a reality. 
Secondly, new nuclear build during the renaissance period has been heavily concentrated in the regions 
of Far East Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, and the Middle East and South Asia. However, even 
within these regions, the idea of a widespread nuclear renaissance taking place is problematic. The new 
reactor construction starts that have begun in these regions since 2000 have been heavily concentrated 
within a small number of countries. Of the 72 reactors under construction worldwide at the end of 2013 
(excluding cancelled or suspended projects), more than three-quarters of them were located in just five 
countries – China (29 reactors), Russia (10 reactors), India (6 reactors), South Korea (5 reactors) and 
the United States (5 reactors)8. That said, even South Korea, one of the few countries to have expanded 
their nuclear programme during the renaissance period, has recently announced that it will significantly 
                                                     
8 The remaining reactors under construction at the end of 2013 were located in Japan (2), Pakistan (2), Slovakia 
(2), Taiwan (2), Ukraine (2), the UAE (1), Argentina (1), Belarus (1), Brazil (1), Finland (1), and France (1).  
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reduce its planned target for reliance on nuclear energy from a planned 41 percent of total power supply 
in 2030 to only 29 percent by 2035 (Voice of Russia, 2014). 
A third conclusion can be drawn from the data on nuclear reactor construction starts since 2000, which 
is that a nuclear renaissance has failed to take place in Western Europe and North America. This is 
particularly significant given that political rhetoric and enthusiasm for the nuclear renaissance was the 
strongest in these regions, and that a revival of nuclear power in these regions was a key criteria that 
underpinned the expectation of a nuclear renaissance. However, the reality of the nuclear renaissance 
in Western Europe and North America is that many plans for nuclear new build have been abandoned. 
Since 2000, reactor construction projects have been suspended or abolished in the UK, France, Bulgaria, 
Canada and the US (Findlay, 2010: 12; Schneider et al., 2012: 4). Similarly, several countries in these 
regions which had earlier showed signs of reversing their anti-nuclear policy positions have chosen not 
to do so, such as Germany, Switzerland, and Italy (Breidthardt, 2011; Stuart, 2011; WNA 2013e). 
Belgium has also abandoned its plans for expanding its nuclear industry (WNA 2013c). 
The absence of a nuclear renaissance in Western Europe is evidenced by a decline in the share of 
electricity produced by nuclear power, as opposed to alternative energy sources. From 2000 to 2014, 
the EU witnessed a net increase in the capacity of power plants driven by renewable energy, such as 
wind power plants (116.8GW increase) and solar power plants (87.9GW), as well as natural gas power 
plants (101.6GW) (Schneider et al., 2015: 96). Meanwhile, the net change in capacity of nuclear power 
plants decreased by 13 GW, as did that of coal and fuel oil (by 25 GW each) (Schneider et al., 2015: 
96). Table 3 below details the percentage of electricity generated by nuclear power as a share of total 
energy production by country from 1985-2013. As can be seen from this table, most countries in 
Western Europe have witnessed a decrease in the share of electricity generated by nuclear power. The 
only exceptions to this trend are France and, to a lesser extent, Sweden (where the share of electricity 
generated by nuclear power in 2013 is only marginally higher than it was in 1985). In North America, 
both Canada and the US have experienced an increase in the share of electricity produced by nuclear 
power from 1985-2013. However, looking specifically at the renaissance period (from 2000 onwards), 
the story changes slightly, with the US instead experiencing a slight decrease in their share of nuclear-
generated electricity. On the other hand, most countries with nuclear programmes in the regions of 
Africa, Central and Eastern Europe, Far East Asia, the Middle East and South Asia, and Latin America 
have experienced an increase in their share of nuclear-generated electricity from 1985-2013.  
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Table 3: Nuclear-Generated Electricity as a Percentage of Total Electricity Generation by 
Country, 1985-2013 
 
Table compiled using data from the IAEA (2014c) Power Reactor Information System 
 
#? 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2012 2013
Africa
South Africa 4.2 5.6 6.5 6.6 5.5 5.2 5.1 5.7
Latin America
Argentina 11.7 19.8 11.8 7.3 6.9 5.9 4.7 4.4
Brazil 1.6 1 1 1.9 2.5 3.1 3.1 2.8
Mexico NA 2.6 6 3.9 5 3.6 4.7 4.6
North America
Canada 12.7 14.8 17.3 11.8 14.5 15.1 15.3 16
United States 15.5 20.6 22.5 19.8 19.3 19.6 19 19.4
Far East Asia
China NA NA 1.2 1.2 2 1.8 2 2.1
Japan 22.7 27.1 33.4 33.8 29.3 29.2 2.1 1.7
Republic of Korea 23.2 49.1 36.1 40.7 44.7 32.2 30.4 27.6
Taiwan 52.4 38.3 28.8 21.2 17.9 19.3 18.4 19.1
India 2.2 2.2 1.9 3.1 2.8 2.8 3.6 3.5
Iran NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.6 1.5
Pakistan 1 1.1 0.9 1.6 2.8 2.6 5.3 4.4
Armenia NA NA NA 33 42.7 39.4 26.6 29.2
Bulgaria 31.6 35.7 46.4 45 44.1 33.1 31.6 30.7
Czech Republic NA NA 20 18.7 30.5 33.3 35.3 35.9
Hungary 23.6 51.4 42.3 40.6 37.2 42.1 45.9 50.7
Kazakhstan NA NA 0.1 0 NA 0 NA NA
Lithuania NA NA 86.1 73.9 70.3 0 0 NA
Romania NA NA NA 10.9 8.6 19.5 19.4 19.8
Russia NA NA 11.8 15 15.8 17.1 17.8 17.5
Slovakia NA NA 44.1 53.4 56.1 51.8 53.8 51.7
Slovenia NA NA 39.5 37.4 42.4 37.3 36 33.6
Ukraine NA NA 37.8 47.3 48.5 48.1 46.2 43.6
Western Europe
Belgium 59.8 60.1 55.5 56.8 55.6 51.2 51 52.1
Finland 38.2 35 29.9 32.2 32.9 28.4 32.6 33.3
France 64.8 74.5 76.1 76.4 78.5 74.1 74.8 73.3
Germany 31.2 33.1 29.6 30.6 26.6 22.6 16.1 15.4
Italy 3.8 0 NA 0 NA NA NA NA
Netherlands 6.1 4.8 4.9 4.3 3.9 3.4 4.4 2.8
Spain 24 35.9 34.1 27.6 19.6 20.1 20.5 19.7
Sweden 42.3 45.9 46.6 39 44.9 38.1 38.1 42.7
Switzerland 39.8 42.6 39.9 38.2 38 38 35.9 36.4
United Kingdom 19.6 19.7 25.4 21.9 20 15.5 18.7 18.3
Middle East and South Asia
Central and Eastern Europe
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Over time, however, it became increasingly clear that the reality of nuclear energy development was 
not reflecting the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance. Already from 2010, political commentators began 
pronouncing the nuclear renaissance to have failed, or to never have existed at all. Headlines described 
the nuclear renaissance as a “myth” (Financial Chronicle, 2010: 1) and as having “failed to materialize” 
(Wald, 2010: 1). An article in The Economist branded nuclear energy as “the dream that failed”, 
concluding that “the promise of a global [nuclear] transformation is gone” (The Economist, 2012: 1). 
An article in The Telegraph described the nuclear renaissance as “heading the same way as Thatcher’s 
nuclear rebirth – down the drain” (Warner, 2012). Another headline affirmed that “North America’s 
‘nuclear renaissance’ grinds to a halt”. The Australian Broadcasting Corporation (2012: 1) reported that 
“a so-called nuclear renaissance seems further away than ever”. The nuclear renaissance was described 
as “just a fairy tale” that was “based on rhetoric” (Bradford, 2013: 1), while others stated that the 
“nuclear industry ‘rebirth’ is instead stillborn” (Becker, 2012). In a report to their investors, analysts 
from the US investment research firm, Morningstar, professed that “we think new-build nuclear in the 
West is dead” (McMahon, 2013). Former Nuclear Regulatory Commissioner Peter Bradford stated that 
“two forthcoming projects are all that remain of a 31-reactor fantasy fleet that was said to constitute the 
real nuclear renaissance as recently as early 2009” (Hiruo, 2012: 13). 
The failure of the nuclear renaissance was further confirmed by the conclusions of several high-profile 
international energy reports. The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013 described the nuclear 
renaissance as “all in ruins now” (Schneider et al., 2013: 4). A presentation by the International Energy 
Agency on the World Energy Outlook 2014 stated that there is “no nuclear renaissance in sight” (IEA 
2014: 11). The World Energy Council’s (WEC) World Energy Resources 2013 Survey stated that 
“globally, the nuclear industry is in decline” (World Energy Council, 2013: 4.6). This was followed by 
the 2014 World Energy Resources Issue Monitor, which highlighted the absence of a nuclear 
renaissance in Europe and North America. The report noted that “we currently do not see signals for 
short-term investment in new nuclear projects” for the European region (World Energy Council, 2014: 
27), and that North America is “unlikely to see new coal or nuclear plants until 2025” (World Energy 
Council, 2014: 33). 
In the US, government rhetoric supporting nuclear energy became more muted after the Fukushima 
disaster. Several representatives made statements declaring that the nuclear renaissance had failed. US 
Senator Jim Inhofe (2014) stated in a committee hearing that “We thought a nuclear renaissance was 
coming. It did not”. When discussing the state of nuclear energy development in America, former NRC 
commissioner Peter Bradford stated that “two forthcoming projects are all that remain of a 31-reactor 
fantasy fleet that was said to constitute the real nuclear renaissance as recently as early 2009” (Hiruo, 
2012: 13). The US State of the Union (SOTU) addresses, wherein the incumbent President provides a 
keynote speech outlining the government’s political and legislative agenda for the upcoming year, made 
by President George W. Bush in 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008 and made by President Barack Obama in 
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2010 and 2011 all contained positive statements about the continued use of nuclear energy for civil 
purposes (Bush, 2005a; 2006; 2007; 2008; Obama, 2010; 2011). However, civil nuclear energy has 
received no mention whatsoever in the SOTU addresses post-Fukushima. 
Journalists and political commentators have attributed the failure of the nuclear renaissance to the events 
at Fukushima, Japan on 11 March 2011. Following a 9.0 magnitude earthquake, a 15-metre tsunami 
struck the east coast of Japan, causing extensive damage to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. 
The tsunami crippled the plant’s power and cooling systems, causing full meltdowns in three of the 
plant’s six reactors (CNN, 2011). Prior to Fukushima, there had never been any member of the general 
public killed as a direct result of a nuclear reactor in an OECD country (Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation, 2011). While there have not yet been any deaths as a direct result of radiation exposure 
from the accident, it has been reported that at least six workers have been exposed to radiation levels 
that exceed the lifetime legal limits (Vergano, 2011). Meanwhile, the World Health Organization 
released a draft report in November 2011 which concluded that there will be no significant increases in 
cancer cases as a result of radiation from the Fukushima disaster (Oiwa, 2012). In December 2011, 
Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda announced the power plant had successfully been stabilised, although 
it would take up to forty years to completely decontaminate the plant and surrounding areas (BBC 
News, 2011b). 
Despite these assurances, Fukushima reignited fears over nuclear safety and prompted governments to 
conduct safety reviews into their nuclear programmes (Elliott, 2013). The case of Germany is typically 
cited as evidence of how Fukushima was the ultimate downfall of the nuclear renaissance. Following 
the Fukushima disaster, the German government declared an immediate three-month moratorium on 
any nuclear power plans. All seven nuclear power plants that had begun operating prior to 1980, in 
addition to another plant that began operations in 1984, were temporarily shut-down (Kanter and 
Dempsey, 2011: 1). In May 2011, the Reactor Safety Commission concluded that all of Germany’s 
nuclear reactors were safe. In spite of this, and in the face of growing pressure from large-scale public 
demonstrations and from anti-nuclear federal states, the government reinstated the previous nuclear 
phase-out policy to close all reactors by 2022. The eight reactors that were already temporarily closed 
as part of the moratorium were declared as permanently closed. Chancellor Angela Merkel defended 
her decision by arguing that her views on nuclear safety had changed since Fukushima, which she 
described as a “turning point in the history of the industrial world” (The Economist, 2011b). 
Governments elsewhere followed the German example by announcing their decision to abandon nuclear 
expansion plans as a result of Fukushima. Two months after Fukushima, Switzerland suspended the 
approvals process for new reactors, which then became a permanent ban on nuclear development. Italy 
held a referendum on nuclear power in June 2011 which forced the government to abandon plans for 
future nuclear development (BBC News, 2011a). In 2012, the Belgian government announced the 
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accelerated closure of two nuclear reactors (Levitan, 2011). The Japanese government announced in 
2012 that it would phase-out all of its operating nuclear reactors by 2040 (although this decision has 
since been overturned) (McCurry, 2013). Nuclear development plans were delayed in Indonesia and 
Thailand, and abandoned in Kuwait and Bahrain as a result of Fukushima (TradeArabia, 2012: 10; The 
Japan Times, 2012; Phetcharatana, 2011). Even though the US government continued to affirm its 
support for nuclear power, several nuclear projects were delayed or cancelled in the wake of Fukushima 
(Elliott, 2013: 56). For example, NRG Energy announced that it would abandon plans for the 
development of two new nuclear units at the South Texas Project as a result of Fukushima (Business 
Wire, 2011). 
The Fukushima crisis was heralded in the media as the ultimate downfall of the nuclear renaissance. A 
headline in the German newspaper Der Spiegel read “Fukushima Marks the End of the Nuclear Era”, 
likening the events to the “9/11 of the nuclear industry” (Der Spiegel, 2011: 1). An article in the Energy 
Economist stated that Fukushima may be the “end of the nuclear renaissance in the West” (Thomas, 
2012b: 6). The resurgence of interest in nuclear power was said to have “ended as soon it started, 
completely buried by the disaster at the Fukushima 1 nuclear power plant” (The Voice of Russia, 2011: 
1). Fukushima was described as the “coup de grâce” for the renaissance (Quiggin, 2012: 1), with others 
declaring that the “era of nuclear renaissance is over. The Fukushima shock marks the beginning of the 
‘nuclear ice age’” (Takahashi, 2011: 1). An article in The Japan Times stated that “the triple meltdown 
at Fukushima…has set in motion the renaissance of nuclear power in reverse” (Chellaney, 2014). 
A second argument that has been put forward to explain the absence of a nuclear renaissance is the 
financial problems faced by nuclear new build. The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2013 stated 
that “the nuclear promoters’ invention that a global nuclear renaissance was flourishing until 3/11 is 
equally false: Fukushima only added to already grave problems, starting with poor economics” 
(Schneider et al., 2013: 6). Senior Research Fellow at Vermont Law School, Mark Cooper (2013: 2), 
argues that “the ‘nuclear renaissance’ never got off the ground in the United States because the cost of 
power from nuclear reactors is substantially higher than other low carbon alternatives available”. 
Professor Stephen Thomas at the University of Greenwich argues that “the Fukushima disaster serves 
to underline the problems the nuclear industry was already facing” such as the industry “failing to 
deliver the promises made” about new reactor designs that “would be cheaper and easier to build than 
their predecessors” (Thomas, 2012a: 54). Peter Bradford, former US Nuclear Regulatory 
Commissioner, stated that “the fundamental problem was the renaissance was always economically 
unsound” (Smith, 2013a). Christopher Paine, the nuclear program director at the US Natural Resources 
Defence Council, has stated that, for the nuclear renaissance, the “primary obstacle has been and 
remains the financial cost” (James, 2010). 
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However, there has not yet been a systematic analysis into why there is a disjuncture between the 
rhetoric and reality of the nuclear renaissance. Assuming that the renaissance has failed in Western 
Europe and North American simply because of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, or because of the 
challenging economics of nuclear power, is problematic for several reasons. Firstly, while Fukushima 
undoubtedly reminded the global public of the dangers associated with nuclear power, the events at 
Fukushima fail to explain why there was so little evidence of growth or real action towards expanding 
nuclear power programmes prior to 2011. The lack of growth in nuclear energy prior to 2011 is difficult 
to explain given that the arguments for reinvesting in nuclear energy (primarily the need to address 
climate change and the need to improve energy security) were so widely accepted. These policy 
problems that had originally underpinned government justifications for expanding their nuclear energy 
programmes prior to 2011 have not become any less salient. Consequently, the lack of growth in nuclear 
energy development prior to 2011 remains unexplained. 
Secondly, the global applicability of the safety and cost arguments for the failure of the renaissance 
means that neither argument is sufficient for explaining the regional differences in nuclear energy 
development since 2000. Neither argument provides sufficient explanation for why some countries – 
primarily those located in Asia and Central and Eastern Europe – have expanded their civil nuclear 
energy capacities 2000, while other countries – primarily those located in Western Europe and North 
America – have not. The high capital costs required for constructing nuclear power plants is a problem 
that faces all new nuclear projects, and yet this has not deterred some countries from continuing to push 
on with expanding their civil nuclear energy programmes. News of the Fukushima nuclear disaster 
reignited public concerns over nuclear safety throughout the globe. Some countries have responded to 
these concerns by abandoning their plans for nuclear new build, while others have not. Consequently, 
an alternative explanation is needed, one that goes beyond simply blaming finances or Fukushima, for 
why there is a disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance in Western 
Europe and North America. 
Furthermore, the safety and cost arguments for the failure of the nuclear renaissance are problematic in 
that they are mono-causal, failing to consider the various causal factors that could potentially influence 
nuclear energy development. These arguments are also problematic as they are a-historical, failing to 
locate recent changes in nuclear development within its broader historical context. Consequently, 
neither the Fukushima nor the economics explanations for the failure of the nuclear renaissance are 
sufficient to explain the regional variations in nuclear development since 2000. A systematic analysis 
into the factors influencing the failure of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America 
is therefore required. 
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3 .  RES EA RCH  D ESI GN  
This chapter details the research design of this thesis. This study is founded upon a problem-centred 
approach to research which places an empirical puzzle, rather than a theoretical framework, as its 
starting point. The empirical puzzle that this thesis examines is to understand why the expectation of a 
nuclear renaissance has failed to produce a widespread expansion of civil nuclear energy development 
in the regions of Western Europe and North America. A problem-centred approach to research informs 
all aspects of the research design. Agents in Context Historical Institutionalism is used as an analytical 
framework to understand how a broad range of factors – including agents, contexts, structures, 
institutions and ideas – influence civil nuclear energy development and nuclear energy policy decisions. 
Comparatively informed historical analysis is used as the methodology to inform the research strategy. 
Comparatively informed historical analysis is undertaken to examine the way in which processes unfold 
over time, and the way in which the uniqueness of different eras can impact upon the variables and 
outcomes under examination. Data collection and analysis are conducted using qualitative research 
methods. The data is collected primarily from a wide-ranging document analysis, and is supplemented 
by semi-structured interviews with experts in the area of civil nuclear energy development. This chapter 
provides a more detailed account of each of these components of the research design. 
RESEARCH APPROACH 
This thesis adopts what Shapiro (2005) defines as a “problem-centred” approach to research. Problem-
centred research begins by identifying a problem or puzzle that exists. Previous attempts to explain the 
problem are canvassed, including any gaps, limitations or inconsistencies within the pre-existing body 
of research. Based on this information, a decision is then made as to whether further study should be 
undertaken. If further study is undertaken, the parameters of the research problem under investigation 
are determined, and the most appropriate methods to best analyse the problem are chosen. The methods 
of data collection that are chosen can be drawn from any discipline, as a problem-centred approach is 
not bound to any particular body of theory. What is most important is that each stage of the research 
process is tailored to the nature of the question under investigation. 
The problem-centred approach differs from the more traditional research approaches which are driven 
by a pre-determined theory or paradigm. Scholars who begin their research with a pre-determined theory 
are guided by a specific set of a priori assumptions that underpin their research questions, methods, 
analysis and interpretation of their findings. The use of a single theoretical lens to examine an issue can 
result in problems being excessively simplified or framed to fit with the theory’s predefined principles 
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and argument. This approach is problematic because it can produce ‘blind spots’, where findings or 
alternative explanations that do not conform to the chosen paradigm are typically marginalised or 
ignored. In their work on analytic eclecticism, Sil and Katzenstein (2010: 2) take issue with the dangers 
of paradigm-bound research, warning that “scholarly discourse risks becoming dominated by self-
referential academic debates at the expense of addressing the complexities and messiness of everyday 
problems”. 
The problem-centred approach, on the other hand, avoids these limitations by locating a problem, rather 
than a theory, as its starting point. Following this, the most appropriate theory or selection of theories 
can be chosen that are best suited to the nature of the problem under investigation. In doing so, the 
problem-based approach does not automatically prioritise one theoretical or methodological approach 
as fundamentally superior to another. It is not limited by the a priori constraints and assumptions of a 
particular paradigm. Instead, it allows for connections to be made between theories, narratives and ideas 
that are normally considered and applied separately from one another. This counters the weaknesses 
apparent in any one paradigm, while allowing for a broader range of possible explanations to be 
considered. By focusing on a problem rather than strengthening or discrediting any one theory, problem-
centred research tends to prioritise the practical, ‘real world’ relevance of an empirical puzzle, and 
avoids engaging in purely abstract, theoretical debates (Katzenstein and Okawara, 2002: 183). As a 
result, problem-centred research is more likely to produce research findings and conclusions that are 
practically relevant for policymakers. Problem-based research develops empirically-grounded and 
evidence-based insights that can help policymakers to negotiate the complex political and social 
challenges that they face. Consequently, a problem-centred approach is well-suited for making sense of 
the complexities of nuclear energy policy, and for understanding why there is a disconnection between 
the rhetoric and reality of a nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America. 
In accordance with the problem-centred approach, this thesis has started with the identification of an 
empirical problem – to understand why there is little evidence to suggest that the rhetoric of a nuclear 
renaissance has generated a widespread expansion of civil nuclear power in Western Europe and North 
America. Following this, existing explanations for the research problem under investigation were 
canvassed. Two explanations were identified as being commonly cited for the failure of the nuclear 
renaissance: firstly, that the Fukushima nuclear disaster eroded public and political support for nuclear 
power, and secondly, that the renaissance failed due to the ongoing financial problems faced by nuclear 
new build. These explanations are explored in more detail in Chapter 2. However, in canvassing the 
existing explanations for the failure of the nuclear renaissance, it became clear that a systematic analysis 
into the disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance had not yet been 
undertaken. Such an analysis is necessary given that simply blaming Fukushima or the economic 
problems of nuclear power does not explain the regional variation in nuclear development during the 
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renaissance period. The global applicability of the safety and cost arguments for the failure of the 
renaissance means that neither argument provides sufficient explanation for why some countries – 
primarily those located in Asia and Central and Eastern Europe – have expanded their civil nuclear 
energy capacities 2000, while other countries – primarily those located in Western Europe and North 
America – have not. Moreover, the events at Fukushima fail to explain why there was so little evidence 
of growth or real action towards expanding nuclear power programmes prior to 2011. The lack of 
growth in nuclear energy prior to 2011 is difficult to explain given that the policy problems that had 
originally underpinned government justifications for expanding their nuclear energy programmes prior 
to 2011 have not gone away. Consequently, the lack of growth in nuclear energy development prior to 
2011 remains unexplained. In addition, both the Fukushima and the economic explanations for the 
failure of the nuclear renaissance are problematic in that they are mono-causal (failing to consider the 
various causal factors that could potentially influence nuclear energy development) and a-historical 
(failing to locate recent changes in nuclear development within its broader historical context). 
Consequently, a systematic analysis is needed to explain why there is a disconnection between the 
expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance in the regions of Western Europe and North America 
since 2000. 
Western Europe and North America have been chosen as the regions under investigation for this thesis 
for several reasons. Firstly, they are the regions where statements about the need for and inevitability 
of a nuclear renaissance were made by the highest level of political leaders, and therefore where the 
expectation of a nuclear renaissance taking place was greatest. Secondly, these regions contain most of 
the longest-standing nuclear industries, and it is these very industries which were meant to be revived 
in order to bring about a “renaissance” of nuclear power. Thirdly, these regions were chosen as 
academic and journalistic discussion to date has tended to focus on the reasons why the nuclear 
renaissance has been successful in a small number of countries – with little academic discussion taking 
place as to why the expectation of a nuclear renaissance has been unsuccessful in regions such as 
Western Europe and North America. The reasons for choosing Western Europe and North America as 
the focus of this study are discussed in greater detail further in this chapter, in ‘Regions Under 
Investigation’. 
In taking a regional approach to investigating nuclear energy development, there is an inevitable trade-
off in terms of the depth of the information that would be gathered in adopting a country specific 
approach. That is, by focusing on the regions of Western Europe and North America, this study is 
unable to take into account all of the individual nuances of the different experiences of nuclear 
development that has occurred within the individual countries within these regions. This limitation has, 
wherever possible, been negated by highlighting individual country experiences and also by recognising 
instances where individual countries within these regions have had experiences of nuclear development 
that differ from the broader regional experience. However, the regional focus of this study has meant 
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that it has not been able to comprehensively capture the reasons why some countries (such as Germany) 
have recently adopted staunchly anti-nuclear policy position, while other countries (such as France and 
the UK) continue to maintain a much more pro-nuclear policy position. Moreover, it does not capture 
all the country-specific historical differences, such as the extent to which different countries have 
historically relied upon nuclear power and the path dependency that this can create for contemporary 
nuclear policy9. 
Despite the regional approach, two countries in Western Europe and North America have been explored 
in greater detail than any other – the UK and the US. There are several reasons for this emphasis. The 
political rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance was strongest in these two countries, where political leaders 
at the highest level of government across multiple administrations and competing political parties made 
public statements in support of a nuclear renaissance. Furthermore, the existing body of literature 
discussing nuclear energy development focuses largely on the experiences of the US and the UK – and 
as such, the greatest amount of information for analysis was available for these two countries, 
particularly for historical information on nuclear development in the 1950s and 1960s. 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
In order to investigate the empirical puzzle at the heart of this research project – understanding the 
disjuncture between the rhetoric and reality of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North 
America – an analytical framework was needed that would facilitate the development of a broader 
perspective on the nuclear renaissance than is currently present in the nuclear debate. As explained in 
Chapter 2, existing explanations for the failure of the nuclear renaissance have tended to argue either 
that the Fukushima nuclear renaissance reignited public and political concerns over nuclear safety 
(thereby prompting governments to waver in their support for nuclear new build), or, that the ongoing 
problems of high capital costs and financial risks involved in new nuclear projects has prevented a 
renaissance from taking place. These explanations are problematic as they are mono-causal, a-historical, 
and fail to explain regional variation in nuclear development. Consequently, an analytical framework is 
needed that helps to facilitate the identification of a broader range of factors that can affect nuclear 
energy development and nuclear energy policy decisions, as well as recognising the interactions and 
interdependencies between these factors. An analytical framework was also needed that would 
complement the holistic and inductive nature of problem-centred research, by recognising that history 
matters – that nuclear energy development in its present state cannot be analysed in isolation from its 
                                                     
9 For example, France has long adopted one of the most enthusiastic nuclear policy positions throughout Western 
Europe. While it has recently set a target to reduce its dependence on nuclear power from 75% to 50%, the 
country’s high reliance on nuclear power over the past several decades means that achieving this target may prove 
challenging. Nevertheless, the regional focus of this thesis means that it cannot comprehensively engage with or 
consider these country-specific developments. 
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long and turbulent past. With these considerations in mind, an expansive version of historical 
institutionalism that was developed by Bell (2011, 2012) and Bell and Hindmoor (2014), known as 
‘Agents in Context Historical Institutionalism’ (AiC-HI) was chosen to guide the analysis of the 
research questions. The following section provides an overview of historical institutionalism, 
demonstrate how historical institutionalism supports the examination of the research questions, and 
describes the way in which historical institutionalism is used for this research project. 
HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM 
Historical institutionalism was chosen as an appropriate analytical framework for understanding the 
disjuncture between the rhetoric and reality of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North 
America. In particular, the work by Bell (2011, 2012) and Bell and Hindmoor (2014) on historical 
institutionalism has been central to the development of the analytical framework used in this thesis.  
Historical institutionalism emerged as one of three major variants of ‘new institutionalism’. Whereas 
‘old’ versions of institutional theory had focused on examining the role of formal and established 
political, legal and administrative organisations, new institutionalism adopts a broader interpretation of 
what constitutes an ‘institution’. While still recognising the importance of formal institutions and 
organisations, new institutionalists focused more on the way in which rules, norms, conventions and 
procedures shape agents’ preferences, interests and behaviour (Cairney, 2012: 69-70). Therefore, within 
this thesis, an institution is defined as “the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” 
(North, 1990: 3). In accordance with this new approach to institutional theory, historical institutionalism 
seeks to understand the relationship between institutions and the way in which they structure behaviour 
and influence policy outcomes. This is an objective shared with other branches of new institutionalism 
such as rational choice and sociological institutionalism (Steinmo, 2008: 126). There are, however, 
several key features of historical institutionalism which differentiate it from other institutional 
approaches. Pierson and Skocpol (2002) identify three of these features, including a focus on analysing 
“real-world” problems, an explicit recognition that “history matters”, and an appreciation of the 
influence of contextual conditions. 
One of the key features of historical institutionalism is a tendency to analyse “big” and “real-world” 
empirical problems and questions (Ma, 2007: 63). Consequently, historical institutionalism works well 
with the problem-centred research approach used in this thesis and the “real-world” nature of the 
problem under investigation. Historical institutionalists usually begin the research process by 
identifying a rare or unexplained event or outcome that is “puzzling” in some way (Pierson and Skocpol, 
2002: 696; Steinmo, 2008: 134). One way in which these puzzles are identified is by noting flaws or 
inconsistencies in existing academic or popular explanations for the phenomenon (Pierson and Skocpol, 
2002: 697). The types of empirical puzzles that historical institutionalists seek to explain also tend to 
be of interest beyond the academic realm. Historical institutionalists try to avoid engaging in academic 
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“navel gazing” by instead focusing on research problems that are of practical relevance to policymakers 
and the general public as well as to their academic cohort (Pierson and Skocpol 2002: 697). This focus 
on real world problems makes historical institutionalism well-suited for examining patterns and 
variations of policy development over time and across countries (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 10), and is 
therefore particularly well suited for examining the changing trajectory of civil nuclear energy 
development. 
The second key feature of historical institutionalism is the explicit recognition that “history matters” 
when analysing processes and outcomes of institutional change. Historical institutionalists see politics 
and history as an evolving, dynamic process, and are therefore interested in the way in which history 
itself shapes institutional change and policy outcomes (Steinmo, 2008: 135). Consequently, policy 
development must be examined as an “unfolding historical process”, where the reasons for why and 
how policy decisions are made are more complex than a simple isolated “moment of policy choice” 
(Pierson, 2005: 36, 42). When a policy choice is examined at a singular point in time, it produces a 
“snapshot” perspective that typically emphasises the immediate and short-term triggers for why that 
particular decision was made (Pierson 1994: 4). In doing so, a snap-shot perspective of policy 
development risks ignoring the influence of factors whose influence only becomes evident over a longer 
time period. As Pierson (2005: 40) argues, snap-shot interpretations of policy events overlook the fact 
that “long, slow erosion of the status quo may be a crucial factor in generating policy change. What 
may seem like a relatively rapid process of reform is in fact only the final stage of a process that has in 
fact been under way for an extended period”. A snapshot perspective also overlooks the impact of 
previously enacted policies and their legacies, or ‘path dependency’, whereby previous policy choices 
can create ‘increasing returns’, ‘self-reinforcing sequences’ or ‘positive feedback’ processes that make 
it increasingly difficult over time to change the policy course (Pierson, 2000; Mahoney, 2000). 
Therefore, by placing “politics in time”, historical institutionalists recognise the continuing influence 
of past events on current issues. This idea has informed the development of this research project in its 
recognition that the outcome of the nuclear renaissance cannot be understood without appreciating the 
ongoing influence of historical developments specific to nuclear power, as well as broader contextual 
changes over time.  
The third core feature of historical institutionalism identified by Pierson and Skocpol (2002: 706) is an 
appreciation of contextual conditions. Rather than focusing on a single institution or process to explain 
change, historical institutionalists argue that “institutional arrangements cannot be understood in 
isolation from the political and social setting in which they are embedded” (Thelen, 1999: 384). Tilly 
and Goodin (2006: 4) note that political behaviour and production of policy outcomes “depend heavily 
on the contexts within which they occur”. Context can refer to a wide range of variables, including 
political, social, economic, cultural, structural, historical, discursive, and institutional context. This 
thesis acknowledges the importance of context in understanding policy change by examining the 
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influence of four broad post-war contextual shifts on the changing trajectory of nuclear energy 
development, as illustrated in Chapters 7-10. Recognising the importance of contextual influences on 
institutional change is, however, a relatively new development in historical institutionalist theory. 
Earlier versions of institutional theory and historical institutionalism in particular have been criticised 
for portraying institutions as overly constraining, deterministic and resistant to change (Schmidt, 2010: 
2; Blyth, 1997: 230; Bell, 2011; Bell and Feng, 2014; Bell and Hindmoor, 2014). Thelen and Steinmo 
(1992: 16) argue that a “critical inadequacy of institutionalist analysis has been a tendency towards 
mechanical, static accounts that largely bracket the issue of change and sometimes lapse inadvertently 
into institutional determinism”. Such accounts portray institutions as overly “sticky” and resistant to 
change, even when critical changes in external conditions take place (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 18). 
Bell (2011: 890) criticises sticky institutional theory for being overly structuralist, and relying 
excessively on concepts of path dependency and exogenous shocks when explaining institutional stasis 
and change. The new-found appreciation for contextual conditions influencing institutional change has 
therefore been a step in the right direction towards developing a broader and more flexible version of 
historical institutionalism. However, scholars have identified several other considerations which have 
been overlooked by overly sticky versions of historical institutionalism. 
One of the major criticisms of sticky versions of historical institutionalism is that it obscures the role of 
individual agency. Steinmo (2008: 133) argues that one major weakness of institutional theory is its 
tendency to portray agents as “simple hostages of the institutions they inhabit”. In doing so, historical 
institutionalism assumes that individual agents will unquestioningly abide by the institutional 
constraints imposed upon them (Peters, 2012: 83). While agents are shaped and constrained by 
institutions, this assumed view overlooks the fact that agents also actively negotiate, influence and 
reconfigure the institutions themselves (Bell, 2002). Schmidt (2008: 314) criticises historical 
institutionalism for subordinating agency to structure, arguing that this perspective ignores the ability 
of agents to “think, speak, and act outside their institutions even as they are inside them, to deliberate 
about institutional rules even as they use them, and to persuade one another to change those institutions 
or to maintain them”. These criticisms highlight the need for a more expansive version of historical 
institutionalism which accounts for considerations of agency. 
Early versions of historical institutionalism have also been criticised for failing to systematically and 
comprehensively acknowledge the role of ideas in shaping political and policy decisions (Campbell, 
1998; Hay and Wincott, 1998; Blyth, 2001; Béland, 2005; Béland, 2007; Béland, 2009; Amenta and 
Ramsey, 2010: 24; Immergut and Anderson, 2008: 357). Fortunately, more recent institutionalist 
scholarship has begun to give greater recognition to the role of ideas in producing political outcomes. 
Ideas can broadly refer to policy paradigms, world views, ideologies, frames, normative frameworks, 
beliefs, visions and traditions (Cairney, 2012: 223). Ideas can influence the decisions of policy-makers, 
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but policy-makers can also actively promote and strengthen ideas. Béland (2009) identifies three ways 
in which ideas can influence the policy-making process, and which must therefore be incorporated into 
historical institutional approach. Firstly, ideational processes can influence which issues make it on the 
policy agenda. Ideas can then be highly influential in limiting the range of options of solutions that are 
available to policy-makers. Finally, policy actors can use ideas to ‘frame’ policy decisions and persuade 
the public of their legitimacy. Blyth (2001: 4) characterises ideas as “weapons” which agents can deploy 
in order to “restructure existing institutional arrangements by defining not only the causes of a 
perceived…problem but also the solutions for dealing with it”. Having recognised the importance of 
ideas in influencing crucial aspects of policy development, Béland (2005: 2) argues that in order to 
“address the theoretical limitations of historical institutionalism…researchers should put together a 
coherent model aimed at understanding the specific role of policy ideas while acknowledging the impact 
of policy legacies and formal political institutions”. This thesis explicitly recognises the importance of 
ideas when examining the way in which both ‘nuclear-specific’ factors (Chapters 4-6) and broader 
contextual shifts (Chapters 7-10) have influenced the changing trajectory of civil nuclear energy 
development. 
AGENTS IN CONTEXT HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM 
A more expansive version of historical institutionalism has been developed by Bell (2011, 2012) and 
Bell and Hindmoor (2014). Bell and Hindmoor are critical of excessively sticky or deterministic 
interpretations of historical institutionalism, which overlook the role of agency in influencing 
institutional and political change. They have therefore developed a more flexible version of historical 
institutionalism that integrates a broader range of causal variables. More specifically, they have 
developed a version of historical institutionalism that examines the impact of formal and informal 
institutions, agents, ideas, context and structures, but which crucially does not privilege any one of these 
variables over another. Rather, Bell (2011: 899) sees these variables as “operating in a dialectical, 
mutually constitutive relationship over time”. This perspective departs from the traditional historical 
institutionalist assumption that institutions determine the behaviour of agents. Rather, institutionally-
situated agents are perceived as being able to actively negotiate and exert influence over their reality, 
and thereby take part in reproducing or reshaping institutions. Agents and institutions are therefore 
perceived as “mutually shaping” one another over time, without one ever wholly determining the 
behaviour or outcomes of the other. The ability for institutions and agents to shape one another is also 
mediated by ideas, as ideational contexts can shape agents’ interests and preferences, and incentivise 
particular behaviours and actions. Agents are also seen to be operating within broader contextual and 
structural environments which can be both constraining and empowering. The broad political, economic 
or social environment can influence the preferences of agents, the resources and opportunities that are 
available, and can establish costs and benefits to encourage agents to act in a particular way. This 
49 
  
expansive version of historical institutionalism therefore rebukes the ‘stickiness’ of earlier institutional 
theories by incorporating a wider range of potential causal variables into its analysis. 
 
Bell (2011, 2012) and Bell and Hindmoor’s (2014) Agents in Context Historical Institutionalism (AiC-
HI) provides the appropriate analytical tools for developing an understanding of why the expectation of 
a nuclear renaissance has failed to produce a widespread expansion of civil nuclear energy development 
in the regions of Western Europe and North America. This thesis uses AiC-HI as a lens through which 
to understand the way in which policymakers shape and are shaped by the wider institutional, structural, 
and ideational context in which they operate. The aim here is to tease out distinctions between agents, 
institutions, and contexts in order to study the way mutually-shaping interactions through time in order 
to help explain why there is a disconnection between the rhetoric and reality of the nuclear renaissance 
in Western European and North American countries. As was discussed earlier in this section, an 
analytical framework was needed to overcome the mono-causal, a-historical, and empirical failings of 
pre-existing explanations for the failure of the nuclear renaissance. Agents in Context Historical 
Institutionalism meets these criteria by adopting a more expansive and inclusive approach to 
institutional change. It overcomes the dualism between agency and structure which has characterised 
earlier historical institutionalist debates. In doing so, it allows for a broad range of causal variables – 
institutions, agency, ideas, structures, and context – and their interdependencies to be included in the 
analysis, without privileging any one of these variables over another. Finally, historical institutionalism 
fits well with a problem-based approach to research, as it typically focuses on addressing real-world 
empirical questions that have a practical relevance for policymakers and the general public as well as 
academia. 
COMPARATIVELY INFORMED HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
In order to answer the research questions, this thesis employs a comparative historical research 
methodology. Specifically, it employs a particular version of comparative historical analysis which 
Hacker (2002: 65) terms a “comparatively informed historical analysis”. Comparative historical 
analysis is a social science research methodology that is not bound to any one particular theory or 
method (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003: 10). Rather, the methodology is characterised by three 
core concerns (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003). Firstly, comparative historical analysts are 
concerned with establishing causal analysis between variables. This can be achieved using either 
qualitative or quantitative research methods. Second, comparative historical analysts examine the way 
in which processes unfold over time. They seek to understand the uniqueness of different eras and how 
this can impact upon the variables and outcomes under examination. Finally, comparative historical 
analysts engage in systematic and contextualised comparison in order to establish causation between 
variables. 
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Within a comparative historical analysis, comparisons can be drawn between earlier and later events, 
between broad trends and specific phenomena, across different geographical locations, and across 
different time periods (Haupt, 2007: 2). The overarching purpose of comparative historical analysis is 
to identify the causes of behaviour and outcomes, and to evaluate, critique, and develop theories that 
are relevant across time and cases (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003: 12). One of the major strengths 
of the methodology is its ability to learn lessons from the past in order to better understand policy 
problems of the present. It facilitates deeper, empirically-driven insights into issues that are commonly 
taken for granted or clouded in broad-based assumptions. As Green (2004: 42) states, “a comparative 
approach helps render the invisible visible”, and in doing so, “it aids us in questioning our own 
generalizations”. 
A comparative historical analysis fits well with both the historical institutionalist analytic framework, 
as well as the problem-centred research approach that this thesis adopts. Both problem-centred research 
and historical institutionalism focus on exploring real-world empirical problems. This focus is shared 
by comparative historical analysis, which is typically used by researchers seeking to address “big” 
questions which are of relevance to both a specialist and a non-specialist audience (Mahoney and 
Rueschemeyer, 2003: 7). The selection of methods within a comparative historical analysis also 
parallels with a problem-centred research approach. As previously discussed, problem-centred research 
allows the researcher to draw upon methods of data collection and analysis from any discipline. 
Similarly, comparative historical analysts are typically “eclectic in their use of methods”, and are able 
to employ and combine whichever tools best enable them to address the nature of the research question 
under investigation (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003: 12). In addition, Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 
(2003: 11) argue that the nature of comparative historical analysis means that “all comparative historical 
works fit comfortably within the field of historical institutionalism”. 
Comparative historical analysts typically conduct their research through a comparison of a small 
number of case studies within a set historical timeframe. However, in his seminal work on the US social 
welfare system, Jacob Hacker (2002) extends the comparative historical analysis literature by 
undertaking a comparative historical analysis that moves beyond a standard case study design.  In doing 
so, Hacker (2002: 65) adopts a particular kind of comparative historical methodology which he terms a 
“comparatively informed historical analysis”. This methodology aligns with the standard format of a 
comparative historical analysis in that it focuses on causal analysis, examines the way in which 
processes unfold over time, and engages in systematic and contextualised comparisons. Where Hacker 
differs from the standard comparative historical approach is that he does not utilise a strict case study 
format. Hacker focuses on the social welfare system and policies of a single country – the United States 
– but does not treat the country as a self-contained case. Rather, Hacker engages in comparative 
historical analysis by drawing comparisons between phenomena and events within the US across time, 
as well as by comparing the US experience with that of other countries. Therefore, while Hacker’s 
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comparatively informed historical analysis does not follow a strict definition of a comparative case 
study, the process of analysis that he undertakes is still inherently comparative. As Hacker (2004: 65-
6) states, “the method is explicitly comparative, in short, but the subjects of comparison are change over 
time and divergent policy paths as much as contrasting national experiences”. By deviating from the 
standard case study format, Hacker is not limited to discussing only the key country, or small group of 
countries, under investigation. Rather, he is able to draw upon the experiences of other countries when 
necessary in order to further strengthen his analysis, without being obliged to dedicate an equal amount 
of time to analysing other countries as dedicated and stand-alone “cases”. 
This thesis adopts Hacker’s version of a comparatively informed historical analysis for its methodology. 
A comparatively informed historical analysis is appropriate for addressing this study’s research 
questions, as it allows for a broad narrative and explanation for the failure of the nuclear renaissance in 
Western Europe and North America to be developed. In accordance with both comparative historical 
analysis and Hacker’s version of this, this research focuses on causal analysis, examines the way in 
which processes unfold over time, and engages in systematic and contextualised comparisons. 
However, as with Hacker’s comparatively informed historical analysis, this research does not use a 
standard comparative case study format. Rather, it engages in a comparative historical analysis of 
countries in Western Europe and North America which were expected to experience a nuclear 
renaissance, but have demonstrated little growth in nuclear development during the renaissance period 
(that is, from 2000 onwards). The disconnection between the rhetoric and reality of nuclear energy 
development in these regions is inherently ‘puzzling’ given the widespread acceptance of the arguments 
over climate change and energy security that supported the claims that a nuclear renaissance was 
imminent. 
The application of comparative historical research methods to the study of nuclear energy development 
is not new. DeLeon (1980) conducted a comparative investigation of the way in which institutional 
actors influence the development of nuclear power technology across the US, the Soviet Union, the UK, 
Germany, Canada and France. Poneman (1982) examined the factors influencing the development of 
nuclear power in the developing world, comparing the experiences of Indonesia, Argentina, and Iran. 
Camilleri (1984) conducted a comparative historical analysis of the role of the advanced capitalist state 
in the development of the nuclear industry in the US, France, West Germany, the UK, Sweden and 
Brazil. Jasper (1990) conducted a comprehensive comparative analysis of nuclear energy policies in 
France, Sweden and the US from the 1960s through to the 1990s, focusing on the role of cultural factors.  
These studies have offered valuable insights into the way in which nuclear energy programmes develop 
over time and the reasons for this. However, more than two decades have elapsed since these texts were 
written, and as such, they do not consider the recent developments in contemporary nuclear history, 
including the nuclear renaissance. 
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There have been several more recent studies which compare the civil nuclear energy programmes of 
multiple countries (Sovacool and Valentine, 2012; Wiliarty, 2013). However, these studies devote 
limited attention to the historical development of nuclear energy programmes, and how this history 
continues to impact upon the current and future trajectory of the civil nuclear energy programmes. 
While most contemporary texts on nuclear energy development include some recognition of the 
importance of history, this is generally limited to a small portion of the entire work, rather than being 
treated as a central element necessary to the overall analysis of nuclear energy development. The one 
exception to this is the work by Yi-chong (2008), who undertakes a comprehensive comparative 
analysis of why and how nuclear energy programmes have been established and evolved in five Asian 
countries (China, India, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan). This study seeks to overcome the limitations 
of previous academic work on nuclear energy by undertaking a comparatively informed historical 
analysis of nuclear energy development from the establishment of the first civil nuclear energy 
programmes through to the present day. It places the importance of history in influencing nuclear energy 
development at the centre of its analysis, and therefore argues that the disconnection between the 
rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance and the reality of contemporary nuclear energy development can only 
be understood through a historical contextual lens.  
REGIONS UNDER INVESTIGATION 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the nuclear renaissance that was expected to take place from 2000 onwards 
was meant to be a global phenomenon. This expectation was reflected in statements made by journalists, 
political commentators and political leaders which referred to the renaissance as being a global event, 
as opposed to being a development that was limited to first-timer nuclear countries. However, data from 
the International Atomic Energy Agency on nuclear energy development since 2000 demonstrates that, 
while growth in nuclear energy development is taking place in a small number of countries located 
mainly in the regions of Far East Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, and the Middle East and South 
Asia, the regions of Western Europe and North America remain largely unchanged in terms of their 
levels of nuclear energy development since 2000 (see Chapter 2 for further details). Furthermore, the 
growth in nuclear reactor construction taking place in Western Europe and North America is not 
necessarily an absolute growth for these nuclear industries, given that many existing nuclear power 
plants are planned for closure around the same time that these new nuclear plants will be coming online. 
The World Nuclear Association estimates that, in the period up until 2030, the nuclear capacity that will 
be lost due to the closure of existing nuclear reactors will be greater than the nuclear capacity gained 
from new nuclear reactor builds (WNA 2014i). Consequently, this research project focuses on 
answering the core research question of why the expectation of a nuclear renaissance has failed to result 
in a widespread expansion of nuclear energy development in the regions of Western Europe and North 
America since 2000. 
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The regional classification used in this thesis is drawn from the regional classification used by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)10. This research project focuses on the regions of Western 
Europe and North America for several reasons. Firstly, in both these regions, statements about the need 
for and inevitability of a nuclear renaissance were made by the highest level of political leaders (see 
Chapter 2 for a detailed overview of these statements). Secondly, these regions both play an important 
role in the story of the nuclear renaissance, as both these regions have lengthy histories of nuclear energy 
development. One key reason for why the expectation of a nuclear renaissance was so significant was 
that the expectation was based on the belief that a new era of growth would take place in countries 
where nuclear energy had been stagnating and declining for several decades. This primarily refers to 
the regions of Western Europe and North America. Consequently, the absence of evidence of a nuclear 
renaissance taking place in these regions to date is both surprising and in need of investigation. 
Furthermore, this thesis focuses upon the failure of the nuclear renaissance in these regions as much of 
the literature to date focuses instead on the reasons why the nuclear renaissance has been successful in 
a small number of countries – with little academic discussion taking place as to why the expectation of 
a nuclear renaissance has been unsuccessful in regions such as Western Europe and North America. 
METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
The selection of a historical institutionalist analytical framework and a comparative historical 
methodology highlighted the need for methods of data collection and analysis which would: 
a) Provide rich empirical detail on nuclear energy development; 
b) Situate recent nuclear energy development in its historical context; 
c) Allow for causal variables which may potentially influence nuclear energy development to 
emerge inductively; and 
d) Allow for comparisons to be drawn between countries and over time. 
With these considerations in mind, qualitative research methods were chosen to build an understanding 
of both how and why nuclear energy development has changed over time. Qualitative research methods 
were chosen as they are typically used to investigate such “how” and “why” questions by generating 
rich, detailed descriptions of the social world (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011: 9; Hageman, 2008: 17). 
Qualitative methods are also well-suited for inductive research, and research that is concerned with 
understanding contextual influences on phenomena (Babbie, 2010: 51; Sallee and Flood, 2012: 139). 
The particular qualitative research methods used for this project’s data collection were document 
                                                     
10 In accordance with the IAEA (2003) classification, the region of Western Europe that is referred to in this thesis 
consists of the countries of Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Gibraltar, 
Greece, Greenland, Holy See, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Svalbard and Jan Mayen Islands, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the 
United Kingdom. The region of North America includes Canada and the United States of America. 
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analysis and semi-structured interviews. The data collected via these methods were then analysed 
thematically11. The data collected from the documentary analysis and the semi-structured interviews 
were used to build an understanding of the way in which agents have perceived and understood nuclear 
energy from the post-war era up until the present day. 
Document analysis is a qualitative research method which involves locating, retrieving, reviewing, and 
synthesising data contained in documents in order to construct understanding and empirical knowledge 
(Bowen, 2009). The data can then be organised into major themes and categories through thematic 
analysis (Bowen, 2009: 32). Thematic analysis is a process whereby the researcher reads and searches 
through the data in order to identify emerging and recurrent themes relating to the issue under 
investigation (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006: 4). The researcher aims to be as systematic as 
possible, but also flexible enough to engage in “constant discovery” and allow for new themes to emerge 
as the research progresses (Altheide et al., 2008: 128). Document analysis is a highly effective method 
for allowing the researcher to build a ‘history of the present’ (Rapley, 2007: 119). That is, to develop 
an understanding of the historic origins of particular issues or events, to track change in the phenomenon 
over time, and to develop an understanding of how past events and changes continue to impact upon 
the phenomenon in the present day. Document analysis allows the researcher to plot a trajectory of how 
ideas, perceptions, institutions and context emerge and evolve over time (Rapley, 2007: 119). It is also 
well-suited for historical research as documents may be the only available source of evidence of events, 
policies, and decision-making procedures (Bowen, 2009: 31). 
The research process began by locating and retrieving a wide-range of documents related to nuclear 
energy development. This included government policy documents, legislation, parliamentary debates, 
press releases, political speeches, non-government organisation and industry reports and statements, 
and newspaper articles from 1945 to the present day. These documents were located and accessed 
manually (at university and public libraries) and electronically (for example, via global internet search 
engines, electronic archives and databases, and individual company and organisation websites). Over 
one thousand documents relating to civil nuclear energy policy and development were consulted, 
roughly three-quarters of which were news articles published from 1945 to the present day. While there 
is of course an inherent limitation in relying upon media accounts of historical events (as the reporting 
may be biased or inaccurate), media reports were drawn upon extensively in this thesis as they provided 
one of the richest data sources for information on historical developments in nuclear power, particularly 
in the earlier periods of the 1950s and 1960s, for which other data sources are limited. Moreover, as the 
document review and analysis was conducted, emphasis was placed on gathering first-hand accounts of 
nuclear energy policy decisions, the reasons given for these decisions, and the responses to these 
                                                     
11 The data was categorised into themes using Microsoft Word (no dedicated qualitative research software package 
was used). Each factor that was identified as potentially influencing civil nuclear energy development was listed. 
These factors were then categorised as either ‘nuclear-specific’ or ‘contextual’ factors. 
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decisions. Doing so gave insight into the way in which agents’ thoughts and perceptions of nuclear 
energy have changed over time. Media reports were extensively drawn upon as a result of this emphasis 
on first-hand accounts, as they provided one of the richest data sources for gathering first-hand accounts 
of government and industry decisions, arguments and justifications throughout the historical and 
contemporary period. This information was then supplemented by other data sources, including 
quantitative data on nuclear energy growth and development, accessed from the International Atomic 
Energy Agency’s Power Reactor Information System. Public opinion surveys were accessed to identify 
how public perceptions and attitudes towards nuclear energy changed over time. 
Semi-structured interviews with key experts were undertaken to expand upon the findings of the 
document analysis by developing an understanding of current expert opinion on civil nuclear energy 
policy and development. Interviews were conducted with sixteen experts on nuclear energy 
development. Experts included government officials, academics, and nuclear industry representatives 
that have expertise in the area of civil nuclear energy development or nuclear energy policy. Each 
interviewee was questioned on their views on the outcome of the nuclear renaissance, the reasons for 
this outcome, the challenges facing nuclear power and the future of civil nuclear energy. These 
questions were asked in an open-ended and inductive manner. That is, interviewees were not explicitly 
asked about their views on any of the nuclear-specific or broader contextual factors identified in the 
document analysis as influencing civil nuclear energy development. Rather, interviewees were asked 
broadly about what factors they thought had influenced civil nuclear energy development in the past 
and whether these factors have had an influenced on the outcome of the nuclear renaissance in Western 
Europe and North America. This meant that interviewees were not ‘led’ towards identifying any 
particular factor that they believed to be influencing civil nuclear energy development. In conducting 
the interview questions in this way, the interviews served to canvass current expert opinion on civil 
nuclear energy development, which was used to build on the findings of the document analysis. The 
interviews were not used to ‘test’ any of the factors identified in the document analysis. Interviews were 
conducted in the period from September 2014 to February 2015. Each interview lasted between fifteen 
minutes to two hours, and were conducted in person wherever possible. When an interview could not 
be conducted in person, the interview was conducted via the telephone instead. 
Participants were recruited using purposive and snowballing sampling techniques. An initial relevant 
set of participants was identified through the document analysis stage of the research. Organisations 
and individuals that could provide expertise on the topic of nuclear energy development were identified. 
These organisations and individuals were then contacted directly and invited to participate in the 
research study. Participants were emailed a letter of introduction and a Project Information Sheet. 
Research participants who took part in the study were also asked if they could provide recommendations 
for other experts in the field who may be able to contribute their expertise to the project. When 
participants consented, the interview audio was electronically recorded. Hand-written notes were also 
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taken during the interviews. After the interview, the hand-written research notes and electronic audio 
recordings were stored in a secure location and de-identified. Interviewees were invited to recommend 
other potential interview candidates, which were then contacted and invited to participate in an 
interview. 
The purpose of this data collection was two-fold. Firstly, the data collected from the document analysis 
was used in a purely descriptive manner in order to build a historical narrative of how nuclear energy 
development had changed over time, from 1945 until the present day. As this research focuses on 
understanding the temporal dimension of nuclear energy development and policy change, an accurate 
and extensive chronology of events was necessary to understand how agents (such as policymakers, 
political leaders, industry representatives, political commentators, voters, activist and lobby groups) 
responded to changes in the institutional, ideational, structural, and contextual context. Secondly, the 
data from both the document analysis and the interviews were analysed thematically in order to allow 
factors which appeared to influence nuclear energy development and nuclear energy policy decisions 
to emerge inductively through the research. As the potential causal variables emerged, comparisons 
were drawn between the experiences of individual countries and across the experiences within countries 
over time. However, while the processes of data collection and data analysis are described here in a 
linear manner, in reality they were undertaken as a concurrent and iterative process as new data sources 
were located and analysed. 
As the data from the document analysis and interviews were analysed, it became clear that existing 
explanations for changes in nuclear energy development heavily focus upon ‘nuclear specific factors’. 
That is, factors that are specific to the construction, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power 
plants. While nuclear-specific factors are of course important to understanding how and why nuclear 
energy development changes over time, this thesis argues that nuclear-specific factors are not the only 
factors that explain the changing trajectory of nuclear power. The very premise of this thesis – that a 
broader, more holistic explanation is needed to understand the failure of the nuclear renaissance – 
suggests that there must be other factors at play that influence nuclear energy development. 
The problem-based research approach that this thesis is based upon allows for any theoretical or 
methodological framework to be used that is considered by the researcher to be the most relevant to the 
research problem under investigation. Consequently, to develop a more comprehensive understanding 
of civil nuclear energy development that goes beyond focusing solely on nuclear-specific factors, this 
thesis draws upon a wide-range of political science literature and theories in order to answer the research 
questions. In particular, four major contextual shifts have been identified in the political science 
literature as appearing to be directly relevant to the topic of civil nuclear energy development. These 
four contextual shifts are the rise of environmentalism, the decline of public trust in government, the 
emergence of a ‘risk society’, and the growing influence of neoliberalism. Each of these issues are 
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widely discussed in the political science literature as representing a major contextual shift in the post-
war era. Each individual contextual chapter engages with core academic texts to demonstrate the 
significance of these contextual shifts as major topics of investigation and debate within the discipline 
of political science. There are, of course, many other major contextual shifts that are discussed in the 
political science literature as having taken place in Western democratic societies since 1945 (such as 
the rise of the welfare state, the growth of consumerism, globalisation, and so on). These contextual 
shifts could have been examined in regards to their potential impact on the development of civil nuclear 
energy. However, the four contextual shifts that are discussed in this thesis (environmentalism, 
declining public trust, risk society, and neoliberalism) were chosen as they each appear to have a direct 
relevance to the changing trajectory of civil nuclear energy development. This decision was consistent 
was a problem-based research approach, which allows the researcher to choose the most appropriate 
methods and theories based on the nature of the empirical problem under investigation. 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
This research project adheres to the guidelines of the ethical review process of The University of 
Queensland. For the semi-structured interviews, informed consent was obtained from all participants 
prior to the commencement of their involvement in the research process. To ensure full disclosure of 
all aspects of the research project, participants were provided with a Project Information Sheet (PIS) 
when they were first contacted to be invited to participate in an interview (see Appendix 1). The PIS 
outlined the nature of the study and the participant’s role should they choose to participate. Participants 
were also provided with a Participant Consent Form (PCF), which they were required to sign before 
participating in the study to indicate that they had read and understood the information sheet (see 
Appendix 2). When interviews were conducted via the telephone, the PCF was emailed to participants 
prior to the interview commencing. Participants had to indicate their agreement either verbally or in 
written form to the conditions on the PCF before their involvement in the research project could begin. 
It was clearly stated in the PIS and the PCF that participants could freely withdraw their involvement 
in the study at any time without providing a reason and without penalty. This was also verbally reiterated 
at the commencement of the focus groups. Participants were informed that their participation in the 
interview would be anonymous and confidential. A guarantee of anonymity was particularly important 
for this research project given the controversial nature of nuclear power. Participants were also informed 
that the interview, or part of the interview, could be ‘off-the-record’ if they chose, with no information 
gained being used in the study. It was also made clear to the participants prior to the commencement of 
the interviews that the purpose of the research project was not to advocate for or against nuclear power, 
but rather, to be as objective as possible in developing a better understanding of how and why civil 
nuclear energy development has changed over time. 
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Furthermore, the hand-written research notes, electronic audio recordings, and Participant Consent 
Forms were all stored securely in a location only accessible to the researcher. The electronic audio files 
of the interview recordings were stored on a password-protected computer. All identifying information 
was kept separate from the written research notes, and all of the data were de-identified for the process 
of data analysis.  
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has detailed the research design of this thesis. It has described the problem-centred 
approach to research that informs all aspects of the research design, the use of Agents in Context 
Historical Institutionalism as an analytical framework used, and the methodology of comparatively 
informed historical analysis. The choice of regions under investigation for this research project have 
been explained and justified. The methods of data collection and analysis have been described, as well 
as the ethical considerations that have underpinned the research design. 
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4 .  N U CLEA R ECONOMI CS  
This chapter examines the first of three ‘nuclear-specific’ factors and their influence on the outcome of 
the nuclear renaissance. It argues that the disjuncture between the rhetoric and reality of the nuclear 
renaissance can be explained by the economics of nuclear power. More specifically, the absence of a 
nuclear renaissance can be attributed to the way in which agents perceive and prioritise the economics 
of nuclear power. In the 1950s and 1960s, the early development and expansion of the first civil nuclear 
energy programmes was facilitated by an ideational context in which the economics of nuclear power 
were perceived by policymakers and industry representatives as a non-issue. This meant that nuclear 
reactors could be built with little concern over the costs involved. This ideational context was shaped 
by the overly optimistic projections for nuclear power that were being put forth at the time, as well as 
the generous financial support that governments were willing to give to ensure nuclear power was 
developed successfully. 
However, a shift occurred from the 1970s onwards, whereby the economics of nuclear power became 
an increasingly important concern for policymakers and industry representatives in determining 
whether nuclear reactors would be built. Several factors contributed to this shift, including the 
increasing visibility and frequency of reactors construction projects that were still under construction 
years past their original completion dates, at more than double their original cost estimates.  Moreover, 
the rise of neoliberal ideas and a decline in state interventionism meant that states were less willing to 
provide the financial support that had been necessary for nuclear new build to succeed.  The ongoing 
economic problems facing nuclear power – such as the high capital costs involved, the inability to 
compete with cheaper alternative energy sources, and the financially risky nature of investing in nuclear 
power – contributed to the stagnation and decline of nuclear industries throughout Western Europe and 
North America from the mid-1970s onwards, with numerous nuclear construction projects being 
delayed, suspended or cancelled as a direct result of economic difficulties. 
When the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance began to gain momentum in the 2000s, one of the key reasons 
underpinning the expectation of a revival of nuclear power was a belief that the economic problems 
inherent to nuclear development had been resolved. Nuclear industry representatives promised that new 
reactor designs would be simpler, easier and therefore cheaper to construct. As a result, nuclear power 
would be able to compete with alternative energy sources, particularly if a price on carbon was 
implemented to combat climate change. Government representatives appeared to accept the argument 
that a fundamental turning-point had been reached in the economics of power, and were soon reiterating 
the argument that nuclear power was a cheap source of energy production as a key reason for why voters 
should support a revival of nuclear power.  
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However, despite this rhetoric, nuclear power during the renaissance period continues to face the same 
economic problems that has previously hindered its development. Numerous reactor projects that were 
announced from 2000 onwards have since been cancelled because of economic difficulties. The nuclear 
reactor construction projects that have proceeded – such as the Generation III+ reactors in Finland and 
France – have faced the same economic challenges that plagued nuclear development in the past, far 
exceeding their original construction cost and time estimates. Consequently, there is little evidence to 
suggest that the economic challenges hindering nuclear power have been resolved. Despite the rhetoric 
of a nuclear renaissance taking place, nuclear new build continues to be impeded by high construction 
costs, an inability to compete with alternative energy sources, and the financial risks involved. The 
ideational shift that has taken place from the mid-1970s onwards means that these economic challenges 
facing nuclear power can not be overlooked by government actors or industry representatives. The 
disconnection between the rhetoric and reality of the nuclear renaissance can therefore be explained, in 
part, by the economics of nuclear power. Moreover, until the economic challenges facing nuclear power 
are resolved, a nuclear renaissance is unlikely to take place in the future. 
TOO CHEAP TO METER 
The absence of a nuclear renaissance can be explained by an ideational shift in the way in which 
policymakers perceive and prioritise the economics of nuclear power. From the mid-1970s onwards, 
the economic issues afflicting the construction and operation of nuclear power plants has become a 
central concern for nuclear power decision-makers. This shift stands in stark contrast to the ideational 
context in which civil nuclear power programmes were first being established in the 1950s and 1960s. 
During these first two decades of development, political, rather than economic, concerns dominated 
government decision-making processes in establishing nuclear power programmes. In many countries 
throughout Western Europe and North America, nuclear power in the post-war period occupied a unique 
position as a project of national significance. The development of nuclear power in the post-war era 
was widely seen as the quintessential symbol of modernity and scientific accomplishment, with 
governments scrambling to become leaders in nuclear technology. The advancement of civil nuclear 
technologies was also propelled by its close connection with potential military applications. For 
governments seeking to advance their nuclear capabilities in the post-war era, cost was only a minor 
consideration. For countries such as Germany and France, the early development of civil nuclear power 
was closely linked to the government’s ambition to elevate their country’s stature in international 
politics following the embarrassments of war time defeat and occupation. In the US, investment in civil 
nuclear energy research was seen as necessary to preserve its position as a world leader in scientific 
advancement. When extensive government funding was approved for the construction of the country’s 
first nuclear reactors, supporters of the bill argued that the funds were necessary to win the race with 
the Soviet Union for world leadership in development of nuclear energy (The New York Times, 1956: 
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3). To a large extent, the decision to fund nuclear energy development and establish a civil nuclear 
energy programme in the post-war era was driven dominated by political, rather than economic, 
concerns. 
Moreover, a widely held belief existed amongst government and industry representatives that the 
economics of nuclear power would be an asset, rather than an impediment, to its development. This 
belief was epitomised by the promise made by the Chair of the US Atomic Energy Commission, Lewis 
L. Strauss, that nuclear power would produce “electrical energy too cheap to meter” (IAEA, 2004a: 1). 
This claim was reiterated by the President of the American Nuclear Society, Alvin M. Weinberg, who 
declared that nuclear power “appear[s] to be the cheapest of all sources of energy”  (Weinberg and 
Young, 1967: 1). Nuclear energy was expected to be highly competitive with the costs of alternative 
sources of energy generation. The Director of the industrial division of the UK Atomic Energy 
Authority predicted that, by 1980, energy produced by nuclear power would be half the cost of using 
coal and oil (The New York Times, 1957: 18). The British General Electric Company promised in the 
mid-1950s to build a nuclear plant that would generate electricity at less than half the present cost of 
conventionally-produced electricity (Hailey, 1956: 21). An article published in the New York Times in 
1954 reported that nuclear power could offer a potential saving of $1bn per year in operating costs for 
electrical utilities (Egan, 1954: 56). 
The apparent economic advantages of nuclear power made for an attractive investment for countries 
such as France and the UK which were dependent on imported coal and oil. In the UK, parliamentary 
discussions on nuclear energy focused on the cost benefits of investing in domestically-produced 
nuclear energy rather than importing fossil fuels. The Director of the UK Atomic Energy Program, Lord 
Cherwell, justified the government’s nuclear investment to the House of Lords on the grounds that “the 
more expensive coal gets, the more attractive will the nuclear energy become” (The New York Times, 
1952: E9). Lord Percy Mills defended nuclear power development with the argument that “since we 
already spend some £250m per annum on importing fuel, chiefly oil, and this burden on our balance of 
payments will continue to grow, the importance of our need to develop nuclear power as a source of 
energy cannot be in doubt” (House of Lords, 1957: 184). 
TOO COSTLY TO MATTER 
However, starting in the mid-1970s, a combination of factors coalesced which resulted in the economics 
of nuclear power becoming a far more salient issue for government and industry representatives. This 
ideational shift in the way in which agents perceived and prioritised the economics of nuclear power 
acted as an impediment to the construction of new nuclear facilities. As nuclear power programmes 
were established and expanded, the realities of nuclear power construction costs far exceeded their 
initial estimates. This was evident in the US, where cost overruns on nuclear power projects from 1966 
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to 1977 averaged 207 percent (Ahearne et al., 2012: 15). Numerous examples emerged of US nuclear 
projects which far surpassed their original cost estimates, leading the director of the Massachusetts 
Energy Policy Office to conclude that “nuclear power is no longer capable of even coming close to its 
promise of cheap energy” (Kifner, 1976: 54). Some of the projects which experienced extensive cost 
overruns include: 
 The Clinch River Breeder Reactor Project was estimated in 1973 to cost $700m, but reached 
$1.7bn two years later. The cost of the project continued to rise to $3.5bn in 1982, at which 
point Congress stopped funding the project (Joppke, 1993: 62). 
 The Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant was initially estimated to cost $75m when the project was 
announced in 1966, but ended up costing $5.5bn by the time the project was abandoned (Ross 
and Staw, 1993: 708). When the plant was being constructed, the builders of the plant - the 
Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO) – said that interest costs were adding $1.2m a day to 
the construction price (The New York Times, 1983: B8). LILCO eventually sold Shoreham to 
the State of New York in 1992 for a grand total of $1 (The New York Times, 1994: B6). 
 The Hanford Nuclear Reservation was originally estimated to cost $6.5bn, but experienced a 
cost overrun of almost 300 percent, to reach $23.8bn (Mathews, 1981: A1).  
 In 1973, the South Texas Nuclear Project was originally expected to cost $1bn, but by 1981 the 
project had cost over $4.5bn (Balz, 1981: A7). 
 The total cost of the Marble Hill Nuclear Power Plant rose from an initial estimate of $1.4bn to 
over $7bn, after which the project was abandoned (The Pittsburgh Press, 1984: A8). 
 The second nuclear reactor at the Beaver Valley Nuclear Power Station was estimated to cost 
$686m, but ended up with a final cost of $3.145bn (McCallion, 1995: 181).  
A similar pattern of construction cost and time overruns unfolded throughout Western Europe. In the 
UK, construction began on the Dungeness B nuclear reactor in the mid-1960s with an estimated cost of 
£89m, but by 1982 the project was still under construction at an estimated cost of £530m (Dickson, 
1982: 24). Project costs for the Hinkley Point B reactor rose from an original £95m to £160m (Wright, 
1980: 3), while costs for the Hartlepool nuclear power station rose from an estimated £92m in 1968 to 
£520m in 1982 (Dickson, 1982: 24). The Heysham nuclear power station rose from an estimated £142m 
in 1968 to £396m in 1980 (Wright, 1980: 3). Capital costs for the Sizewell B nuclear reactor increased 
from £1691m to £3700m, while construction costs for a nuclear reactor at Torness increased from 
£742m to £2500m (Thomas et al., 2007: 11). In Germany, construction of the SNR-300 nuclear reactor 
near Kalkar resulted in a cost overrun from original project estimates of almost 380 percent (The Wall 
Street Journal, 1982). An investigation by Grubler (2010) into the projected and actual costs of the 
French Pressurized Water Reactor nuclear power programme demonstrated that the costs of 
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constructing nuclear reactors in France steadily escalated from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, 
although these costs were consistently underestimated in formal cost projections. 
The disconnection between the original estimates and actual costs of constructing nuclear plants can be 
explained by several factors. Firstly, the original cost estimates of nuclear power plant construction 
were largely based on speculation, but presented as systematic economic calculations (Jasper, 1990: 5). 
Engineering estimates were calculated by “scaling up” the costs of constructing much smaller 
experimental reactors. These estimates failed to recognise the differences in individual reactor designs 
and construction sites which required specialised components and highly-skilled engineers, all of which 
increased the cost of reactor construction (Davis, 2011: 5). Cost increases also resulted from unfinished 
reactor designs being released, causing contracts to be modified when construction was already 
underway (Squassoni, 2009b: 4). Delays in licensing approval processes and reactor construction 
increased project lead times, exposing nuclear plants to more stringent and expensive regulatory 
requirements and higher interest rates (Campbell, 1988: 5). Lengthy construction periods often meant 
that equipment installed in the first phase of construction had deteriorated and needed to be refurbished, 
escalating total construction costs (The Guardian, 1978: 13). A growing awareness of the safety risks 
of nuclear power led to the added cost of increased regulatory requirements, particularly after the events 
at Three Mile Island (Squassoni, 2009b: 4). As a result, the early promises made by the nuclear industry 
of low running costs and price stabilisation never came to fruition (Hertsgaard, 1983: 62). 
The poor economic performance of nuclear power plants during this period was also caused by the 
sensitivity of the price of nuclear-generated electricity to changes in the ‘load’ or ‘capacity’ factor of 
the plant. Given that the cost of uranium is so low relative to other fuel costs, the price of nuclear-
generated electricity is determined largely by the load factor of nuclear power plants. A nuclear power 
plant’s load factor is the ratio of its actual output over a period of time, compared to its potential output 
if it were continuously operating at full capacity over the same time period. The load factors of operating 
nuclear power plants have tended to be much lower than their original forecasts. For example, in the 
early 1980s, nuclear power plants worldwide had an average load factor of approximately 60% - far 
lower than their expected load factors of 85-95% (Thomas, 2010: 24). The low load factors of nuclear 
power plants meant that the cost of nuclear-generated electricity was much higher than originally 
expected during this time period. 
The result of the ongoing construction cost and time overruns was that the myth of nuclear energy being 
‘too cheap to meter’ could not be perpetuated. The result was an ideational shift whereby the economics 
of nuclear power became central to government and industry decision-making processes over whether 
nuclear reactors should be built. As the actual cost of constructing nuclear power plants became more 
visible, governments and utilities in Western Europe and North America increasingly chose to suspend 
or cancel many of their plans to build new nuclear power plants. For example, when plans to build a 
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nuclear plant in Pennsylvania were suspended in 1975, the reactor manufacturer cited construction costs 
being “way beyond what was initially projected” as the reason for the contract being broken (The New 
York Times, 1975b: 63). When Middle South Utilities cancelled the construction of two nuclear units, 
the president of the company stated that the cancellation was “simply a question of our ability to finance 
them…and we figured they got too expensive” (Stuart, 1975: 167). The Houston Power and Lighting 
Company cancelled plans to build several nuclear power plants because of its inability to finance 
increased construction costs (Stuart, 1975: 167), while rising costs caused the Delmarva Power and 
Lighting Company to shelve plans for constructing a nuclear power plant (The Washington Post, 1975: 
B6). In 1974, the Consumers Power Company of Michigan cancelled plans for two reactors as lengthy 
construction times meant that they could not continue to raise sufficient capital to finance the project 
costs (Smith, 1974: 1). When the Northern Indiana Public Service Company announced in 1981 that 
they were abandoning plans for their Bailly Nuclear Power Plant, this marked the first time in the US 
that a nuclear project was cancelled after construction had already begun. The plant had initially been 
expected to cost $187m, but later estimates revised the cost to $2.3bn (Omang, 1981: A6). The utility’s 
CEO explained that the project was cancelled “due wholly to the effect of inflation and the time-cost of 
money,” and that “cost increases of this magnitude are simply not bearable” (Omang, 1981: A6). The 
widespread belief held by agents in the 1950s and 1960s that nuclear power would be ‘too cheap to 
meter’ was, from the mid-1970s onwards, gradually replaced by a view that nuclear energy was instead 
‘too costly to matter’. 
THE NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE: FROM PERIL TO PROFIT? 
When the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance emerged, economics continued to feature heavily in the 
nuclear debate. One of the key reasons underpinning why the expectation of a nuclear renaissance 
emerged was because industry representatives promised that many of the economic problems that had 
previously plagued nuclear power had been resolved. In particular, they promised that technological 
advancements and new reactor designs, such as Generation III+, would make nuclear reactors cheaper 
to construct (Thomas, 2012a). The growing political concern over the need to reduce carbon emissions 
to combat climate change was also expected to create a more favourable economic environment for 
nuclear energy, particularly if governments chose to put a price on carbon. Nuclear industry 
representatives promoted the idea that nuclear power was a highly cost-competitive form of electricity 
generation. For example, Vincent de Rivaz, the CEO of EDF Energy, described nuclear power as “the 
cheapest, large-scale, low-carbon electricity source” (Crooks, 2010: 2). 
By the late 2000s, it became clear that government and political leaders were accepting the nuclear 
industry’s promises that a turning point in the economics of nuclear power had been achieved. There 
appeared to be a genuine belief shared amongst government representatives that the financial problems 
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plaguing the nuclear industry had been resolved, to the extent that government representatives began to 
invoke the argument that nuclear power was a cheap source of energy as a key justification for why a 
revival of nuclear power should take place. The US Energy Secretary, Spencer Abraham, justified the 
government’s proposed budget for nuclear development on the grounds that nuclear was an “affordable 
source of energy” (Power Engineering, 2003). The UK Minister for Energy, Malcolm Wicks, stated 
that “the economics have moved in favour of new nuclear because of the relatively high price we have 
seen recently of oil and gas” (Select Committee on Trade and Industry, 2006). The UK Government 
agreed to support an expansion of nuclear power on the grounds that it would be entirely funded by the 
private sector. This decision was initially welcomed by the nuclear industry, which was adamant that 
the economics of nuclear power had become so favourable that the decades of state aid that had been 
provided to support civil nuclear power would no longer be necessary (see Chapter 10 for more detail 
on the rise of neoliberalism and the implications this has had for reducing state aid for nuclear energy). 
However, as plans for a nuclear renaissance unfolded, it became clear that the economic problems which 
had plagued nuclear construction in the past remained unresolved. Despite claims by the nuclear 
industry that new generations of reactor designs would resolve many of the financial troubles that had 
historically afflicted nuclear power, there is little evidence of such improvements being made. The 
construction of nuclear reactors in Western Europe and North America since 2000 has occurred in a 
manner consistent with construction of nuclear reactors in the past – over-budget, over-time, and heavily 
dependent on state aid. One of the key claims underpinning the expectation of the nuclear renaissance 
was the promise made by the nuclear industry that a Generation III+ reactor could be built at an 
overnight cost of approximately $1000/kW (Thomas, 2012a: 52). However, recent cost estimates have 
raised this figure five-fold (Thomas, 2012a: 52). 
The construction of Generation III+ reactors in Europe are clear examples of the ongoing financial 
problems that nuclear new build has faced during the renaissance period. Construction approval was 
granted for a new reactor at the Finnish Olkiluoto Nuclear Power Plant in 2002, with an estimated 
construction time of 4 years at a cost of €3bn (Schneider et al., 2013: 49). By 2015, however, 
construction was still unfinished. Revised estimates increased the expected construction time to at least 
11 years and at almost triple the original cost estimate (YLE, 2014). This was the same nuclear reactor 
that had previously been praised by the CEO of AREVA SA for making “into reality the nuclear 
renaissance” (Erkheikki, 2005: 1). A similar story has unfolded with the first construction start in France 
in fifteen years, at the Flamanville Nuclear Power Plant. Construction was originally expected to cost 
€3.3bn and be completed by 2012 (World Nuclear News, 2007a), but this has been revised to completion 
in 2016, at an estimated cost of €8bn (World Nuclear News, 2012a). 
The high costs and financial risks involved with constructing nuclear facilities has caused nuclear power 
to struggle to compete with the growing affordability of alternative energy sources, such as shale and 
66 
  
liquid gas. In the mid-2000s, the US witnessed a sudden expansion in the production of shale gas. The 
expansion occurred as a result of advancements in drilling and extraction methods, with both horizontal 
drilling and hydraulic fracturing being deployed together for the first time. In the years that followed, 
shale gas production exceeded even the most optimistic estimates. The US Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) calculates the average annual growth rate in shale gas production to be 51 percent 
over the period of 2008-2011 (EY, 2013: 1). Total dry natural gas production in the US increased by 35 
percent from 2005-2013, mainly because of expanded production of shale gas (US Energy Information 
Administration, 2015: 20). The EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook predicts that shale gas production will 
double in the years 2013-2040 (EY, 2013: 1). 
The US shale gas boom has lowered the price of natural gas, making nuclear power a less attractive 
investment option. The CEO of NRG Energy estimated that new gas-fired generation costs $0.04/kWh, 
compared with at least $0.10/kWh for nuclear power (The Economist, 2013). The impact of shale gas 
on new nuclear build during the renaissance period is evident in statements made by US nuclear industry 
representatives, many of which have blamed shale gas for the closure of nuclear reactors or the 
cancellation of nuclear expansion plans. The CEO of General Electric highlighted the inability of 
nuclear power to economically compete with natural gas, stating that “it's just hard to justify nuclear. 
Gas is so cheap and at some point, economics rule” (Gloystein, 2012). In 2012, Dominion Resources 
announced that it would close its Kewaunee nuclear plant because of the low price of natural gas 
(diSavino, 2012). Low gas prices caused Constellation Energy to abandon plans for a nuclear plant at 
Calvert Cliffs, and were cited as one factor (combined with growing pressure post-Fukushima) which 
caused NRG to abandon plans for two nuclear units in Texas in 2011 (Plumer, 2013). The CEO of NRG 
Energy described shale gas as “killing off new nuclear” (Smith, 2012). Joseph Dominguez, Exelon’s 
senior vice president for government and regulatory affairs and public policy, described the recent 
growth of shale gas and the subsidies provided for renewable energy projects as “game changers” which 
have been starting to “seriously impact the economics of plants” (Malik and Polson, 2015). In 2012, 
Exelon stated that the “low natural gas prices and economic and market conditions…have made 
construction of new merchant nuclear power plants in competitive markets uneconomical now and for 
the foreseeable future” (Exelon, 2012). EDF withdrew from the US nuclear power market because the 
drop in gas prices caused by the shale gas boom meant that nuclear power was no longer an attractive 
investment option (Amiel, 2013). The International Atomic Energy Agency reported that “very low 
natural gas prices, particularly in the USA, caused by a rapid shale gas expansion, have fundamentally 
transformed the energy economy. They have reduced the competitiveness of commercial nuclear 
power” (IAEA, 2014a: 4). 
While cost overruns is an issue that is commonplace amongst energy infrastructure projects more 
broadly (rather than being a problem inherent to nuclear power alone), recent research suggests that 
cost overruns may be more common amongst nuclear power construction projects than other energy 
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technologies. A study by Sovacool et al. (2014) into the construction costs of 401 electricity 
infrastructure projects constructed worldwide between 1936 and 2014 found that nuclear reactors and 
hydroelectric dams have historically suffered from the greatest amount and frequency of cost overruns, 
even when normalised to overrun per installed megawatt of electricity. That said, the argument that 
nuclear power suffers more from construction cost overruns remains contested. A study by Lovering et 
al. (2016) concluded that there is no intrinsic cost escalation associated with nuclear power. Instead, 
Lovering et al. (2016) argue that the costs associated with nuclear power vary depending on different 
contextual and institutional factors, which result in large variance in the costs of nuclear over time. 
Lovering et al. (2016: 379) also note that in some instances, such as in South Korea, the cost of 
constructing nuclear reactors has decreased over time.   It is important to note, however, that Lovering 
et al. (2016) do not cite or engage with the Sovacool et al. (2014) study in their paper. 
Industry representatives have increasingly acknowledged that economic issues are preventing nuclear 
new build from proceeding. When announcing the closure of Entergy’s Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 
Station, the President of Entergy Wholesale Commodities stated that “the decision was solely based on 
economics” (Smith, 2013b). Entergy announced that it would close a nuclear power station in New 
York because of falling plant revenues, unfavourable market conditions and high operational costs 
(World Nuclear News, 2015b). German utilities RWE and E.ON originally planned to construct nuclear 
reactors at Wylfa and Oldbury in the UK, but abandoned their plans over financing and the expected 
cost increases as a result of the Fukushima nuclear disaster (Milmo and Harvey, 2012). E.ON has 
announced closure of two reactors in Sweden because “there are no prospects of generating financial 
profitability” (World Nuclear News, 2015c). The Court des Comptes, France’s audit court, calculated 
the cost of generating nuclear power to have increased from €49.6/MWh in 2010, to €59.8/MWh in 
2013 – an increase of 20.6 percent (Reuters, 2014). In March 2015, Standard & Poor’s downgraded the 
credit rating of the world’s largest nuclear company, Areva, to BB-, or ‘junk’ status (Reuters, 2015). 
Numerous reports released by energy analysts have concluded that the rhetoric of a new era of 
economically competitive nuclear power has not materialised. Many of the financial problems that 
caused nuclear industries to stagnate and decline from the mid-1970s onwards continue to afflict nuclear 
industries throughout Western Europe and North America today. Even as early as 2003, a report 
released by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) on the future of nuclear power concluded 
that “nuclear power is not an economically competitive choice” (MIT, 2003: 3). An update of the MIT 
report released in 2009 found that, since the release of the 2003 report, “the overnight cost of building 
a nuclear power plant has approximately doubled”12 (Du and Parsons, 2009: 2). The New Economics 
Foundation, a British think tank, released a report in 2005 which argued that the calculated cost of new 
nuclear build was based on “voodoo economics” and underestimated by a factor of three (BBC News, 
                                                     
12 The overnight cost of a power plant refers to the cost that would be incurred if the plant was built at once. 
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2005). Christopher Pain, the nuclear program director at the US Natural Resources Defence Council, 
stated that for nuclear new build, “the primary obstacle has been and remains the financial cost” (Paine, 
2010: 1). In 2008, a representative of Moody’s Investors Service described cost estimates released by 
major nuclear operators such as NRG Energy, Exelon, and Southern Company, as “having blown by 
our highest estimates” of projections that were made just eight months earlier (Smith, 2008: 1). 
The interviews conducted as part of this research project further support the findings from the literature 
review that the cost of constructing nuclear power plants remains a significant impediment to the 
success of the nuclear renaissance and the future of the nuclear industry. The importance of economics 
in facilitating or hindering nuclear development was by far the most extensively cited and discussed 
issue amongst the interview participants. Every participant interviewed identified the economics of 
nuclear power as a major obstacle to the success of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and 
North America. The economics of nuclear power was widely identified as the “biggest obstacle” to the 
success of a nuclear renaissance, with one energy analyst concluding that “ultimately it all comes down 
to cost” (Interview with Director of an Energy Research Consultancy, 13/10/2014). This interviewee 
also identified the failure of the nuclear industry to fulfil its promise of developing and implementing a 
more efficient and cost-effective design of nuclear power plant as a key reason for the failure of the 
nuclear renaissance in regions such as Europe, stating that the nuclear industry “wasn’t ready to slap 
down on the table a really modern new design that could be pumped out cookie-cutter style at a low 
cost” (Interview with Director of an Energy Research Consultancy, 13/10/2014). Another academic 
interviewed described the economics of nuclear power as a “catastrophe” that poses an immense 
challenge to nuclear new build, given that “cost means everything” to determining the fate of nuclear 
power (Interview with University Research Fellow, 23/01/2015). A representative of a national nuclear 
science and technology organisation identified the “huge” capital costs for constructing nuclear power 
plants, combined with the current economic conditions facing many OECD countries, as undermining 
the success of the nuclear renaissance (Interview with Government and International Relations Advisor 
for a National Nuclear Science Research Organisation, 2/10/2014). Moreover, this interviewee 
attributed the failure of the nuclear renaissance to the fact that nuclear energy is still not cost competitive 
with other sources of energy, stating that: “while the operating cost is quite low, extremely low 
compared to other [energy] sources, the capital cost is significantly higher. Being able to fund new build 
is a challenge” (Interview with Government and International Relations Advisor for a National Nuclear 
Science Research Organisation, 2/10/2014). 
Two conclusions can be drawn from this combined evidence. Firstly, the financial problems which have 
hindered the development of nuclear power from the 1970s onwards remain unresolved. Nuclear power 
plants are still inherently expensive to build, and this acts as a considerable barrier to the establishment 
and expansion of civil nuclear energy industries. The promise that the nuclear renaissance would be 
driven by new era of nuclear power plants that were cheaper to construct, or that would overcome the 
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financial problems of the past, have been unfulfilled. The accurate forecasting of costs of power 
produced by a nuclear power plant continues to be difficult to achieve during the period of an expected 
renaissance. Thomas (2010) identifies several reasons why this continues to be the case. Cost estimates 
continue to be based on ‘overnight costs’ of construction, which ignore issues of inflation and financing, 
such as the cost of interest incurred on borrowings during the construction of the plant. Several of the 
processes involved in the nuclear fuel cycle have still not been proven on a commercial scale, and could 
therefore result in far higher costs than originally estimated. Similarly, modern designs of nuclear 
technologies are untested, and could therefore incur far higher costs than initially expected. There is 
also a lack of reliable and current data on the actual costs of nuclear power plants, a problem that is 
compounded by the continued secrecy of utilities in terms of the actual costs which they incur. 
Consequently, the failure of the nuclear renaissance can be explained, in part, by the poor economic 
performance of nuclear power plants. This conclusion is affirmed by findings of both the document 
analysis and the interviews conducted for this research. The second conclusion that can be drawn from 
this chapter is that the idea of cost has remained at the forefront of debates about nuclear power during 
the nuclear renaissance. The ideational prominence of the costs of constructing and operation nuclear 
power that first emerged in the mid-1970s remains unchanged today. Both policymakers and industry 
representatives continue to perceive cost as a fundamental issue in determining whether nuclear power 
development should take place. 
The economic challenges inherent to nuclear development are arguably even more of a problem for 
nuclear new build now than they were in the 1970s, as governments are becoming less willing to provide 
the financial support and subsidisation that has historically been required for nuclear new build to take 
place. As discussed in much greater detail in Chapter 10, a broad contextual shift has taken place from 
the 1970s onwards whereby neoliberal ideas have become increasingly influential over the decision-
making processes of government. The rise of neoliberal ideas has created a new institutional and 
ideational environment that has heavily shaped the behaviour of policymakers and their approach to 
civil nuclear energy development. Within the US and the UK in particular, the rise of neoliberalism has 
contributed to a decline in state interventionism, an aversion to subsidies and a growing preference for 
market mechanisms. This has meant that governments are now less willing to provide the same extent 
of direct financial support than they have in the past. This is problematic for the expansion of civil 
nuclear power, which has historically relied upon extensive state subsidies in order for new nuclear 
reactors to be built. 
CONCLUSION 
Two conclusions can be drawn from this chapter. Firstly, there has been an ideational shift in the way 
that agents perceive and prioritise the economics of nuclear power. In the 1950s and 1960s the 
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economics of nuclear power were largely viewed as a non-issue. However, from the mid-1970s 
onwards, the economics of nuclear power have become central to the nuclear debate. Any decision to 
construct a nuclear reactor is now dependent on the economic estimates and actual costs involved. This 
ideational shift has been driven by several factors including a greater realisation of the actual costs 
involved in constructing nuclear power plants, the increasing frequency and visibility of construction 
time and cost overruns in nuclear construction projects, as well as a broader contextual shift in the 
degree to which governments are willing to provide financial support for nuclear new build.  
Secondly, the economic problems that have historically plagued nuclear new build have not been 
resolved, despite promises made by the nuclear industry which suggested that a turning point was 
reached in the economics of nuclear power. Nuclear power plants are still inherently expensive to build, 
and pose a risky investment option for financiers. The nuclear reactor construction projects that have 
begun in Western Europe and North America since 2000 have been a clear example of history repeating 
itself, with the projects far exceeding their original construction cost and time estimates. The ongoing 
financial problems facing nuclear new build have contributed to the failure of the nuclear renaissance 
as they have caused many private companies to withdraw their plans for new reactors to be constructed. 
Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) are one of the nuclear industry’s latest proposed solutions to the 
economic challenges facing nuclear power. SMRs are meant to defy the conventional economic logic 
of nuclear power which has typically been to achieve economic competitiveness through economics of 
scale. SMRs, on the other hand, are meant to achieve economic competitiveness through “economies 
of serial production” (Glaser et al., 2015: 20). That is, unit costs are decreased by being able to build 
larger numbers of identical smaller modular reactors within a single production facility. This is meant 
to reduce unit costs through a learning process, or the “learning rate” (the relative reduction in cost of 
construction accompanying every doubling of the cumulative number of units). SMRs are expected to 
be easier to finance, given that the absolute cost of one SMR is less than that of a large reactor. While 
there is great hope amongst the nuclear industry for SMRs to be the future of an economically 
competitive nuclear power, the economic effectiveness of SMRs is yet to be proved on a large scale. 
Large initial orders of SMRs are needed to begin the serial production process. Moreover, SMRs will 
continue to be subject to the same broader set of challenges that face all nuclear reactors in terms of 
siting and public acceptance for nuclear new build. 
Clearly, the economics of nuclear power continue to be fundamental to determining whether nuclear 
new build will take place. The nuclear renaissance has failed, in part, because nuclear development is 
still financially risky, struggles to compete with alternative energy sources, and requires massive capital 
investment. Governments are now also less willing to provide the same levels of mass subsidisation 
that nuclear power has historically depended upon in order to succeed. Moreover, the ideational shift 
that has taken place means that these financial problems cannot be overlooked by policymakers or the 
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nuclear industry. There is a disjuncture between the rhetoric and reality of a nuclear renaissance because 
agents now perceive the cost of nuclear build as a defining consideration in whether or to what extent 
they will support nuclear development. It is highly unlikely that an ideational shift will take place 
whereby the economics of nuclear power will become less central to the nuclear debate. Therefore, a 
nuclear renaissance is unlikely to take place unless the economic problems plaguing nuclear power can 
be resolved. To date, there is little evidence to suggest that this is going to happen. Consequently, the 
economics of nuclear power appear to have contributed to the failure of the nuclear renaissance thus far 
in Western Europe and North America. Moreover, nuclear new build is unlikely to take place in these 
regions unless the financial problems that have historically plagued nuclear development are resolved. 
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5 .  N U CLEA R SA F ETY  
This chapter argues that the disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance 
can be explained by a shift in the way in which agents perceive and prioritise the safety of nuclear 
power. While the degree to which nuclear power plants can be operated safely is important to 
determining the policy and investment decisions around nuclear power, what matters just as much to 
determining the success of nuclear development is the extent to which agents perceive nuclear power 
as safe. The degree to which agents (primarily voters) perceive nuclear power as safe is important as it 
determines how much political capital politicians are willing to invest in trying to overcome public 
opposition. The establishment and expansion of the first civil nuclear power programmes in the 1950s 
and 1960s was facilitated by a lack of concern over the potential hazards of nuclear energy. Little 
consideration was given by policymakers, industry representatives, the media or the general public to 
the risks posed by the construction, operation or closure of nuclear power plants. This is evident in a 
distinct absence of consideration over the safety of nuclear power plants in political debates and media 
reporting during the 1950s and 1960s. 
However, from the 1970s, nuclear safety began to feature more prominently in public and political 
discourse over whether civil nuclear programmes should be established or expanded. This shift was 
driven by the increasing visibility and severity of accidents at nuclear power plants, exemplified by the 
disasters at Three Mile Island (TMI) in 1979 and Chernobyl in 1986, which have undermined 
government and industry promises that any risks posed by nuclear power can be safely managed through 
regulation and technological advancements. As a result, nuclear power has increasingly been perceived 
by large segments of the public as an unsafe and inherently risky technology with potentially 
catastrophic consequences. Moreover, broad contextual shifts – such as the growth of environmentalism 
and the emergence of a ‘risk society’ – have served to further heighten public awareness of and concern 
over the dangers posed by nuclear power. This changing perception of nuclear power and nuclear safety 
has contributed to an increase in public opposition to the construction and operation of nuclear facilities. 
When the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance emerged in the early 2000s, one of the key promises made 
by the nuclear industry was that new reactor designs would be safer to operate than ever before. As a 
result, there would be little reason to oppose nuclear power on the grounds that it is unsafe. Moreover, 
nuclear industry representatives pointed to the impressive safety track-record of nuclear power plants 
throughout the globe since the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986 as further evidence that nuclear power 
poses no threat to society or the environment. It was expected that these two factors would allay any 
remaining public concerns over the safety of nuclear power, thereby reducing public opposition to 
nuclear new build and pave the way for a revival of nuclear power to take place. 
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However, there is little evidence to suggest that such a transformation in public perceptions of nuclear 
safety has occurred. Rather, public opinion polling from 2000 onwards suggests that the perception of 
nuclear power as an inherently unsafe or risky technology continues to remain entrenched. Opposition 
to nuclear new build has continued to take place during the renaissance period on the grounds that 
nuclear power poses unacceptable risks to humans and their environment. Consequently, the nuclear 
renaissance has failed, in part, because of the widespread and sustained perception that nuclear power 
is unsafe. 
THE IDEATIONAL SHIFT IN NUCLEAR SAFETY 
When civil nuclear energy programmes were first established in the 1950s and 1960s, there appeared 
to be little consideration given to the potential safety issues associated with nuclear power. While public 
opinion data on nuclear power in the 1950s and 1960s is not readily available, the lack of concern for 
nuclear safety issues is nevertheless evidenced by the distinct lack of consideration in debates over 
nuclear energy’s role in society as to the potential environmental and human health hazards associated 
with nuclear power plants. One reason for this absence of concern was that the scientific community 
reassured the public that the problems associated with radioactive materials could be safely managed 
through technical and engineering solutions, and therefore did not pose a significant environmental or 
safety threat (North, 1998: 123). As a result, the potential risks that nuclear power poses to human safety 
were largely dismissed on the grounds that the statistical probability of a serious nuclear incident 
occurring was very low (Scurlock, 2010: 31). Yet, in contrast to this belief, accidents were already 
taking place at nuclear power plants during this time. For example, in 1957, thirty-five men were 
exposed to “substantial airborne contamination” in a radiation leak caused by a fire at Britain’s 
Windscale Piles (The New York Times, 1974: 4). Radiation was released across Cumbria, and spread 
further throughout the UK and Europe. There were fears that the radioactive material would contaminate 
the milk produced in the surrounding area, causing health problems in children such as Thyroid Cancer. 
In response, locally produced milk within a radius of 500km2 of the Windscale Piles was destroyed for 
several weeks (Awosika, 2008: 4). The Chalk River Nuclear Laboratories in Canada suffered serious 
nuclear accidents in 1952, when a reactor core was destroyed, and in 1958, when a partial meltdown 
caused masses of contaminated water to leak into the reactor building (Cross, 1980; Milnes, 2011). 
Similar events occurred at the Enrico Fermi Nuclear Generating Station in the US, when a partial 
meltdown occurred in 1966 (Kavanagh, 2011). Despite the severity of these accidents, media reporting 
on nuclear incidents remained limited and generated minimal public interest or concern (Camilleri, 
1984: 75). This suggests that the safety of nuclear power did not register as a significant issue for agents 
during the initial two decades of civil nuclear energy development. 
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In the 1970s, however, an ideational shift began to take place in the way that agents (policymakers, 
industry representatives, the media and the general public) perceived and prioritised the safety of 
nuclear power plants. Prior to this period, the military origins of nuclear power had kept the industry 
shrouded in secrecy. However, from the 1970s onwards, a number of events took place to erode this 
secrecy and place nuclear power increasingly in the public spotlight. Accidents at nuclear power plants 
became increasingly severe and visible to the public. The first fatalities to take place at a nuclear facility 
in West Germany occurred in 1975, when two workmen died from burns inflicted by escaping steam at 
the Gundremmingen Nuclear Power Plant (The New York Times, 1975a: 7). There were numerous 
reports of workers being seriously injured or exposed to excessive levels of radiation at nuclear power 
plants across the US (The New York Times, 1979: 30; Bertini, 1980: 66-7; Daytona Beach Morning 
Journal, 1977: 5C; Lewiston Morning Tribune, 1979: 2A). At the same time, media reporting on nuclear 
accidents became more widespread. This made it increasingly difficult for the nuclear industry to 
perpetuate the idea that nuclear power was an entirely safe source of electricity generation. As the 
potential dangers of nuclear power became more visible, members of the public became increasingly 
critical of the government and the nuclear industry’s ability to ensure that the risks of nuclear power 
were contained. Public scepticism over the safety of nuclear power was further heightened by broader 
contextual shifts occurring at the time. For example, the environmental movement emerged in the mid-
1970s, which publicised the dangers of nuclear power to the general public (see Chapter 7 for a more 
detailed examination of the impact of environmentalism on public perceptions of nuclear power). The 
environmental movement contributed to the increasing visibility of nuclear issues by forcing them into 
sight through public hearings and demonstrations. Similarly, Beck (1992) argues that a ‘risk society’ 
has emerged from the late 1970s onwards, whereby individuals have become increasingly concerned 
about the risks resulting from technological advancements, such as nuclear power. The impact of a risk 
society on public and political perceptions of nuclear power is explored in further detail in Chapter 9. 
Governments tended to respond to the growing scepticism over the safety of nuclear power by 
promising more stringent regulatory requirements and safety standards. However, in doing so, 
government representatives also served to confirm and legitimise the public’s concerns that nuclear 
power plants were unsafe in the first place. By taking active and visible measures to allay public 
concerns over nuclear safety, government actors also contributed to a shift in the political agenda 
whereby safety considerations have become intrinsic to the nuclear debate. Both the rise in public 
concern over nuclear safety, and the government discourse and actions responding to and legitimising 
these concerns, has resulted in the issue of nuclear safety becoming a central discussion point in any 
debate over the value or future of nuclear power. 
Attempts by the nuclear industry to improve public perceptions of nuclear safety proved largely 
unsuccessful, and in some instances, even served to worsen the industry’s public image. The nuclear 
industry initially responded to the increasing concerns over nuclear safety by staunchly defending the 
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industry’s safety record. They argued that the probability of a major reactor accident taking place was 
no more than 1 in 100,000 reactor years (Camilleri, 1984: 81). The chairwoman of the US Atomic 
Energy Commission (AEC), Dixie Lee Ray, defended nuclear power plants on the grounds that they 
were “infinitely safer than eating” (Walker, 2009). In order to allay public fears over nuclear reactors, 
the AEC commissioned a study to provide a realistic estimate of the risks to the public should an 
accident take place at a nuclear power plant. The Reactor Safety Study was completed in 1975 and 
concluded that “the risks to the public from potential accidents in nuclear power plants are 
comparatively small” (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1975: 1). However, rather than restoring 
public faith in the nuclear industry, the report came under extensive criticism for its methods and 
conclusions (Office of Technology Assessment, 1984: 218-9). In 1978, the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission withdrew its endorsement of the report’s findings (Office of Technology Assessment, 
1984: 219). By the late 1970s, the nuclear industry had little choice but to accept that public concerns 
over nuclear safety were going to remain a central issue for determining the future success of the nuclear 
industry.  
The shift in public perceptions of nuclear safety became even more firmly entrenched after the disasters 
at Three Mile Island (TMI) in 1979 and Chernobyl in 1986. The severity of these two nuclear disasters 
appeared to confirm the public’s fears that nuclear power could not be managed safely by governments 
and the nuclear industry. The partial meltdown of a reactor at the TMI nuclear station in Pennsylvania 
on the 28th March 1979 was described by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2013: 1) as the 
“most serious accident in US commercial nuclear power plant operating history”, even though the 
meltdown did not result in any fatalities. Approximately 144,000 residents evacuated the area, even 
though a mandatory evacuation was never called (Observer-Reporter, 1979: A6; Scurlock, 2010: 31). 
The damaged reactor took almost twelve years to clean up, at a cost of roughly US$973m (WNA, 
2012c). 
The impact of the TMI disaster on agents’ perceptions of nuclear safety was significant. In the US, 
public opposition to nuclear energy experienced an immediate and sustained increase in the wake of 
TMI (Office of Technology Assessment, 1984: 211). Several factors surrounding the TMI disaster in 
1979 amplified the public and political attention that the event received, leading Mazur (1990: 299) to 
suggest that “had the accident at Three Mile Island occurred in 1976, it might also have been ignored, 
at least initially…It happened at the right time and place to make it the centre of attention”. One factor 
which amplified the attention that TMI received was what Dubner and Levitt (2007) term the “Jane 
Fonda effect”. Twelve days prior to the meltdown at TMI, a film starring Jane Fonda, The China 
Syndrome, was released. The movie depicts a journalist (Fonda) discovering the cover-up of a near-
miss safety accident at a nuclear power plant. Despite the fictional nature of the film, it nevertheless 
served to highlight the risks associated with nuclear energy, and cast doubts on the ability of government 
and industry to safely operate nuclear power plants. Even before TMI occurred, newspapers were 
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publishing articles about the film, posing questions as to whether the fictional plot could become a real-
life scenario, questioning the ability of regulators to ensure the safety of nuclear power plants, and 
reminding the public of other accidents which had previously occurred at nuclear facilities. An 
executive from Westinghouse described the film as “an overall character assassination of an entire 
industry” (Burnham, 1979b: D1). The film stoked “widespread panic” about the nuclear industry, and 
placed the dangers of nuclear power at the forefront of public consciousness (Dubner and Levitt, 2007). 
The TMI disaster contributed to the change in public perceptions of nuclear power and nuclear safety. 
The coincidental release of the film so close to the disaster taking place contributed to the extensive 
news coverage that TMI received – far greater than the news coverage of any previous nuclear accidents 
taking place in the US or elsewhere. Governments responded to the heightened public concerns over 
nuclear safety by revising their nuclear programmes and strengthening their institutional regimes for 
ensuring nuclear safety. The Swedish government responded to public concerns over nuclear safety by 
holding a national referendum on the future of nuclear power, which resulted in a plan to phase-out all 
nuclear power stations in the country by 2010 (Nohrstedt, 2005: 1042). In the US, TMI prompted a 
widespread overhaul in reactor safety management, with greater attention paid to the “human factors” 
that can contribute to safety incidents (Walker and Wellock, 2010: 57). The Institute of Nuclear Power 
Operations was established by the nuclear industry in the months after TMI as an industry watchdog. 
While these actions were undertaken in an attempt to improve public confidence in nuclear safety, they 
also served to legitimise public fears by suggesting that nuclear power in its current form was unsafe, 
and that actions needed to be taken to address this. Furthermore, by making public announcements 
about their efforts to improve nuclear safety, government representatives contributed to the shift in 
discourse whereby issues of safety became inextricably linked to any discussion of nuclear power and 
its future. 
Public concerns over the safety of nuclear power were further reinforced by the Chernobyl nuclear 
disaster. On the 26th April 1986, an explosion destroyed one of four reactors at the Chernobyl Nuclear 
Power Plant in the Ukraine (then Soviet Union). The explosion caused massive amounts of radioactivity 
to become airborne and eventually fall over large areas of Belarus, Russia, and the Ukraine. However, 
it was not until two days after the event – when radiation levels ten times higher than normal were 
detected in Sweden, Denmark, and Finland – that the Soviet Union revealed that the explosion had 
taken place. Even then, the Soviet Union did not initially disclose which nuclear plant was affected or 
where the plant was located, nor did they reveal whether there were any injuries or deaths caused 
(Williams, 1986). The extent of the impact of Chernobyl continues to be debated today. While less than 
fifty deaths were directly caused by radiation from the disaster, predictions over total deaths attributable 
to Chernobyl range from 4,000 to half a million (Vidal, 2010). Over 100,000km2 of land was 
significantly contaminated (Marples, 1996: 24), and almost 350,000 people were evacuated or resettled 
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(UNDP/UNICEF, 2002: 66). There have also been widespread mental health impacts and elevated 
incidence rates of childhood thyroid cancer in the affected region (Chernobyl Forum, 2006). 
Chernobyl has arguably done more to damage the public image of the nuclear industry and reinforce 
the stereotype that nuclear power is unsafe than any other event in the history of the technology. As 
news of the damage at Chernobyl spread, public and political confidence in the safety of nuclear power 
collapsed. The secrecy surrounding the Soviet Union’s reluctance to admit that a nuclear accident had 
taken place, or to disclose the scale of its impact, fuelled public concerns about transparency in the 
nuclear industry. Government and industry officials in Western Europe and North America attempted 
to reassure the public about the safety of nuclear power by highlighting the difference in Soviet and 
Western reactor designs. The Chairman of the Central Electricity Generating Board argued that nuclear 
safety standards were significantly higher in Great Britain than in the Soviet Union, and as such, it was 
impossible for a disaster like Chernobyl to take place in the UK (Thorson, 1986). The Vice-President 
of the Canadian Nuclear Association described the possibility of a core meltdown in Canadian reactor 
designs as “inconceivable” (Wilson, 1986: A21). However, the detection of elevated radiation levels 
across Europe following the disaster also illustrated to the public the trans-boundary effects of a nuclear 
accident. It became clear that the effects of sub-standard reactor designs were not limited to the country 
operating the nuclear power plant. 
The impact of Chernobyl on the global nuclear industry was immediate and long-lasting. In the months 
after the meltdown, new reactor starts ground to a halt worldwide, several operating reactors were shut 
down prematurely, and many of the reactors that were planned or already under construction were 
cancelled (Darst and Dawson, 2010: 56). The impact of Chernobyl on nuclear policy was particularly 
dramatic in Western Europe. In the year following Chernobyl, the Italian government held a referendum 
on nuclear energy, the result of which was to phase-out the country’s entire use of nuclear power 
(Nuclear Information and Resource Service, 2011: 2). Opposition political parties in Germany and the 
UK announced that they would phase out nuclear energy if they were elected (Renn, 1990: 151). The 
Swedish government brought forward the implementation start-date for its planned nuclear phase-out 
(Bergenäs, 2009). Finland postponed new orders for nuclear reactors, while Greece decided that it 
would not pursue the development of a nuclear programme (Renn, 1990: 154). Public opposition to 
nuclear power immediately after the accident increased in Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Spain, Sweden, The Netherlands, the UK and Yugoslavia (Renn, 1990: 155). 
By the 1990s, the issue of nuclear safety had become central to the debate over nuclear power. The 
increasing severity and visibility of accidents at nuclear facilities has meant that nuclear power is now 
widely viewed as a source of potentially catastrophic danger to society and the environment. The public 
is now less willing to unquestioningly accept industry claims that nuclear power is one of the safest 
sources of energy production available. As a result, nuclear industry representatives and pro-nuclear 
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government officials now have to work much harder to convince the public that nuclear power plants 
can be operated safely. An ideational shift had occurred whereby public perceptions of nuclear power 
have been altered to give much greater consideration to the technology’s potential risks and hazards. 
A NEW ERA OF NUCLEAR SAFETY? 
A key factor contributing to the expectation of a nuclear renaissance was the promises made by the 
nuclear industry that new reactor designs would be safer than ever before. Consequently, there would 
be little reason for the public to be worried about the safety of nuclear power, or to oppose nuclear 
power on the grounds that it is unsafe. Moreover, the nuclear industry pointed to its impressive safety 
record over the past two decades as evidence that there was no longer any reason for the public to be 
concerned about the potential dangers of nuclear power. 
The expectation of a nuclear renaissance was driven by representatives from the nuclear industry who 
announced the development of new nuclear reactor designs that would be safer than ever before (Power, 
2004: 7). Specifically, the nuclear industry claimed that new Generation III+ advanced nuclear reactor 
designs were far safer than previous models as they incorporated passive safety features, rather than 
requiring active intervention to prevent a nuclear accident from taking place as a result of a malfunction 
(WNA, 2014a). Highlighting these design improvements, Westinghouse described its Generation III+ 
nuclear reactor, the AP1000, as the safest nuclear power plant available worldwide (Westinghouse, 
2015a). AREVA described its European Pressurised Reactor as having “an unequalled safety level 
thanks to a drastic reduction of the probability of severe accidents” (AREVA, 2015). GE Hitachi (2014) 
described its Generation III+ Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor as “the world’s safest 
reactor”. A spokesman for Entergy described the nuclear industry as “by far the safest industry in the 
world” (Dennehy, 2005). A report released by the OECD’s Nuclear Energy Agency concluded that the 
“theoretically calculated frequency of a severe nuclear power plant accident” had been reduced by a 
factor of 1600 between the Generation I and the Generation III/III+ nuclear reactor designs (OECD 
Nuclear Energy Agency, 2010a: 7). These claims, that nuclear power was safer than ever before, were 
expected to drive a nuclear renaissance by improving public and political confidence in the safety of 
power, thereby increasing popular support for nuclear new build.  
Public perceptions of nuclear safety were also meant to have become more favourable as a result of 
sustained improvements in the nuclear industry’s safety record over the past two decades. The 
Chernobyl disaster prompted numerous institutional responses which sought to improve both the safety 
of nuclear power plants, as well as the public perception of nuclear power as safe. The World 
Association of Nuclear Operators was created after Chernobyl in order to foster a global nuclear safety 
culture, while the IAEA’s approach to plant safety was reformed (Adamantiades and Kessides, 2009: 
5154). These organisations have since worked to improve plant safety by creating transnational 
79 
  
networks and exchanges for continuous and results-oriented peer review of safety practices (WNA, 
2013h). Plants in the US have fared particularly well, with nuclear facilities in 2011 achieving near-
record levels of reliability and safety performance (Nuclear Energy Insitute, 2012). Moreover, since 
Chernobyl, there has not been a single fatality as a result of exposure to radiation from a commercial 
nuclear reactor (WNA, 2014l). The nuclear industry expected that this impressive track record would 
improve public perceptions of the safety of nuclear energy, and convince the public that nuclear energy 
was a safe form of energy production. 
However, public concerns over nuclear safety were renewed afresh when a nuclear disaster occurred at 
Fukushima, Japan in March 2011. The events at Fukushima reignited fears over nuclear safety and 
prompted countries worldwide to review and revise their nuclear energy programmes (Elliott, 2013). In 
the months following the Fukushima disaster, the governments of Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Mexico, 
Belgium, Japan, Kuwait, and Bahrain abandoned plans for future nuclear energy development. Nuclear 
development plans were delayed in Indonesia and Thailand, and temporarily suspended in China. The 
US undertook safety reviews of all its nuclear power plants, with several reactor construction plans 
delayed or abandoned. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission responded to Fukushima by ordering 
$100m worth of safety enhancements at existing nuclear power plants (WNA, 2014l). These decisions 
seemed to confirm public fears that nuclear power was unsafe and that government and industry 
regulation of the technology could not be trusted. 
The revelation of further safety incidents in the months following the meltdowns have continued to 
erode public confidence in the ability of the nuclear industry to safely and effectively respond to a 
nuclear disaster. It has since been revealed that hundreds of tonnes of highly radioactive water have 
leaked from storage tanks at the Fukushima Daiichi plant, and that contaminated water has also started 
leaking into the sea (The Telegraph, 2013a; Yamaguchi, 2013). The Fukushima disaster effectively 
overrode any earlier promises made by the nuclear industry that nuclear accidents were a relic of the 
past. It served to highlight the ongoing ideational importance of nuclear safety, and the centrality of the 
idea of nuclear safety to determining the success of the nuclear renaissance. 
Yet even in the face of Fukushima, nuclear energy still holds a far more impressive safety record than 
any form of fossil fuels (OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, 2010a). Despite the severity of the nuclear 
incident at Fukushima, the fact that not a single death has been attributable to the nuclear accident could 
arguably serve as a further justification that nuclear power remains safe even under severe and highly 
improbable conditions. However, the idea that nuclear is an unsafe technology has continued to 
dominate agents’ perceptions of nuclear power, and influence their degree of support for the technology. 
In addition to longer-standing concerns around accidents at nuclear power plants and radiation releases, 
growing fears around terrorism and the possibility of an attack at a nuclear facility have added a new 
layer of public concern that the nuclear industry has to contend with if they are to convince agents that 
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nuclear power is safe. For example, a report released in 2013 by the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention 
Project concluded that more than 100 nuclear reactors across the US are inadequately prepared in the 
case of an attempted terrorist attack (Gardner, 2013). 
The issue of nuclear safety continues to be a key justification underpinning the arguments put forward 
by large-scale organisations and localised anti-nuclear groups alike for why nuclear power should not 
be utilised. Friends of the Earth describes nuclear power as one of the “most dangerous” sources of 
energy, evidenced by the history of accidents and leaks at nuclear power plants (Friends of the Earth, 
2013a: 1). Greenpeace International (2014b) describes nuclear power as “inherently dangerous” and 
claims that “safe reactors are a myth”. The ‘Stop Hinkley’ campaign, which aims to stop the 
construction of the Hinkley Point C nuclear reactor in the UK – opposes the construction on the grounds 
that “nuclear power stations risk a catastrophic accident”, and that they are a “prime target for a terrorist 
attack” (Stop Hinkley, 2014: 1). In Germany, the leaders of the Green political party stated that 
Fukushima demonstrated “that nuclear power is an uncontrollable, highly dangerous technology” 
(Deutsche Welle, 2011). The German environmental group, BUND (Friends of the Earth Germany), 
opposed nuclear power on the grounds that “we can no longer afford bearing the risk of a nuclear 
catastrophe” (Associated Press, 2011). The French anti-nuclear group, Sortir du nucléaire, argues that 
nuclear power should be phased-out on the grounds that “a nuclear accident provokes countless victims 
and leaves vast tracts of land uninhabitable for thousands of years” (Sortir du nucléaire, 2015). This 
disconnect between the measured level of nuclear safety, versus what the public perceives to be the 
level of nuclear safety, highlights the central importance of safety as a social construction. 
When the European Commission called for stress testing of nuclear power plants in the wake of 
Fukushima, several Members of the European Parliament (MEP) stated their opposition to nuclear 
power on the grounds of safety concerns. For example, MEP Margrete Auken, declared that “the only 
thing that is safe and secure about nuclear is that our grandchildren will hate us” (Skelton, 2012). MEP 
Jo Leinen, warned that “the inherent risk of a commercial nuclear power station is there…you cannot 
avoid the [possibility that the] biggest nuclear accident would happen” (Skelton, 2012). In the US, the 
Sierra Club – a nationwide environmental organisation – opposes nuclear energy on the grounds that it 
is “a uniquely dangerous energy technology for humanity” (Sierra Club, 2015). Similarly, the Sierra 
Club in Canada opposes nuclear power on the grounds that “contrary to nuclear industry advertisements, 
nuclear power is neither clean nor safe. We cannot afford to forget the devastation of a nuclear 
catastrophe” (Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout, 2006). The Green Party of the United States advocates 
for a complete phase-out of nuclear power because “all processes associated with nuclear power are 
dangerous” (Green Party, 2012). 
The nuclear industry has continued to perceive nuclear safety as a matter of risk, rather than uncertainty. 
They have attempted to improve public confidence in nuclear power through a measured, empirical 
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approach. They publish factsheets and reports measuring and testing the degree of safety at nuclear 
power plants, and provide the public with detailed reports of the engineering measures that are in place 
to prevent any kind of nuclear accident from taking place. The numerous safety reviews and stress tests 
that were conducted at nuclear power plants post-Fukushima were expected to reassure the public that 
nuclear power is being safely and competently managed and regulated. However, the idea of nuclear 
power as an unsafe technology remains largely unchanged in the public’s mind. If the public is 
unconvinced by the nuclear industry’s guarantees of nuclear power as a safe source of energy 
production, then governments are unlikely to support nuclear energy development, for fear of public 
opposition. Therefore, what matters most is what agents believe to be the case when it comes to nuclear 
safety, rather than what the industry or government objectively measures the safety of nuclear power to 
be. 
The failure of the nuclear industry to convince the public of the safety of nuclear power is evidenced 
by opinion polls conducted during the renaissance period. A poll conducted for the International Atomic 
Energy Agency in 2005 found that only 28 percent of respondents believed nuclear power to be a safe 
and important source of electricity (OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, 2010b: 34). Another study 
conducted by Globescan in 2011 investigated public perceptions of nuclear power in twelve countries 
that were currently operating nuclear power plants (Globescan, 2011). Only 22 percent of the 
respondents agreed with the statement that “nuclear power is relatively safe and an important source of 
electricity, and we should build more nuclear power plants” (Globescan, 2011). The 2010 
Eurobarometer report on Europeans and Nuclear Safety investigates public opinion on issues of nuclear 
energy and nuclear safety from the 27 EU Member States. The survey found that in 18 out of the 27 
countries surveyed, an absolute or relative majority of respondents believed that nuclear risks are being 
underestimated (Eurobarometer, 2010: 46). Furthermore, 52 percent of respondents surveyed believed 
that nuclear power plants are not sufficiently secured against terrorist attacks, 49 percent do not believe 
that radioactive waste disposal can be carried out safely, and 45 percent of respondents believed that 
nuclear materials are not sufficiently protected against malevolent use (Eurobarometer, 2010: 52)13. 
A survey of British public perceptions of climate change and energy conducted in 2010 found that only 
39 percent of respondents thought that the nuclear industry could be trusted to run nuclear power 
stations safely (Spence et al., 2010: 13). A study conducted by MIT in 2007 into the US public’s 
perceptions of nuclear power found that 69 percent of respondents disagreed with the statement that 
“nuclear waste can be stored safely for many years” (MIT, 2011: 129). Another study of US public 
                                                     
13 It is important to note that there are also significant variations in how safe nuclear power is perceived to be by 
the public across different countries in the region of Western Europe. For example, in the 2007 Eurobarometer 
report on Europeans and Nuclear Safety, 61% of respondents from Sweden and 50% of respondents from the 
Czech Republic believed that the advantages of nuclear power as an energy source outweighs the risks it poses 
(Eurobarometer, 2007b: 18). On the other hand, only 13% of respondents from Ireland and 13% of respondents 
from Greece agreed with this statement (Eurobarometer, 2007b: 18). 
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opinion conducted in 2011 asked participants to provide the first word that came to mind when they 
thought of “nuclear power”. Participants were significantly more likely to associate nuclear power with 
being bad, dangerous or scary, or associate it with images of “disaster”, than they were in a previous 
version of the study conducted in 2005 (Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies, 2015). 
Similarly, a study conducted in the weeks after the Fukushima nuclear disaster of the Canadian public’s 
opinion of nuclear power generation found that 43 percent of respondents agreed with the statement 
that “the safety of nuclear power is now in question and we should hold off building new plants”, 
compared with only 22 percent of respondents who agreed that “nuclear power is a safe source of energy 
and Canada should continue to build more plants” (Abacus Data, 2011: 6). The 2012 Canadian National 
Nuclear Attitude Survey found that 55 percent of respondents thought that the word “dangerous” 
describes nuclear power extremely or very well (Innovative Research Group, 2012: 17) 14. The findings 
of these many opinion polls suggest that despite the strong safety record of the nuclear industry, and 
the many claims made by the industry of new and safer reactor designs, public opinion on the safety of 
nuclear power remains divided. 
The interviews conducted for this thesis confirm the important role that public perceptions of nuclear 
safety have played in influencing the success of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North 
America. One academic interviewed argued that the failure of the nuclear renaissance in OECD 
countries was partly a result of the inability of the nuclear industry to convince the public of the safety 
of nuclear energy. More specifically, the interviewee argued that the nuclear industry has been unable 
to convince the public of the safety of nuclear power, and that this has prevented the nuclear industry 
from successfully generating a nuclear renaissance. The interviewee stated that “the engineering, 
science and the industry sector must not be telling the story well enough, because the reality is that it 
has proven itself to be perhaps the safest energy or electricity supply system available to us. Yes there 
have been some incidents, but the number of incidents of death is still way shorter than any other energy 
system” (Interview with Director of Energy Research Centre, 17/09/2014). 
Another academic interviewed highlighted the ongoing public fear over radiation from nuclear power 
plants as a barrier to the expansion of nuclear power development. In particular, the interviewee 
highlighted the intangible and imperceptible nature of radiation as a core element underpinning public 
fears over nuclear power, as compared with other forms of energy electricity, describing this as “the 
                                                     
14 It should be noted that there is not a universal consensus amongst public opinion studies that nuclear power is 
unsafe. There have been contradictions in findings of public opinion on nuclear safety between studies, and even 
within studies themselves. For example, the 2010 Eurobarometer report on Europeans and Nuclear Safety also 
found that 59 percent of respondents were confident that nuclear power plants can be operated safely 
(Eurobarometer, 2010: 53). This finding somewhat contradicts the report’s other findings on perceptions of 
nuclear safety, and demonstrates the complexity and variability in public perceptions on nuclear power and the 
influence of survey design on responses. 
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fear of the unknown” (Interview with University Research Fellow, 5/09/2014). The interviewee argued 
that: 
“The problem is people would rather see a coal-fired power plant and all the black smoke coming 
out. That’s OK, that doesn’t kill people. We see it there, that’s fine. Radiation you can’t see and 
people are afraid of things you can’t see. So essentially you’ve got a major kind of reputation 
issue in Europe, say Western Europe, where because of what’s happened in Chernobyl, now 
reinforced by Fukushima, the population is just allergic to it in some way. They don’t want 
nuclear power. I don’t know how you can bypass that problem in any shape or form” (Interview 
with University Research Fellow, 5/09/2014). 
Agents and their ideas about nuclear safety matter. What counts is not simply whether or not nuclear 
power plants can be operated safely and that the nuclear industry can objectively measure and 
demonstrate this, but whether or not the public believe that nuclear power is safe. While the nuclear 
industry argues that it has an impressive safety track record when compared with other forms of fossil 
fuel energy generation, this argument remains contested (see, for example, Wheatley et al., 2015). 
Moreover, the nuclear industry’s insistence that their risk assessments are ‘objective’ fail to recognise 
that accidents and human error are an inevitable property of complex systems (Perrow, 1984), such as 
those involved in nuclear power plants. Clearly, the nuclear industry’s argument that nuclear power is 
safe has failed to be widely accepted by the public. Public opinion poll data indicates that the 
renaissance period has not witnessed a shift towards greater public confidence in the safety of the 
nuclear industry. Critics of nuclear power cite the safety risks associated with nuclear energy as a core 
reason for their opposition. The events at Fukushima in 2011 have cemented fears already held as a 
result of previous nuclear accidents, and illustrated the inevitability that accidents will happen within 
complex systems. This finding has been reaffirmed through the interviews conducted with experts in 
nuclear energy. Regardless of the objective measures provided by the nuclear industry on the safety of 
nuclear power, what matters for explaining why a renaissance has not taken place is understanding that 
the public continues to believe that nuclear power is unsafe. This belief acts as a significant barrier to 
nuclear energy development in Western Europe and North America, as governments are often unwilling 
to publicly support nuclear power in the face of public opposition. Consequently, the socially 
constructed nature of safety will continue to act as a hindrance to any future attempts at creating a 
nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America. 
CONCLUSION 
In accordance with an Agents in Context Historical Institutionalist perspective, this chapter has argued 
that the ideational context in which agents operate is central to understanding the changing trajectory 
of nuclear energy development over time.  It argues that there has been a collective change in public 
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perceptions of the importance of nuclear safety, and to the ability of governments and the nuclear 
industry to safely manage nuclear power. Furthermore, it argues that this ideational shift has contributed 
to the disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance. The early rise of 
nuclear power in the 1950s and 1960s was made possible, in part, by a widespread lack of concern over 
the safety of nuclear power plants. However, the increasing visibility and severity of accidents at nuclear 
power plants - highlighted by the events at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima – has inflamed 
public fears over the safety of nuclear power. It has also led to a growing public scepticism over the 
ability of governments and the nuclear industry to safely operate and manage nuclear power plants. 
The growth in public concern and scepticism over nuclear safety has served as a barrier to the 
development of nuclear power. Governments and the nuclear industry have responded to these concerns 
through an institutional change – by increasing the regulatory and safety standards that are imposed on 
nuclear power plants to a degree that far surpasses the requirements of any other form of energy 
production. As a result, one of the key justifications for the nuclear renaissance was that the safety 
problem had been ‘fixed’ through the development of new reactor designs that were far safer than the 
models currently in operation. The industry’s strong track record in nuclear safety post-Chernobyl, 
particularly when compared to the safety records of other fossil fuels, was meant to further reinforce 
the industry’s claims that nuclear power was now safe. Yet despite these promises, public opinion poll 
data indicates that large segments of the public still perceive nuclear power to be unsafe. Agents’ 
ongoing concerns over nuclear safety make it considerably difficult for governments to gain public 
support for nuclear energy development, and make it difficult for the nuclear industry to gain a social 
license to operate within a country. Consequently, this chapter concludes that the disconnection between 
the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance can be explained, in part, by an ideational shift in 
the way that agents perceive and prioritise the issue of nuclear safety. It is unlikely that a nuclear 
renaissance will take place for as long as the public continues to believe that nuclear power is unsafe – 
and objective measures and calculations of safety undertaken by the nuclear industry are not enough to 
sway public perceptions of the dangers posed by nuclear power. 
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6 .  N U CLEA R WAS TE  
This chapter argues that the failure of the nuclear renaissance can be explained by an ideational shift in 
the way in which nuclear waste is perceived and prioritised as a policy problem. An inevitable by-
product of the generation of electricity by nuclear power plants is highly radioactive waste. This waste 
can pose immense risks to both human and environmental health. However, the degree to which agents 
have perceived the issue of nuclear waste as a problem in need of an effective solution has changed 
significantly over time. During the early development of civil nuclear power in the 1950s and 1960s, 
the issue of nuclear waste was paid little attention by policymakers, and even less by the general public. 
While policymakers were aware that nuclear waste was a dangerous substance, it did not register as a 
problem that was in need of an immediate solution. Little effort or consideration was invested in 
developing a long-term solution to the management of nuclear waste. 
However, over time, the issue of nuclear waste has become a much more visible policy issue. This 
visibility has been driven by the increasingly negative media coverage on the topic of nuclear waste, 
reports of leaks and mismanagement at nuclear facilities storing radioactive waste, and the emergence 
of the environmental movement in the 1970s. These factors have highlighted to the public the dangers 
associated with nuclear waste, and the risks that could result from mismanagement of radioactive 
substances. Growing public attention to the problem of nuclear waste has led to the issue becoming a 
central discussion point in debates over nuclear energy development. And yet, despite the increasing 
ideational prominence of nuclear waste to debates over nuclear energy development, a long-term 
solution for the storage and disposal of nuclear waste remains elusive. At present, there are no long-
term nuclear high-level waste storage and disposal facilities operating anywhere in the world. Many of 
the attempts by governments and the nuclear industry to site and construct a High Level Waste (HLW) 
disposal facility have been thwarted by the rise of public opposition to the development of such a 
facility, given the risks that nuclear waste poses to human and environmental health. This opposition 
indicates that nuclear waste continues to be a highly problematic issue for the future development of 
nuclear energy programmes worldwide. 
However, the issue of nuclear waste was largely overlooked by advocates of the nuclear renaissance. 
The expectation of a nuclear renaissance was based partly on the assumption that technological 
advancements in nuclear reactor design would result in nuclear power plants producing far less 
radioactive waste than existing designs. In addition, any remaining public fears over nuclear waste were 
meant to be eased and public opposition to the construction of nuclear waste facilities reduced through 
the adoption of more democratic procedures for nuclear waste management. However, the development 
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of advanced nuclear reactor designs does not address the ongoing problem of HLW that continues to sit 
in temporary storage across the globe. The adoption of more democratic procedures for siting nuclear 
waste facilities also proved to have mixed results. In the UK, the adoption of democratic siting 
procedures has failed to secure a site for a long-term nuclear waste disposal facility. Consequently, the 
issue of nuclear waste continues to pose a challenge to nuclear energy development throughout Western 
Europe and North America. The unresolved nature of this issue suggests that the expectation of a nuclear 
renaissance was never likely to become a reality. Governments need to find a politically palatable 
solution to the long-term storage and disposal of nuclear waste in order for nuclear energy development 
to be successful. 
THE HAZARDS OF NUCLEAR WASTE 
There are three categories of radioactive waste generated as a result of operating nuclear power plants. 
Low level waste (LLW) includes items that have become contaminated and emit radiation at low levels, 
and therefore require only minimal shielding for transport and storage. LLW represents 90 percent of 
the total volume of radioactive wastes produced worldwide, but contain only 1 percent of the total 
radioactive content of the waste (WNA 2013f). Intermediate level waste (ILW) represents 7 percent of 
the total volume of radioactive waste, and represents 4 percent of the radioactive content (WNA 2013f). 
High level waste (HLW) consists of used nuclear fuel and separated waste from the reprocessing of 
used nuclear fuel. HLW amounts to only 3 percent of the total volume of nuclear waste, but is 
responsible for 95 percent of all radioactive content. Final disposal of HLW is delayed for 40-50 years 
to allow its radioactivity to decay to a level where it can be handled more easily (WNA 2012d). HLW 
contains highly radioactive elements which can remain hazardous for up to thousands of years 
(Greenberg, 2013: 24). HLW poses the greatest risk to human health, as even short periods of direct 
exposure to radioactive elements can prove fatal (Adeola, 2011: 52). Nuclear waste leakage can enter 
ground water or waterways, contaminating food chains and causing long-term environmental damage 
(US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2011). Nuclear waste poses a further safety risk in regards to 
weapons proliferation, as nuclear waste can be reprocessed and then re-used for the production of ‘dirty 
bombs’ (Medalia, 2011: 60). 
NUCLEAR WASTE IN THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF 
NUCLEAR POWER 
When civil nuclear energy programmes were first being developed in the 1950s and 1960s, little 
consideration was given to the waste that such programmes would generate (Litmanen, 1996: 524). This 
lack of attention is evident on both an international and a domestic level. The International Atomic 
Energy Agency, established in 1957 to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy, did not hold any 
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meetings on developing permanent storage solutions for nuclear waste until 1973 (Walls, 2011: 28). In 
Sweden, only limited attention was paid to the issue of radioactive waste management up until the early 
1970s (Thegerström and Laârouchi Engström, 2013: 359). Nuclear scientists and politicians alike 
assumed that technology would eventually be developed to eliminate the nuclear waste issue (Anshelm 
and Galis, 2009: 272). Meanwhile, any discussion over nuclear waste was limited to political and 
academic circles, with no space for public involvement. Information leaflets produced by the nuclear 
industry made no mention of the risks associated with nuclear waste (Anshelm and Galis, 2009: 273). 
In Belgium, decisions regarding investment in nuclear energy were made with little thought given to 
the issues arising from nuclear waste (Schröder et al., 2015: 141). In the US, neither the original Atomic 
Energy Act of 1946 nor its 1954 amendments explicitly addressed the regulation and disposal of nuclear 
waste. The lack of consideration over the issue of nuclear waste during the early period of nuclear 
development was evident when, in 1967, the British Government tasked the Select Committee on 
Science and Technology with producing a comprehensive report examining the UK nuclear reactor 
programme in general. The completed report made no mention of the radioactive waste being produced 
at existing nuclear reactor sites, nor of the waste which would accumulate over time as the country’s 
nuclear programme expanded (Chandler, 1997: 53). An examination of Hansard, the transcripts of 
British parliamentary debates, reveals that nuclear waste was mentioned only twice in passing in the 
1950s (in 1953 and in 1958), and three times in the 1960s (in 1967, 1968 and 1969).   
Several factors can explain the distinct lack of public or political concern over the issue of nuclear 
waste. Firstly, the amount of HLW that a nuclear power plant generates is physically quite small, and 
can therefore be temporarily stored at the site where the waste was being produced. The ability to store 
waste on-site meant that governments and the nuclear industry had little incentive to develop a longer-
term strategy for storing and disposing of HLW. In the UK, untreated nuclear waste was generally kept 
at the site where it was produced, such as at Sellafield, where nuclear waste was stored in cooling ponds 
and silos without any strategy for how the waste would be treated or removed (Sellafield Ltd., 2012: 5). 
French officials planned on reprocessing their nuclear waste, which meant that little consideration was 
given to developing a long-term HLW storage plan (Palfreman, 2014). However, this assumption 
ignored the fact that reprocessing spent nuclear fuel would still result in a smaller amount of leftover 
HLW that would need to be stored and disposed of. The lack of concern over nuclear waste during this 
time can also be attributed to the fact that the civil and military nuclear facilities were only recently 
constructed, and it was expected that the leftover HLW would not accumulate into larger bodies of 
waste for several decades – at which point it was assumed that longer-term waste storage facilities 
would have been developed elsewhere (Stewart and Stewart, 2011: 22). Consequently, the problem of 
how to dispose of HLW from nuclear facilities was largely overlooked by policymakers throughout the 
first two decades of nuclear energy development. The issue of nuclear waste did not feature in public 
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or political debates over whether nuclear reactors should be constructed. Put simply, political leaders 
and nuclear advocates did not consider nuclear waste to be a problem. 
THE GROWING POLICY PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR WASTE 
While nuclear waste had always been a problem in need of a solution, it was not until the mid-1970s 
that the idea of nuclear waste began to become problematic. Following the initial public and political 
indifference towards nuclear waste, the management and risks associated with radioactive materials 
began to be treated more seriously as a policy problem. The ideational shift in agents’ perceptions of 
nuclear waste can be attributed to growing media interest in issues associated with nuclear waste. In the 
1950s and 1960s, newspaper coverage of issues relating to nuclear waste was limited. Yet by the early 
1970s, provocative headlines such as “The deadly waste of nuclear power”, “Nuclear waste fears”, and 
“Nuclear waste can kill us all” became more frequent, alerting the public to the potential hazards of 
nuclear waste. Newspaper articles increasingly reported on mismanagement and waste leakages at 
nuclear reactors and waste storage sites (Blau, 1977: 27; Los Angeles Times, 1973: A6; Dye, 1973: 
A1), and warned that utilities were rapidly running out of space to store the accumulating waste 
(Rattner, 1978: D3; Sinclair, 1979: A2; Omang, 1977: A10). When British Nuclear Fuels announced 
plans to build a nuclear waste reprocessing plant at Windscale in Cumbria, the plans received little 
public or political attention until the Daily Mirror released a front page story in October 1975 that 
warned the construction of the plant would make Britain “the world’s nuclear dustbin” (Harris, 2005: 
1). 
The effect of this increasingly negative media coverage was that public opinion towards nuclear energy 
and the waste it produces became increasingly negative from the 1970s onwards (Rosa and 
Freudenburg, 1993) (see Chapter 5 for more detail on declining public opinion towards nuclear power). 
In 1979, an article in the New York Times stated that “so widespread is public concern about the lack of 
a solution that it has become a major barrier…to the continued development of nuclear power in the 
United States” (Burnham, 1979a: A1). The issue of nuclear waste began to feature more prominently 
in political debates, and be treated as much more of a serious problem by political leaders. Whereas 
nuclear waste was raised in British parliamentary debates only twice in the 1950s and three times in the 
1960s, it was discussed in parliament in every year throughout the 1970s (except for 1971), 1980s and 
1990s. 
The increasing visibility of nuclear waste as an issue was also driven by the emergence of the 
environmental movement in the 1970s, and the sustained growth of this movement over the following 
decades. As described in more detail in Chapter 7, the storage, transportation and disposal of nuclear 
waste is a major concern for environmentalists, given that radioactive waste remains toxic for thousands 
of years. The environmental movement has actively campaigned to raise public awareness of the 
89 
  
dangers associated with nuclear waste, and the risks that could result from mismanagement of 
radioactive substances. The growth of the environmental movement has also contributed to institutional 
changes in the way in which nuclear waste is managed. For example, the actions of environmental 
organisations led to the implementation of a ban on the practice of sea dumping of nuclear waste in the 
1980s.  These two factors – widespread media reporting on the issue of nuclear waste, and the growth 
of the environmental movement and its campaign against nuclear power – contributed to the increasing 
public recognition of the risks posed by nuclear waste.  
Governments throughout Western Europe and North America responded to escalating public concerns 
over the dangers of nuclear waste by adopting a more purposive stance towards the issue. Political 
leaders began to acknowledge that nuclear waste was a problem that needed to be solved. In order to be 
seen as actively working towards a waste solution, governments began commissioning reports and 
investigations into nuclear waste and the best approach for its management. The outcome of this process 
was that, by the late 1970s, an almost global consensus had emerged that burying HLW in a deep 
geological repository (DGR) was the best long-term solution (Solomon et al., 2010: 17; IAEA, 1990: 
7). This involves isolating nuclear waste in a stable geological formation deep underground, and is 
expected to offer the safest and most secure outcome for human and environmental health in the long-
term. However, as governments began commissioning work into the identification of potential sites for 
construction of a DGR, they encountered widespread public opposition from local residents and 
landowners, as well as from the anti-nuclear movement more broadly. In most instances, this opposition 
severely delayed the siting process, or caused the siting process to be abandoned altogether.  
For example, in Germany, the process of site selection for a HLW disposal facility began in 1972, but 
the search was abandoned only four years later after the site investigations generated fierce local 
opposition (Hocke and Kallenbach-Herbert, 2015: 183). In France, investigations for an appropriate site 
for a HLW repository were conducted in the 1980s. However, local opposition that emerged in response 
to the site investigations caused the government to declare a one year moratorium on the search for an 
appropriate site in 1990 (Poisson, 2013: 495). In the US, Congress passed the first piece of legislation 
governing the management and disposal of waste – the Nuclear Waste Policy Act – in 1982. This 
legislation declared the use of DGR as the official strategy for storing and disposing of nuclear waste 
in the US. From 1984-86, a range of potential sites for the first and secondary repositories were 
identified across thirteen states (Hancock, 2010: 5). Public opposition emerged towards the potential 
sites in every state, with citizens forming a National Nuclear Waste Task Force to oppose the entire 
program (The New York Times, 1986: A22). As a result, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act was amended 
to make Yucca Mountain the only site under consideration for the first nuclear waste repository. Since 
the decision to site a repository at Yucca Mountain was made, members of the public, politicians, and 
anti-nuclear organisations have protested against the development, arguing that the site was chosen for 
90 
  
political reasons and challenging the scientific statements about the suitability of the location (Endres, 
2009: 50). 
The British government’s response to the rise in public concern about nuclear waste is yet another 
example of the state adopting a more purposive approach to solving the nuclear waste dilemma. In 1976, 
the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution released a report on Nuclear Power and the 
Environment. The Commission created the report in response to “signs of increasing anxiety in many 
countries about projected growth in nuclear power and about the environmental risks that this might 
imply for the future” (Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, 1976: 1). In its discussion over 
the dangers of nuclear waste, the report concluded that, 
“radioactive waste management is a profoundly serious issue, central to the environmental 
evaluation of a nuclear power programme. There must be a clear, identifiable, policy centre 
and a means to ensure that the issues posed by waste management are fully considered at the 
outset of a nuclear programme, not dealt with many years after the decisions on developments 
that lead to the wastes have been made and when options may have been effectively 
foreclosed” (Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, 1976: 164). 
The report also concluded that nuclear new build should not proceed until a viable solution to the issue 
of radioactive waste management had been designed and implemented. The report’s release generated 
widespread media interest, further inflaming public concerns over the environmental and safety risks 
posed by nuclear waste. The British government released an official response to the Commission’s 
report in which it was announced that the Secretary of State for the Environment would become 
responsible for implementing a nuclear waste management policy (Department of the Environment, 
1977: 7). As part of this policy, the UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) identified a range of sites 
that would be assessed for their feasibility as a location for nuclear waste disposal (Rüdig, 1990: 187). 
However, when news emerged that the feasibility of sites for test drilling was being assessed, public 
opposition to the siting of nuclear waste disposal facilities escalated quickly. In 1992, the Nuclear 
Industry Radioactive Waste Management Executive (NIREX, the British organisation responsible for 
storage of nuclear waste) announced plans to build a Rock Characterisation Facility (RCF) at Sellafield, 
which was meant to demonstrate the practicability of a deep underground radioactive waste repository. 
However, critics of the RCF project (such as Cumbria County Council, Friends of the Earth and 
Greenpeace) argued that the RCF was really a “Trojan horse” for the construction of a full-scale deep 
waste repository (McDonald, 1996). In 1997, a local planning inquiry was undertaken into the RCF, 
which led to Environment Secretary John Gummer rejecting the plans for the RCF. The perceived 
under-handedness of NIREX’s actions in planning the construction of a nuclear waste facility has 
contributed to a legacy of perceived poor governance of nuclear waste issues in the UK. 
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In Wales, the potential siting of nuclear waste facilities in the area was opposed by local residents, 
farmers, the Welsh Anti-Nuclear Alliance and the People Against Nuclear Dumping on Rural Areas 
(The Guardian, 1980: 2; Lewis, 1980: 2), the result of which was that the government chose not to lodge 
any formal application for test drilling in Wales. The UKAEA lodged an application to conduct test 
drilling at Cheviot Hills in Northumberland in 1978, but it was rejected in the wake of opposition by 
the Cheviots Defence Action Group (Greenpeace, 2003: 1). Another application was lodged for test 
drilling at Mullwharchar Hill near Loch Doon, but was opposed by the Campaign Opposing Nuclear 
Dumping, the Scottish Conservation Society, and the Scottish Campaign to Resist the Atomic Menace 
(The Glasgow Herald, 1978: 8). These groups successfully mobilised public opinion against drilling in 
the area via protests, public meetings and petitions, which ultimately led to the application being 
withdrawn (Watson, 2007). The only successful application for drilling was at Altnabreac in Caithness. 
However, two months later, in the wake of sustained public opposition, the government cancelled the 
entire test drilling program for storing high level nuclear waste (Hetherington, 1981: 1). Instead, most 
of the HLW in the UK continues to be held in temporary storage at the Sellafield site (Nuclear 
Decommissioning Authority, 2014). 
As the experiences of these countries illustrate, the siting of deep geological repositories throughout 
Western Europe and North America has taken decades to finalise and, in many cases, has been 
abandoned as a result of public opposition. By the 1990s, there was still no clear long-term solution in 
sight for the management of nuclear waste anywhere in the world. The governmental failure to secure 
a site for a HLW facility further strengthened the anti-nuclear movement’s argument that governments 
were unable to safely manage nuclear waste or its associated risks. The problem of nuclear waste 
continued to be used as a core argument underpinning the anti-nuclear movement. 
The history of nuclear energy in Western Europe and North America demonstrates that public and 
political perceptions of nuclear power have become increasingly tied to the issue of nuclear waste, with 
some notable exceptions such as in France. Prior to the mid-1970s, nuclear waste was broadly 
overlooked on the assumption that a long-term solution for nuclear waste would eventually be 
developed through advancements in science and engineering. Until then, the HLW produced by nuclear 
reactors could be placed in temporary storage at existing nuclear sites. However, a shift in agents’ 
perceptions of nuclear waste, and the treatment of nuclear waste as a policy problem, becomes clear 
from the mid-1970s onwards. Increasingly negative media coverage of nuclear waste issues raised the 
public profile of nuclear waste and heightened public concerns over how nuclear waste was being 
managed. The growth of the environmental movement during this time further contributed to escalating 
public concerns over the human and environmental health risks of nuclear waste specifically, as well as 
the risks associated with nuclear energy more broadly. Governments responded to these rising concerns 
by commissioning investigations and developing strategies for the long-term management of nuclear 
waste. However, sustained public opposition to these efforts have meant that the problem of HLW 
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disposal remains largely unresolved. Nuclear waste became an increasingly salient issue amongst the 
anti-nuclear lobby, with critics using the ongoing failure to develop a nuclear waste solution as a central 
argument for why expansion of nuclear energy should not take place, and why existing nuclear reactors 
should be phased out. Consequently, by the time the discourse of a nuclear renaissance had begun to 
emerge in the early 2000s, nuclear waste had become central to debates over whether or to what extent 
nuclear energy development should take place. 
THE RENAISSANCE: RESOLVING THE WASTE ISSUE? 
The idea of nuclear waste and the hazards that it represents have remained central to the debate over 
nuclear energy during the renaissance period. In the early 2000s, the problem of how to dispose of 
nuclear waste remained unresolved. After three decades of trying to site a HLW disposal facility, little 
concrete action had been made on making the plan of a HLW disposal facility a reality. However, when 
the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance began to gather momentum, one of the arguments put forward by 
nuclear advocates for why a renaissance was going to take place was that the problem of nuclear waste 
was close to being resolved. Darst and Dawson (2010: 51) identify nuclear waste as a central factor 
explaining why the expectation of a nuclear renaissance emerged, arguing that “were it not for the 
growing perception that this problem now has a solution, the prospects for a climate change-driven 
nuclear renaissance would now be significantly reduced”. A combination of political and technical 
solutions were expected to change agents’ perceptions of the waste issue by restoring public confidence 
in the ability of governments and the nuclear industry to safely store and dispose of nuclear waste. 
Technological advancements and new reactor designs were meant to help overcome the nuclear waste 
issue by generating only minimal amounts of radioactive waste (US Department of Energy Nuclear 
Energy Research Advisory Committee, 2002: 6). SKB, the company responsible for nuclear waste 
management in Sweden, had developed a new storage method called KBS-3, which was meant to 
increase the number of locations that would potentially be suitable for construction of a deep geological 
repository (Darst and Dawson, 2010: 52). 
In addition to the technological advancements, there was also an expectation that governments would 
be able to address the social barriers to nuclear waste through political solutions. In particular, public 
fears over nuclear waste were meant to be eased and public opposition to the construction of nuclear 
waste facilities reduced through the adoption of more democratic procedures for nuclear waste 
management. Starting in the 1990s, there has been an almost universal shift by governments towards 
more participatory methods for developing a nuclear waste management strategy (Bergmans et al., 
2014). This institutional contextual shift has taken place in response to the sustained public opposition 
to nuclear waste management, and public criticism of the top-down and technocratic procedures that 
had been used to identify and develop potential nuclear waste facilities. Rather than identifying sites 
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based on technical or scientific criteria, governments have increasingly chosen to allow communities to 
volunteer their regions for the construction of a nuclear waste facility. In return, communities would 
receive generous financial incentives. Increasing public participation in the nuclear waste decision-
making process was expected to improve the legitimacy of the decisions being made, reduce public 
opposition to the siting and creation of nuclear waste facilities, and reduce public opposition to nuclear 
energy more broadly. 
However, neither the technical or political solutions have proved as successful in allaying public fears 
over nuclear waste as their advocates had hoped. While the development of new reactor designs which 
would produce less waste than existing reactors may help to address the nuclear waste problem in the 
future, it does not alleviate the ongoing problem of HLW that continues to sit in temporary storage 
across the globe. There are currently fifty countries across the globe which have HLW that requires 
disposal in a long-term facility. This amounts to almost 270,000 tonnes of spent nuclear fuel currently 
sitting in ‘temporary’ storage, ninety percent of which is stored at cooling ponds at existing nuclear 
reactor sites (Sato, 2011). Storage of HLW at such interim facilities presents neither a sustainable, safe 
nor a cost-effective solution for the long-term. Most of the HLW in the UK is currently held in 
temporary storage at the Sellafield site, which the National Audit Office has recently warned poses 
“intolerable risks to people and the environment” (BBC News, 2012b: 1). In the interviews conducted 
for this research project, one academic described Sellafield as a “symbol – especially for anti-nuclear 
people – of what is wrong with nuclear power” (Interview with Director of a Research Centre, 
14/01/2015). In 2001, it was discovered that radioactive waste had leaked into the groundwater under 
the site at Sellafield (Brown, 2002: 6). The cost for cleaning-up Sellafield was estimated in 2013 to be 
over £70bn, with the most costly component being the clean-up of the nuclear waste stored at the site 
(Macalister, 2013b). The issue of nuclear waste continues to be further complicated by the nuclear 
industry’s decision not to legally classify plutonium as nuclear waste. Clearly, the promises made by 
advocates of the nuclear renaissance that the waste issue would be resolved through new reactor designs 
has not yet come to fruition. The success of the nuclear renaissance will continue to be challenged in 
Western Europe and North America by the nuclear waste issue until governments and the nuclear 
industry can convince the public that they can manage, store and dispose of nuclear waste safely. 
The institutional contextual shift towards the greater use of democratic procedures as a political solution 
to improving public confidence in nuclear waste management has produced mixed results, with some 
success in Finland and Sweden, but less so in countries such as the UK and Slovenia. To date, the 
country which has come closest to securing a long-term solution for its HLW is Finland. This success 
has been achieved through a shift to more participatory and inclusive decision-making processes. 
Research into the development of an underground repository for HLW in Finland has been underway 
since the 1980s. However, the management of radioactive waste in Finland has experienced a 
“participatory” or “deliberative turn” since the mid-1990s, particularly in regards to the way in which 
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plans for an underground repository for HLW have been developed (Lehtonen, 2010a: 181; Strauss, 
2010: 213). In their process of identifying a possible location for a repository in Finland, Posiva (the 
Finnish nuclear waste management company) undertook an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
that featured extensive levels of public engagement. Throughout 1997, Posiva held over fifty meetings 
with citizens in four potential regions (Auffermann et al., 2015: 241). Information was made available 
at Posiva’s local offices and distributed directly to individual households. Focus groups, interviews, 
exhibitions, workshops and public hearings were also held, providing citizens with an opportunity to 
ask questions and share their views about Posiva’s plans. In 1999, Posiva announced that it considered 
Eurajoki to be the most appropriate location for a HLW facility. Local residents strongly supported the 
proposal, as did the Eurajoki Council, which chose not to exercise their right to veto the entire project. 
However, the degree to which the processes used by Posiva actually qualify as being truly deliberative 
or participatory has been questioned. Critics have argued that Posiva’s interaction with the Finnish 
public has not been truly deliberative given that Posiva set the terms of public engagement and limited 
the debate so that discussions could not take place over whether alternative disposal options would be 
more appropriate, or whether nuclear energy should be used in Finland more broadly (Lehtonen, 2010b: 
152). Despite these critiques, what is clear is that Finland has been the most successful country so far 
across the globe in developing a long-term strategy for HLW disposal. Finland appears to have 
overcome the problems of public opposition that have prevented nuclear waste facilities being 
constructed in other parts of the world. As a result, the Finnish experience now offers a case study which 
other countries can learn from to improve their own procedures for securing a HLW site. 
Sweden is another example where an institutional shift has occurred towards the increased use of 
participatory methods to improve public acceptance for the siting of a nuclear waste facility. The 
Swedish government identified three suitable municipalities for a HLW facility – Östhammar, Tierp 
and Oskarshamn. Each of the municipalities were free to withdraw their community from consideration 
as a possible construction location. Tierp chose to withdraw from consideration, leaving only 
Östhammar and Oskarshamn as the remaining options. In March 2011, Svensk Kärnbränslehantering 
AB (SKB, the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company) applied for a license to 
construct the repository at Forsmark in Östhammar - a decision that was made on the basis of strong 
local community support. 
The process by which Forsmark was chosen as the location for a geological waste repository has been 
characterised as adopting a “bottom-up perspective” (H. Keskitalo et al., 2015). Similarly, Lidskog and 
Sundqvist (2004: 258) describe the Swedish process of identifying a HLW repository site as one which 
“puts stakeholder involvement, public participation and transparency at the centre”. A consultation 
process was initially undertaken with the county administrative board and local residents, which was 
then widened to include consultation with the general public, municipal councils, other government 
agencies, and non-governmental organisations. There were multiple opportunities for different 
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stakeholders to oppose the construction of a HLW facility. For example, the Swedish municipalities 
held strong self-governing rights, with the ability to refuse to have a HLW facility constructed in their 
region. Environmental organisations that had existed for at least three years and that had a minimum of 
2000 members were able to appeal decisions being made, as were local residents (H. Keskitalo et al., 
2015). The Swedish Government made funding available for municipalities, county administrative 
boards, and non-government organisations to follow the process of siting a nuclear waste repository as 
it unfolded. The use of participatory methods for determining the site of the HLW facility appears to 
have been highly successful in quelling the problems of public opposition that have been experienced 
elsewhere. In 2008, an independent poll found that 77 percent of residents in the municipality of 
Östhammar supported the construction of a nuclear waste repository being constructed in their region 
(WNA, 2015). 
However, despite the apparent success experienced by Finland and Sweden in using democratic 
procedures to improve public acceptance for the construction of a HLW facility, the participatory turn 
in siting nuclear waste facilities has not been universally successful. The case of HLW disposal in the 
UK is a prime example of this. In the mid-2000s, the British Government showed signs of developing 
a more democratic approach to HLW management. An independent Committee on Radioactive Waste 
Management was established, which was tasked with investigating the best options for nuclear waste 
management in the UK. The Committee presented its findings to the government in 2006, 
recommending that a geological disposal facility (GDF) should be constructed in partnership with local 
communities and authorities in order to bury nuclear waste deep underground (Committee on 
Radioactive Waste Management, 2012: 4). In accordance with these recommendations, the government 
began a process whereby communities could express their interest in housing the GDF in their local 
area. This was expected to reduce the public opposition that had thwarted previous attempts at siting a 
HLW facility. 
However, the outcome of the volunteer process has proved just as unsuccessful as the past several 
decades of attempts to construct a nuclear waste facility in the UK. Copeland and Allerdale Borough 
Councils, both located in Cumbria, submitted expressions of interest in hosting the facility (Nuclear 
Industry Association, 2014). In response, hundreds of demonstrators gathered in Cumbria to protest the 
potential development (BBC News, 2013f). In January 2013, the Cumbria County Council over-ruled 
the boroughs’ expressions of interest, effectively stopping the sites from being considered as hosts for 
the disposal facility (BBC News, 2013a). The Department for Energy and Climate Change responded 
to the county council’s actions by proposing to revise the search process to prevent county councils 
from overruling district council decisions (BBC News, 2013e). The Cumbria Trust – a pressure group 
established solely to oppose construction of a waste repository in Cumbria – has labelled the 
Department’s actions as “astonishingly undemocratic” (BBC News, 2013c). No other community or 
council in the UK has since submitted an expression of interest in hosting the GDF (Moss, 2013). In 
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April 2015, the British government abandoned their democratic approach to siting a HLW facility and 
instead returned to a hierarchical process for site selection. Parliament passed legislation which stated 
that sites for nuclear waste facilities would now be considered as “nationally significant infrastructure 
projects”, and would be chosen by the Secretary of State for Energy (Jowit, 2015). Local councils and 
community members can object to site developments, but are unable to stop the construction of waste 
facilities altogether. 
Slovenia is another example of an institutional shift towards participatory mechanisms for siting a 
radioactive waste facility. Slovenia has one operating nuclear power reactor – the Krško Nuclear Power 
Plant - which was constructed in the mid-1970s and is jointly owned with Croatia. When Krško was 
being constructed, little consideration was given to the nuclear waste that the plant would produce. It 
was expected that more nuclear power plants would be constructed throughout Yugoslavia in the 
coming years, and as such, one centralised disposal facility for radioactive waste produced by all nuclear 
reactors in the region would eventually be developed (Polič et al., 2012: 8). However, when this regional 
expansion of nuclear power reactors did not take place, Slovenia was left without a solution for 
radioactive waste disposal. In the mid-1980s, Slovenia began searching for a suitable site for the 
construction of a low and intermediate level radioactive waste (LILW) facility. A technocratic approach 
was adopted, whereby thirty-nine possible locations were identified based on geological, social and 
technical criteria (Polič et al., 2012: 8). This was then narrowed down to five possible sites, the 
announcement of which generated strong opposition from local communities in these regions. In 
response to this public opposition, the siting process was suspended and then abandoned. 
In 1997, the Agency for Radwaste Management (ARAO) proposed a new ‘mixed mode’ approach for 
identifying a potential LILW site, which would grant local municipalities a central role in determining 
where in Slovenia the waste facility would be constructed (Polič et al., 2012: 10). In 2004, local 
communities nationwide were invited to volunteer their location for the construction of a LILW facility. 
Financial compensation would be given to whichever community housed the facility. Eight of the 
almost two hundred communities in Slovenia volunteered to host the facility, although three of these 
subsequently withdrew. The search was then narrowed to three possible locations – Sevnica, Krško and 
Brežice. Local partnerships were established in all three municipalities, and an independent mediator 
was used to facilitate negotiations between the various stakeholders. These local partnerships were 
intended to improve communication and strengthen trust between the local communities and 
government representatives (Bergmans et al., 2014: 354). In 2006, mounting public opposition led the 
local council of Sevnica to withdraw from consideration (Polič et al., 2012: 37), leaving only two 
potential sites remaining. In 2009, the site of Vrbina was chosen as the final site for the LILW facility. 
The institutional shift towards participatory mechanisms for siting a LILW facility in Slovenia appears 
to have worked, given that an appropriate site was successfully chosen and finalised. However, an 
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investigation that has since been undertaken by researchers from the University of Ljubljana into the 
nature of public participation in the siting process has revealed several problems with the way in which 
the process was undertaken, and which have continued to negatively impact public opinion and trust 
(Polič et al., 2012). In Krško, local residents felt that their requests were ignored, the opportunities for 
genuine participation in the decision-making process were limited, and social acceptance for the project 
had not been achieved (Polič et al., 2012: 43). In Brežice, local residents argued that the siting process 
had not been conducted in a fair and transparent manner (Polič et al., 2012: 43). Non-government 
organisations questioned the credibility of the supposedly ‘independent’ studies that were conducted 
for the siting process (Polič et al., 2012: 44). ARAO, on the other hand, asserted that the process was 
transparent and that a relationship of trust was established with the local communities (Polič et al., 2012: 
44). However, public opinion surveys indicate that citizens have “extremely negative attitudes” towards 
radioactive waste in Slovenia (Polič et al., 2012: 46). This suggests that the use of participatory 
mechanisms has done little to improve public trust in nuclear waste management and the actors 
responsible for this. Furthermore, LILW facilities are typically much easier to site than HLW facilities 
– evident in the fact that while there are several LILW facilities operating worldwide, there is not yet a 
single HLW facility that has entered operation. The fact that only two of Slovenia’s almost two hundred 
local communities was ultimately willing to host a LILW facility demonstrates that even the promise 
of participatory mechanisms is not enough to overcome widespread public distrust and opposition 
towards nuclear facilities. 
The increasing democratisation of nuclear waste management appears to have overcome some of the 
siting issues that have hindered the development of a long-term nuclear waste solution. However, the 
cases of the UK and Slovenia suggest that this approach is not guaranteed to be universally successful. 
Furthermore, the positive signs indicating that a HLW facility will be constructed in Finland, and 
potentially in Sweden as well, has had little effect on improving the public acceptance of developing 
nuclear waste facilities outside of these countries. 
The anti-nuclear movement has drawn on the continued failure of governments to develop a long-term 
solution to the problem of HLW, as well as the dangers posed by radioactive waste in general, as a key 
reason for why nuclear energy development should not be pursued. Greenpeace, a leader of the anti-
nuclear movement, continues to oppose nuclear energy development on the grounds that even if a deep 
geological repository is constructed and enters operation, there is no guarantee that such a repository 
would contain the hazards associated with nuclear waste. Greenpeace argues that “whether the storage 
containers, the store itself, or the surrounding rocks will offer enough protection to stop radioactivity 
from escaping in the long term is impossible to predict” (Greenpeace, 2014b). On this basis, Dr. Doug 
Parr, the Chief Scientist at Greenpeace, has argued that “new nuclear should not go ahead until we have 
sorted out the waste problem” (Pfeifer, 2013). The lack of progress towards a safe solution for nuclear 
waste storage and disposal has continued to be a key concern in the nuclear debate. A representative of 
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the Union of Concerned Scientists has labelled the current practice of temporarily storing HLW at 
existing nuclear facilities as extremely dangerous, describing the temporary storage pools as 
“essentially loaded guns aimed at neighbouring communities” (Sforza, 2013). There continues to be a 
widespread fear amongst the public about the dangers associated with nuclear waste, with large 
segments of the population refusing to believe the government and nuclear industry’s promises that 
waste can be safely and securely disposed of with no harm to human or environmental health. 
CONCLUSION 
Nuclear waste is now widely perceived by public and political actors alike to be a much greater problem 
than it was in the 1950s and 1960s. From the time that the first commercial nuclear power plants were 
first entering operation in the mid-1950s, the highly radioactive waste produced by these plants has 
always needed to be stored and disposed of in some way. And yet, the question of what should be done 
with this waste in the long-term was broadly overlooked during the early growth of civil nuclear energy 
programmes. This is evidenced by the lack of public or political debate over the dangers posed by 
nuclear power, or how the issue of nuclear waste storage and management should best be addressed. 
However, a shift is evident from the 1970s onwards in the way in which nuclear waste is perceived and 
prioritised as a policy problem. 
While the radioactive waste produced by nuclear facilities has always been a problem in need of a 
solution, the idea of nuclear waste is now much more of a challenge to the future of nuclear power than 
it was in the 1950s and 1960s. This shift has been driven by increasingly negative media coverage on 
the topic of nuclear waste, reports of mismanagement and leaks at nuclear facilities storing nuclear 
waste, and the emergence of the environmental movement in the 1970s. These factors have led to 
growing public awareness about the hazards and dangers associated with the highly radioactive waste 
produced at nuclear power plants. As a consequence, government and industry attempts to site and 
construct nuclear power plants and nuclear waste storage facilities have often been hampered by 
members of the public who oppose the construction of these facilities due to the risks that nuclear waste 
represents. 
One of the key drivers underpinning the expectation of a nuclear renaissance was that the problems 
associated with nuclear waste would be overcome. This would be achieved through advancements in 
reactor designs which produce less nuclear waste, as well as an institutional shift towards more 
participatory methods in gaining public acceptance for the construction of nuclear waste facilities. 
These two developments were meant to facilitate a nuclear renaissance by improving public acceptance 
for the construction of nuclear waste facilities. However, the reality of the nuclear renaissance thus far 
indicates mixed results. New reactor designs do not negate the ongoing problem of the existing HLW 
that continues to be kept in temporary storage worldwide. While participatory methods have been 
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successful in aiding the siting of a HLW facility in Sweden and Finland, countries such as the UK and 
Slovenia indicate that participatory methods will not necessarily guarantee public support for 
construction of nuclear waste facilites. The failure to construct a long-term HLW storage facility 
continues to be invoked by anti-nuclear activists as evidence of the government and the nuclear 
industry’s inability to safely manage and dispose of nuclear waste. Given the ideational shift that has 
taken place, whereby nuclear waste is now widely perceived to be a far more problematic issue, the 
problems of nuclear waste cannot be ignored by policymakers in the way that were in the 1950s and 
1960s. The failure of governments and the nuclear industry to convince the general public that nuclear 
waste can be managed effectively and safely, and that it does not pose a risk to human or environmental 
health, has contributed to the ongoing public opposition to nuclear energy development. Consequently, 
the nuclear renaissance has failed, in part, because of the ideational shift in the way that nuclear waste 
is perceived by the public, and the opposition to nuclear power that results from public concerns over 
nuclear waste.  
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7 .  ENV I RON MENTALI S M  
This chapter presents the first of the ‘contextual’ factors that help to explain the disjuncture between 
the rhetoric and reality of the nuclear renaissance. As discussed in Chapter 1, this thesis argues that 
nuclear-specific factors can not solely explain the disjuncture between the rhetoric and reality of the 
nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America. Rather, the absence of a nuclear renaissance 
in these regions cannot be fully understood without considering broader institutional and ideational 
contextual shifts that have influenced the changing trajectory of civil nuclear energy development. Both 
the nuclear-specific and the broader contextual shifts identified in this thesis are mutually dynamic and 
interactive. Consequently, having examined the influence of three nuclear-specifics factors on the 
outcome of the nuclear renaissance in Chapters 4-6, the impact of broader context factors on the nuclear 
renaissance are now explored in Chapters 7-10. In doing so, this thesis develops a more expansive and 
holistic understanding of the reasons for changes in civil nuclear energy development over time and the 
disjuncture between the rhetoric and reality of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North 
America. 
This chapter argues that the disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance 
can be explained by a shift in the way in which agents perceive and prioritise issues relating to the 
natural environment. In accordance with an Agents in Context Historical Institutionalist perspective, 
this study recognises that both individual agents, and the institutions within which agents operate, play 
a key role in determining policy change. Consequently, when examining the changing trajectory of 
nuclear power, the decisions and thought processes of individual agents, as well as the institutions 
within which these agents operate, must be considered. One of the major ideational and institutional 
shifts that has taken place in the post-war period is the growth of environmentalism. From the 1960s 
onwards, public and political leaders alike have become far more aware and concerned about issues that 
impact upon the natural environment. By the time that talk of a nuclear renaissance began emerging in 
the early 2000s, environmental issues had already become firmly entrenched on the global policy 
agenda.  
The growth of environmentalism has had significant implications for the way that agents perceive and 
respond to the use of nuclear power. The birth of the environmental movement was driven partly by 
concerns over the use of nuclear power and the environmental dangers it posed. From the late 1960s 
onwards, environmental organisations actively campaigned to raise public awareness of the dangers 
associated with nuclear power. These actions contributed to an ideational shift whereby nuclear power 
has come to be widely perceived as a danger to both human and environmental health. The growing 
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perception that nuclear power was an environmental hazard meant that members of the public were now 
more likely to oppose the construction of new nuclear power plants on environmental grounds.. This 
meant that governments had to work harder to gain public support for new nuclear build, or risk facing 
a backlash from voters. Consequently, the growth of environmentalism has created a more challenging 
political environment for the construction of new nuclear power plants. 
However, when talk of a nuclear renaissance began, nuclear advocates drew upon environmental 
discourse as a key argument for why a revival of nuclear power was necessary. By the early 2000s, 
climate change had become firmly entrenched as a key policy priority on the global political agenda. 
Nuclear advocates capitalised on this by reframing nuclear power as an environmentally-friendly energy 
source. While some political leaders and even several high-profile environmentalists have accepted the 
environmental argument for nuclear power, large segments of the environmental movement continue 
to remain deeply opposed. Moreover, the construction of new nuclear facilities during the renaissance 
continues to encounter extensive opposition based partly on environmental grounds. This suggests that 
the ideational shift in agents’ perceptions of nuclear power that occurred in response to the growth of 
environmentalism from the 1970s onwards – whereby nuclear power is perceived as an environmental 
hazard – continues to hold sway. The ongoing environmental opposition to nuclear power during the 
renaissance period indicates that, while there has been some shift towards nuclear power being accepted 
by some actors for its environmental credentials, this ideational shift has not been as widespread or 
transformative as the nuclear industry may have hoped for. 
Consequently, the disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance can be 
explained, in part, by the high level of public and political concern for environmental issues. Agents 
now operate in a vastly different political context than was present in the 1950s and 1960s, when low 
levels of environmental concern meant that nuclear power plants could be developed with virtually no 
environmental opposition. The growth in environmental concern at an individual and societal level from 
the late 1960s onwards has influenced agents’ perceptions of nuclear power as an environmental hazard. 
Agents have responded to this ideational shift by implementing a wide range of environmental 
regulatory institutions designed to reassure the public that the environmental impacts of nuclear power 
can be contained. Nevertheless, opposition to nuclear power on environmental grounds continues to be 
present, even during the renaissance period. This opposition has made it difficult for governments and 
the nuclear industry to secure the public support that is necessary for a nuclear renaissance to take place.  
This chapter begins by providing an overview of the growth of environmentalism from the late 1960s 
until the present day. It identifies the implications that the growth of environmentalism has had on the 
development of nuclear energy. It describes the ideational shift in public perceptions of nuclear power 
that can be attributed to the environmental movement, whereby agents were made more aware of the 
environmental dangers of nuclear power. It also describes the institutional shift that has occurred as a 
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result of this ideational shift, whereby governments have implemented a range of environmental 
regulatory institutions, as well as nuclear-specific environmental institutions. The ongoing impact of 
this ideational and institutional shift during the renaissance period is then discussed. The chapter 
concludes by arguing that in spite of the attempt made by the nuclear industry to reframe nuclear power 
as environmentally-friendly in order to encourage a nuclear renaissance, widespread public concern 
over the environmental dangers of nuclear power continue to pose a challenge to nuclear new build and 
to the success of the nuclear renaissance. Consequently, the disconnection between the expectation and 
reality of the nuclear renaissance can be explained by the ongoing influence of environmentalism. 
THE BIRTH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM 
Evidence of widespread public concern for the environment began to emerge in the 1960s, but it was in 
the early 1970s that the birth of an environmental movement gained momentum. Prior to this period, 
few environmental organisations existed (van Leeuwen, 2010: 57), let alone any kind of widespread 
“green ideology” or environmentally-focused social movement (Carter, 2007: 5). As Dauvergne (2009: 
xliii) explains, “before the 1960s, the word environment, in the relatively rare instances when it 
appeared in print, referred primarily to the home or work environment, not to nature, ecosystems, or the 
earth”. It therefore represented a significant ideational shift when agents began perceiving the 
environment as a bigger, interconnected system that had an inherent value and was in need of protection. 
This more modern understanding of the environment brought to light a vast range of ecological issues 
that had never before received much, if any, public or political attention. Issues such as overpopulation, 
habitat destruction, water scarcity, land degradation, waste disposal and pollution became the topic of 
political debate throughout much of Western Europe and North America from the 1970s onwards. 
Several factors contributed to the growth in environmental concerns at this time. Environmental 
concerns became prominent through the publication of a range of works in the 1960s and 1970s that 
drew attention to the fragility of the natural environment, and the irreparable damage that human actions 
were inflicting on it. One of the most influential books for the birth of the environmental movement 
was Rachel Carson’s (1962) Silent Spring, which warned of the dangers present in the use of pesticides 
and synthetic chemicals. Others included The Limits to Growth (1972), which argued that economic 
and population growth would deplete earth’s finite resources, and The Population Bomb (1968), which 
argued that immediate action was necessary to prevent overpopulation from causing mass human 
starvation in the coming decades. Newspapers and television programs increasingly reported on 
environmental issues, forcing them onto the political agenda. In an article published in February 1970, 
Time magazine declared that “the environment may be the gut issue that can unify a polarized nation in 
the 1970s” (Time, 1970). Two months later, twenty million US citizens, including several politicians, 
participated in the first ‘Earth Day’ - a nationwide demonstration held to promote environmental reform. 
103 
  
Events such as the accident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant in 1979, the Union Carbide 
toxic gas release in Bhopal in 1984, the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, and the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 
1989 all received widespread media coverage and further alerted the public to the human and 
environmental dangers associated with industrial development. 
The 1970s witnessed the establishment of a vast suite of environmental institutions. The first United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment was held in Stockholm in 1972, a milestone indicating 
that the environment had now reached international political importance.  It has been estimated that 
100,000 government and non-government environmental organisations were established in the twenty 
years following the UN’s 1972 Stockholm conference (Chasek et al., 2014: 31). Environmental policy 
became institutionalised through the establishment of dedicated government departments and agencies. 
Environmental groups and organisations sprung up at a local, regional, national and international scale. 
Some of the largest and most influential of these groups included Friends of the Earth, formed in the 
US in 1969, and Greenpeace in 1971. Environmentally-focused political parties were formed for the 
first time. Between 1970 and 1990, green political parties were established in Belgium, Canada, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Spain and the UK. This widespread emergence of environmental institutions is evidence of an 
ideational shift in the way in which agents perceive and prioritise environmental issues. 
In the 1980s, the membership numbers of environmental groups grew, as did the number of protests 
that these groups carried out. While 134 non-government environmental organisations participated in 
the 1972 Stockholm conference, over 1400 groups participated in the 1992 UN Conference on 
Environment and Development (Conca and Dabelko, 2010: 5). In the UK, environmental group 
membership doubled in size between 1981 and 1991 (Dryzek et al., 2002: 676). Environmental 
organisations were increasingly perceived as a legitimate political actor, and were able to work within 
the policy-making process by being granted greater access to government elites. Organisations became 
increasingly professionalised and less radical, with larger budgets provided by their membership base 
and various fundraising activities (Carter, 2007: 146). The UN established the World Commission on 
Environment and Development in 1982 to address the lack of action that had been taken to combat 
growing environmental challenges worldwide. The commission produced a report that was instrumental 
in bringing the idea of ‘sustainable development’ – the need to preserve earth’s resources for future 
generations – to the forefront of environmental debate (Chasek et al., 2014: 32).  
The 1990s saw the rise of corporate environmentalism, the integration of environmental and economic 
goals. Over the previous two decades, corporations had tried to refute environmental criticisms of their 
business practices, and fought the implementation of potentially costly environmental regulations. In 
the US, corporations fought the growth of environmental regulations by financing and lobbying political 
parties, funding industry scientists to cast doubt on environmental science, and even taking legal action 
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against the US Environmental Protection Agency (Dauvergne, 2009: lviii). However, by the late 1980s, 
corporations began to change their tactics to adopt a more constructive approach to environmental 
regulation of the private sector. Businesses began to develop partnerships and voluntary agreements 
with environmental organisations and government departments (Levy, 2011: 109). International 
organisations such as the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development adopted ‘eco-modernist’ policy positions (Hajer, 2015). The concept of ‘corporate social 
responsibility’ also took hold – the idea that corporations are social institutions which are endowed with 
specific ethical responsibilities (Dillard and Murray, 2012: 12). 
By the early 1990s, environmentalism had become institutionalised throughout Western Europe and 
North America (Carter, 2007: 148). Environmental issues became a permanent fixture on the global 
political agenda. In particular, the issue of global warming and climate change became a major focus 
for the environmental movement, to the extent whereby considerations of climate change have almost 
‘trumped’ all other concerns related to environmentalism. As part of this shift, climate change has 
become a major policy priority for governments around the world. US President Barack Obama 
described climate change as the issue that “will define the contours of this century more dramatically 
than any other” (Office of the Press Secretary, 2014). British Prime Minister David Cameron stated that 
“man-made climate change is one of the most serious threats that this country and this world faces” 
(The Guardian, 2014). Opinion polling also demonstrates the perceived importance of climate change 
to members of the public. The 2014 Eurobarometer survey on Climate Change found that 90 percent 
of respondents perceived climate change to be either a serious or a very serious problem (European 
Commission, 2014a: 21). 
The growth of environmentalism as a political concern is evident in the growing membership of green 
political parties over time. Figure 4 below illustrates the membership numbers in various green political 
parties in Western Europe from 1979 to 201415. Most notable here is Germany, where membership to 
the Die Grünen (The Greens) has increased from 11,156 members in 1979 to 61,359 members in 2013.
                                                     
15 The green political parties for which membership data is charted here includes the Green Party of England and 
Wales (UK), Die Grüne (Germany), Europe Écologie - Les Verts (France), Miljøpartiet De Grønne (Norway), 
Miljöpartiet de Gröna (Sweden), GroenLinks (The Netherlands), Groen (Belgium). 
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Figure 4: Green Political Party Membership in Western Europe, 1979-2014 
 
Chart compiled using data from the Members & Activists of Political Parties (2015) database16 
Another way in which the growth of environmentalism as a political issue in the post-war era can be 
visualised is through empirical data on changes in issue attention over time. The Comparative Agendas 
Project (CAP)17 is an empirical research project studying changes in issue attention over time. The CAP 
developed out of the Policy Agendas Project (PAP), established by US scholars Frank Baumgartner and 
Bryan Jones in 1993. The PAP sought to establish a reliable measure for tracing changes in policy 
activity within particular policy areas over long periods of time. A coding scheme was developed to 
classify policy issues into 19 major topics (such as environment or energy), which then contain over 
200 sub-topics (such as recycling or nuclear energy). This coding scheme was then applied to a wide 
range of policy activities, such as Congressional hearings, public laws, President State of the Union 
Speeches, Supreme Court cases, and a sample of New York Times news articles, from 1945 to the 
present day. The CAP then built on the PAP by applying the same coding scheme to policy activities in 
several countries across the globe. The use of a standardised coding scheme means that issue attention 
to particular policy areas can be compared over time and across countries. In this instance, data from 
the CAP is drawn upon to better understand attention to environmental issues across countries in the 
post-war period. 
Three datasets developed as part of the CAP are drawn up here to illustrate the growing salience of 
environmental issues since 1945: Conclusions of the European Council, US Congressional Hearings, 
                                                     
16 Specific datasets drawn upon from the database include Bennie (2014), Bolin (2015), Delwit (2015), Jupskås 
et al. (2014), Spier (2014), Van Haute (2014) and Van Holsteyn et al. (2014). 
17 For further information and access to individual country projects and their datasets, see the Comparative 
Agendas Project website at www.comparativeagendas.info 
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and a sample of articles from the New York Times18. Figure 5 below illustrates the number of 
conclusions made by the European Council on environmental issues from 1978 to 2012. There is a clear 
and steady increase in the number of conclusions being made on environmental issues from the late 
1970s through to 2009, supporting the claim that the environment has become an increasing salient 
issue over this time period.  
Figure 5: Conclusions of the European Council on Environmental Issues 
 
Chart compiled using data from the EU Policy Agendas Project, see Alexandrova et al. (2014) 
A similar trend of growing attention towards environmental issues can be seen in the US. Figure 6 
below illustrates the number of US Congressional Hearings relating to environmental issues from 1946 
to 2012. From 1946 to 1968, few congressional hearings on environmental issues took place. This was 
followed by a steady increase in the number of hearings on environmental issues until 1990. From 1990 
onwards, the number of congressional hearings on environmental issues has gradually decreased. 
                                                     
18 Each dataset was accessed via the individual country project datasets available via the Comparative Agendas 
Project website (http://www.comparativeagendas.info/). Individual references for each dataset are provided in-
text. 
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Figure 6: US Congressional Hearings on Environmental Issues 
 
Chart compiled using data from the US Policy Agendas Project, see Jones and Baumgartner (2013)  
Figure 7 below charts the attention to environmental issues in a systematic random sample of articles 
published in the New York Times from 1946 to 2008 (a total of 49,201 records). It demonstrates a sudden 
increase in the number of articles on the environment in 1970. Since then, attention to the environment 
has steadily decreased, but still remains far higher than attention paid in the early post-war years (from 
1947 until 1969). 
Figure 7: New York Times articles on Environmental Issues 
 
Chart compiled using data from the US Policy Agendas Project, see Jones and Baumgartner (2013)  
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ENVIRONMENTALISM & NUCLEAR POWER 
One of the major concerns of the environmental movement has been the use of nuclear power. For 
decades, environmental activists have actively campaigned against the use of nuclear power for either 
military or civilian purposes. Indeed, in Europe, the creation of some of the first green political parties 
occurred largely as a response to concerns over nuclear power development. For example, the first green 
political parties formed in Belgium and Germany in the 1970s emerged largely from the anti-nuclear 
movement, and were established with a primary goal of opposing the use of nuclear power for either 
military or peaceful purposes (Sauer, 2013: 32; Joppke, 1993: 118). Similarly, in Austria, Finland, 
France, Luxembourg and Sweden, green political parties were formed as a direct response to 
referendums that were being held on the use of nuclear power (Carter, 2007: 96). Moreover, many 
environmental NGOs, such as Greenpeace, emerged largely in response to issues of nuclear weapons 
testing, with campaigns against nuclear weapons testing in the south pacific becoming a crucial issue 
contributing to the rise of environmentalism. 
Through their campaigning, the environmental movement raised the public and political profile of 
nuclear power by highlighting the human and environmental dangers associated with its use. In doing 
so, the environmental movement has contributed to an ideational shift whereby nuclear power is 
increasingly perceived as an unsafe or ‘risky’ technology. At the same time, the growth of the 
environmental movement has also contributed to an institutional shift in the way that nuclear power is 
governed. Governments have responded to growing public concern over the environmental impacts of 
nuclear power by implementing a range of new institutions to ensure the environment is protected from 
the hazards of nuclear power. Some of these institutions have stemmed from broader institutional shifts 
in environmental governance, while others have been developed in response to the specific potential 
environmental impacts of nuclear power. 
Prior to the emergence of the environmental movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s, little 
consideration was given to the environmental consequences of constructing and operating nuclear 
power plants. Decisions over whether or where to build nuclear power plants were driven primarily by 
technical and financial considerations. There was a noticeable lack of legislation governing the 
environmental impacts of nuclear energy during the 1950s and 1960s. The two major pieces of 
international legislation that governed liability for nuclear accidents prior to 1997 were the Paris 
Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (1960) and the Vienna Convention 
on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (1963). Within these two documents, only personal injury and 
property damage were considered in relation to the impacts of a nuclear accident taking place 
(Emmerechts, 2008: 91). No mention was made of liability resulting from environmental damage 
caused by nuclear accidents. The absence of concern or debate over the environmental impact of nuclear 
energy is also evident in the way in which nuclear waste was managed throughout the first two decades 
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of civil nuclear energy development. As described in more detail in Chapter 6, despite the highly toxic 
and long-lasting composition of radioactive waste, governments throughout Western Europe and North 
America did not begin to formulate strategies or legislation to govern the storage and disposal of nuclear 
waste until the early 1970s. 
The growth of environmentalism drew attention to the impact of all forms of industrial development on 
the earth’s natural resources. The construction and operation of nuclear power plants was no exception 
to this. The environmental movement actively campaigned to raise public awareness of the dangers 
associated with nuclear power. In particular, environmentalists warn of the dangers of a nuclear accident 
causing radioactive substances to leak into the natural environment. The storage, transportation and 
disposal of nuclear waste is a major concern for environmentalists, given that radioactive waste remains 
toxic for thousands of years. Environmentalists are also concerned about the potential for nuclear 
materials designated for civil energy production to instead be used for the manufacture of nuclear 
weapons.  
In addition to campaigns against nuclear power conducted by environmental organisations, many of the 
organisations that labelled themselves specifically as ‘anti-nuclear’ used environmental concerns to 
justify their opposition to nuclear power. Protests against nuclear power occurred at a local, regional 
and national scale. In the US, the community-led Clamshell Alliance was formed to oppose the 
development of the Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant. In their mission statement - the Declaration 
of Nuclear Resistance – the Clamshell Alliance described nuclear power as “dangerous to all living 
creatures and to their natural environment” (Clamshell Alliance, 1977). The Clamshell Alliance 
organised the first large-scale anti-nuclear site occupation in the US, with almost 2000 people refusing 
to leave the Seabrook site (The Washington Post, 1977). In Germany, citizen action groups formed to 
oppose the construction of reactors at Breisach and Whyl, which were then united as the International 
Committee of Baden-Alsace Citizen Initiatives – a network concerned about the pollution and safety 
problems caused by nuclear power plants (Karapin, 2007: 118, 127). In the US, environmental 
organisations that mobilised to oppose nuclear development included the Sierra Club, Friends of the 
Earth and the Natural Resources Defense Council (Camilleri, 1984: 89). In the UK, environmental 
groups such as Friends of the Earth, the Conservation Society and the Royal Society for the Protection 
of Birds persistently opposed the government’s nuclear programme (Rüdig, 1994: 77). The French 
Federation of Nature Protection Societies consisted of over 150 environmental organisations who 
collectively conducted petitions calling for the French government’s nuclear program to be abandoned 
(Topçu, 2008: 229). 
Plans for new nuclear plants were often delayed, suspended or abandoned because of environmental 
opposition. For example, the emergence of the environmental movement in Ireland was partly driven 
by the proposed construction of a nuclear power plant in Carnsore Point. Leonard (2008) describes the 
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effectiveness of environmental and anti-nuclear protestors in campaigning against the proposed nuclear 
development at Carnsore since the plans were first announced in 1968. Protestors opposed the plant on 
environmental grounds, including the impact of the plant on disrupting the local bird sanctuary, 
depleting fresh water supplies, the long-term effects of radiation on the local ecosystem, and the risks 
associated with radioactive waste. The Council for Nuclear Safety and Energy Resource Conservation 
was established in 1975, which worked together with regional branches of Friends of the Earth to oppose 
the plant. In 1978, the Carnsore Collective was formed with plans to occupy the land at Carnsore 
earmarked for development. An anti-nuclear festival was held at Carnsore which received national and 
international media attention. Confronted by ongoing pressure from the environmental and anti-nuclear 
movement throughout the 1970s, the Irish government eventually abandoned their plans for the 
Carnsore nuclear power plant in 1981. Elsewhere, in the US, environmental opposition led the 
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company to cancel plans to construct two nuclear units in November 1972 
(Ripley, 1972: 1). In 1975, the Nuclear Research Centre Jülich in Germany released plans for 350 
nuclear power plants to be built by 2000. However, opposition from environmental groups led to the 
plans being revised to have only 33 nuclear power stations constructed by 2000 (Papadakis, 1996: 16).  
The growth of environmentalism has also resulted in an institutional shift in the way in which nuclear 
power is governed. In some instances, these institutional changes were a direct result of campaigning 
by the environmental movement. For example, opposition from environmental groups compelled the 
British government to change the way in which nuclear waste is disposed of. The UK had been dumping 
radioactive waste at sea since 1949 (IAEA 1999: 53). In February 1983, a proposal was submitted at 
the 7th Consultative Meeting of the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 
Wastes and Other Matter to prohibit sea dumping on all radioactive wastes. The UK government 
opposed the proposal on the basis that there was insufficient scientific evidence demonstrating the need 
for such a ban (Gündling, 1984: 95). In response, Greenpeace collaborated with trade unions such as 
the National Union of Seamen, the Transport and General Workers’ Union, and the Associated Society 
of Locomotive Steam Enginemen and Firemen to encourage their members to refuse to work on any 
vessel used for the disposal of nuclear waste at sea (Ardill, 1983: 30). The trade unions’ actions received 
broad media coverage and widespread domestic and international support (Rüdig, 1994: 84). In 
December 1983, the Environment Minister, Patrick Jenkin, conceded that there was “substantial public 
disquiet about nuclear waste disposal” (Tucker, 1983: 1). The practice of dumping nuclear waste at sea 
was then suspended and has not resumed since. 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) responded to the growing public concern about 
environmental issues by implementing a range of new institutions designed to reassure the public that 
nuclear power is safe for both humans and the natural environment. The Convention on Assistance in 
the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (1986) was introduced in the aftermath of 
Chernobyl for the purpose of minimising harm to individuals, society and the environment in the case 
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of a nuclear emergency (IAEA 1986). The Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage 
was amended in 1997 to broaden the term “nuclear damage” to cover damage to the environment (IAEA 
1998). The IAEA introduced the Convention on Nuclear Safety in 1994, which required signatories to 
“establish and maintain effective defences in nuclear installations against potential radiological hazards 
in order to protect individuals, society and the environment” (IAEA 1994: 2). The IAEA also introduced 
the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the safety of Radioactive Waste 
Management (1997), the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (2004) 
and the Code of Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactors (2004), all of which are designed to protect 
people and the environment from the hazards of radiation (IAEA 1997; 2004b; 2004c).  
The effect of this combined ideational and institutional shift, whereby agents are increasingly aware of 
and concerned about environmental issues, has created a more challenging political environment for the 
construction of nuclear reactors. The growth in public concern over environmental issues makes it more 
difficult for governments to convince their citizens that nuclear energy can be generated safely. Any 
proposal to build a new nuclear facility is likely to face opposition from environmental groups, as well 
as opposition from local residents opposing the development for its environmental impact. The growth 
of environmental institutions means that environmental considerations now influence the decisions 
made in all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. Consequently, nuclear power plant operators need to invest 
larger amounts of time and resources in order to comply with increasingly stringent environmental 
regulations. For example, an Environmental Impact Assessment must now be completed when selecting 
an appropriate site for a new nuclear facility. Environmental protection considerations may influence 
the choice of reactor technology used. The operation of a nuclear power plant must comply with national 
and international regulatory frameworks and safety standards that aim to protect both society and the 
natural environment. Governments and the nuclear operators need to ensure that emergency planning 
is undertaken to limit environmental damage in the case of a nuclear accident. The storage, transport 
and disposal or nuclear waste needs to be undertaken in a way that minimises the risk to the natural 
environment. For these reasons, the growth of environmentalism appears to have increased the costs 
and challenges involved in successfully developing and expanding civil nuclear energy programmes. 
ENVIRONMENTALISM & THE NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE 
When talk of a nuclear renaissance began in the early 2000s, nuclear advocates drew upon the 
importance of environmentalism as a global policy priority as a justification for why an expansion of 
nuclear power was necessary. More specifically, representatives from the nuclear industry capitalised 
on the international community’s growing awareness that greenhouse gas emissions needed to be 
rapidly reduced in order to address threats posed by climate change. When over fifty countries ratified 
the Kyoto Protocol and committed to reducing their greenhouse gas emissions, a global demand was 
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created for affordable, low carbon-emitting fuel sources that would still be capable of meeting ever-
increasing predictions of energy consumption. Advocates of nuclear energy – journalists, scientists, 
industry lobbyists and politicians alike – responded to this demand by deliberately reframing and 
promoting nuclear power as a clean, efficient, and sustainable source of electricity generation 
(Bickerstaff et al., 2008; Doyle, 2011). Specifically, they emphasised the low greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions associated with the technology that can assist governments with meeting their emissions 
targets in the context of climate change. When the entire lifecycle of nuclear power plants is considered, 
the GHG emissions produced per unit of electricity are at least two orders of magnitude below 
corresponding emissions from fossil fuel energy chains, and are comparable to most renewables at 
almost zero (Sims et al., 2003: 1317). The contribution of nuclear power to reducing GHG emissions is 
said to have already been proven, with the operation of nuclear power plants to date having saved 
roughly 10 percent of total carbon dioxide emissions from world energy use (Adamantiades and 
Kessides, 2009: 5151).  
The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), one of the major nuclear lobby groups in the US, describes nuclear 
power as having “one of the lowest impacts on the environment of any energy source” (Nuclear Energy 
Institute, 2015). The NEI launched a multimillion-dollar campaign to improve public and political 
support for nuclear energy development by reframing it as an environmentally friendly source of 
electricity, using the slogan “Nuclear: Clean Air Energy” (Farseta, 2008: 38). The IAEA produced a 
report on climate change and nuclear power, which stated that “nuclear power has the potential to 
continue to play a significant role in the effort to limit future GHG emissions while meeting global 
energy needs” (IAEA 2012: 5). The World Nuclear Association describes nuclear power as “the single 
most significant means of limiting the increase in greenhouse gas concentrations while enabling access 
to abundant electricity” (World Nuclear Association, 2015). The Clean and Safe Energy Coalition, a 
nuclear advocacy group, states that nuclear power has “perhaps the lowest impact on the environment 
of any other energy source, as it produces zero carbon emissions” (CASEnergy Coalition, 2015). 
Westinghouse, one of the major suppliers of nuclear technology, advertises nuclear power as having 
“no adverse effects to water, land, habitat, wildlife, or air resources” (Westinghouse, 2015b). 
The nuclear industry’s framing of nuclear power as a solution for combating climate change appears to 
have convinced many governments of the need for nuclear power. In the 2000s, governments 
throughout the world began to incorporate nuclear power into their climate change strategies. Many 
government representatives also made public statements in support of the environmental benefits of 
nuclear power, and the need for greater investment in the nuclear energy sector in order to reduce GHG 
emissions. The US government under President George W. Bush promoted greater investment in 
nuclear technologies as a potential solution to reducing GHG emissions and mitigating climate change 
(AFX Asia, 2005). President Bush described nuclear energy as “one of the safest, cleanest sources of 
power in the world and we need more of it in America” (Gawenda, 2005). This sentiment continued 
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through a change of government, with President Barack Obama declaring that to “prevent the worst 
consequences of climate change, we’ll need to increase our supply of nuclear power. It’s that simple’’ 
(Office of the Press Secretary, 2010b: 1). In 2004, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair informed a committee 
of senior members of parliament that nuclear power was a necessary component of the policy agenda 
“if you are serious about the issue of climate change” (Wintour and Brown, 2004: 1). Blair’s Chief 
Scientific Adviser, Sir David King, argued that “we have no alternative to nuclear power” if Britain 
seriously wants to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions (King, 2006). Germany’s economics minister, 
Michael Glos, warned that it would be “impossible to fulfil the Kyoto objectives without using nuclear 
energy” (Bilefsky, 2007: 1). 
The reframing of nuclear power as a solution to climate change appears to have contributed, in some 
countries, to an increase in the social “acceptability” of nuclear power. In the UK, for example, the 
reframing of nuclear power as a solution to climate change mitigation appears to have led to a growing 
“reluctant acceptance” of nuclear power – a resignation amongst citizens who might not see nuclear 
power as an ideal energy solution, but who believe that nuclear power is necessary to combat global 
warming (Bickerstaff et al., 2008). However, in other countries, such as Germany, the idea of 
environmentalism continues to have a much broader conceptualisation than focusing solely on the issue 
of climate change. As a result, there has been less of a shift towards a reluctant acceptance of nuclear 
power. 
Nuclear power’s new environmentally-friendly image was further reinforced when several prominent 
environmentalists, many of whom had been notoriously anti-nuclear in the past, began to speak 
publically of the need for more nuclear power plants in order to combat climate change. British 
journalist and environmentalist Mark Lynas, who had previously campaigned against the use of nuclear 
power, published an article in 2012 defending nuclear energy, stating that “without nuclear, the battle 
against global warming is as good as lost” (O'Hehir, 2013). Armond Cohen, the executive director of 
the Clean Air Task Force (an environmental organisation campaigning for the reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions), stated that “I can tell you it wasn't easy for me — who, as a lawyer back in the '80s, 
started my career fighting nuclear power — to come around to the view that it actually may be one of 
the things in the portfolio that may be necessary to save us… But that's where the facts lead you" (Harris, 
2013). George Monbiot, a British journalist and environmentalist who had stated that in 2000 that is 
“time to shut nuclear power down” (Monbiot, 2000), changed his position when he began advocating 
for an expansion of nuclear power in 2011. Monbiot became especially critical of the anti-nuclear 
movement for having “misled the world about the impacts of radiation on human health” (Monbiot, 
2011). Ralph Cavanagh, the co-director of the energy program for the environmental advocacy group, 
the Natural Resources Defense Council, stated that “there is no credible path to climate stabilization 
that does not include a substantial role for nuclear power” (Patterson, 2013). Prominent 
environmentalist James Lovelock described nuclear power as the “only green solution” to global 
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warming, and criticised opposition to nuclear power as being based on “irrational fear” (Lovelock, 
2004). More than seventy ecologists signed a letter urging anti-nuclear environmentalists to reconsider 
their opposition and embrace nuclear power to combat climate change (Mooney, 2014). In 2013, the 
documentary Pandora’s Promise was released which framed nuclear power as an environmentally-
friendly energy source. The film contained interviews with key figures who were once well-known anti-
nuclear activists, but who have since changed their positions and have begun supporting the use of 
nuclear power as a low-carbon energy source. At the United Nations Conference on Climate Change in 
Paris in December 2015, four leading climate scientists argued that nuclear power holds immense 
potential for reducing carbon emissions (World Nuclear News, 2015a). 
However, the newfound enthusiasm for nuclear power has not been universally adopted by the 
environmental movement. Numerous environmental groups continue to oppose nuclear power on the 
grounds that it is not sustainable (given that the nuclear fuel production cycle still involves the emission 
of some GHGs, and given that uranium reserves are limited); that sufficient nuclear power plants cannot 
be built in time in order to have a significant impact on reducing climate change; that the costs involved 
with constructing nuclear power plants are far greater than the costs of renewable energies such as wind 
and solar; that there is no long-term environmentally-friendly solution to the disposal of nuclear waste; 
and that nuclear power continues to present unacceptable risks to humans and the environment. 
Consequently, the ideational shift in agents’ perceptions of nuclear power and its relationship with the 
environment does not appear to be as all-encompassing as dialogue from the nuclear industry suggests. 
While certain political representatives seem to have accepted the environmental argument for nuclear 
power, by and large, the environmental movement has not shifted in its opposition to nuclear power. 
Even during the renaissance period, large segments of the environmental movement continued to 
campaign against nuclear power as a hazard to people and the environment. 
For example, Greenpeace continues to oppose nuclear power on the grounds that it poses an 
“unacceptable risk to the environment and to humanity” (Greenpeace International, 2014a). Friends of 
the Earth continues to oppose the construction of new nuclear reactors, arguing that they are “not needed 
to contribute to carbon pollution reductions” (Friends of the Earth, 2013b). Green political parties also 
remain unconvinced of the environmental argument for nuclear power. As illustrated in Table 4 below, 
an examination of the policy positions of green political parties throughout Western Europe and North 
America reveals that almost all of them continue to oppose the use of nuclear power1920.
                                                     
19 This table has been constructed by examining the policy manifestos made available on each of the green political 
parties’ websites. Each of the green political parties listed in this table have stated a clear position within their 
policy manifestos that they oppose the use of nuclear power. 
20 While this chapter does consider the views of green political parties, it does not assess the views and opinions 
of mainstream political parties. 
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Table 4: Nuclear Power Policy Position of Green Political Parties throughout Western Europe 
and North America 
 
 
Proposals for nuclear new build have also continued to face opposition on environmental grounds 
during the renaissance period. Environmentalists have protested against the construction of the first 
nuclear power plant in Turkey (Deutsche Welle, 2015), and against the construction of nuclear power 
plants in the US (Winslow, 2014). In Canada, environmental groups opposed the construction of a 
geological repository for nuclear waste in Ontario because the facility could cause irreversible 
environmental devastation (Pignataro, 2015). In 2011, approximately 150 political parties and 
Country Green Political Party Support/Oppose Nuclear Power
Die Grünen – Die Grüne Alternative
https://www.gruene.at/
Groen
https://www.groen.be/home
Green Party of Canada
http://www.greenparty.ca
Vihreät - De Gröna
https://www.vihreat.fi/
Europe Écologie – Les Verts 
http://eelv.fr/
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen
https://www.gruene.de/
Miljøpartiet De Grønne
https://www.mdg.no/
Os Verdes
http://www.osverdes.pt/
EQUO
http://partidoequo.es/
Miljöpartiet de Gröna
http://www.mp.se/
Les Verts
http://www.gruene.ch/gruene/fr.html
GroenLinks
https://groenlinks.nl/
Green Party
https://www.greenparty.org.uk/
Green Party of the United States
http://www.gp.org/
Oppose
Oppose
Oppose
Oppose
Oppose
Oppose
Oppose
Oppose
Oppose
Oppose
Oppose
The Netherlands
UK
US
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Oppose
Germany
Norway
Portugal Oppose
Canada
Finland
France
Austria
Belgium
Oppose
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environmental organisations participated in Switzerland’s biggest anti-nuclear demonstration for more 
than twenty-five years (SwissInfo, 2010). Environmental protestors continue to block and delay trains 
carrying nuclear waste throughout France and Germany (RFI, 2012). In the UK, the construction of the 
Hinkley Point C nuclear reactor continues to be opposed because of the environmental dangers that it 
poses. Allan Jeffrey, a representative of the Stop Hinkley campaign, argues that nuclear power is “not 
a sustainable [energy] source” as it “indirectly generate[s] greenhouse gases…significantly more than 
sustainable renewable energy sources such as solar, wind, hydro and tidal” (Jeffery, 2014). 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has argued that the growth of environmentalism has contributed to the disconnection 
between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance. The growth of environmentalism has 
created a new ideational context in which agents are more concerned about protecting the natural 
environment. The environment is no longer seen as a natural resource which humans should utilise for 
their own benefit, but rather, as having its own intrinsic value that needs to be protected for future 
generations. Agents in Context Historical Institutionalism recognises that agents and institutions are 
mutually interactive. Thus, while agents have been shaped by this changing ideational context, they 
have also responded to these changes by creating a new environmentally-focused institutional context. 
For example, as public concern over environmental issues has grown, governments and international 
organisations have responded by implementing numerous environmental laws and regulations. These 
actions have further reinforced the new-found importance of the environment as a policy issue. The 
importance of environmental issues on the global political agenda is most recently illustrated by 
governments around the world acknowledging the need to combat climate change. 
At the same time, the ideational and institutional focus on environmental issues has generated greater 
public awareness of and opposition to the environmental impacts of nuclear energy. The early 
development of civil nuclear energy programmes in the 1950s and 1960s took place in an ideational 
context whereby environmental issues were generally not considered to be a priority. The limited public 
or political concern for the environment meant that nuclear construction projects could be undertaken 
with limited public opposition. However, the actions of the environmental movement from the 1970s 
onwards placed the environmental risks of nuclear power under a spotlight. Government and industry 
proposals for the construction of new nuclear facilities became the target of local, regional and state-
wide environmental protests. These protests were widely covered by television and print journalists, 
encouraging even greater public awareness of the environmental risks of nuclear power. The perception 
that nuclear energy was an environmental hazard became widespread. The growth of environmentalism 
in the 1970s contributed to the stagnation and decline of civil nuclear energy by creating a more 
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challenging political environment for nuclear power. Plans for the construction of nuclear facilities were 
increasingly delayed, suspended or abandoned as a result of environmental opposition. 
Consequently, when nuclear advocates began invoking environmental justifications for the inevitability 
of a nuclear renaissance, it suggested that a new ideational shift was taking place that would overcome 
the challenges that environmentalism had historically posed for nuclear energy. Nuclear advocates 
argued that the immense potential of nuclear power as a low-carbon energy solution meant that any 
environmentalist that was serious about addressing climate change would be compelled to embrace the 
technology. Governments throughout Western Europe and North America appeared to accept this 
argument, publically supporting nuclear power as a strategy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
However, by and large, the environmental movement remains committed to its opposition to nuclear 
power. Prominent environmental organisations such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth remain 
committed to opposing nuclear energy, as they have done for almost half a decade. Green political 
parties throughout Western Europe and North America also remain firmly opposed to nuclear energy 
development. Proposals for the construction of new nuclear facilities continue to be opposed on the 
ground that they threaten the safety of humans and the natural environment alike. Consequently, the 
effectiveness of the reframing of nuclear power as an environmentally-friendly energy source remains 
limited. 
The ideational and institutional contextual shift towards environmentalism that emerged in the 1970s 
has not been undone. The rise of environmentalism contributed to the stagnation and decline of civil 
nuclear energy industries in the 1970s and 1980s, and this same issue has continued to hinder the success 
of the nuclear renaissance from 2000 onwards. Nuclear energy development during the renaissance 
period continues to be challenged on environmental grounds. Governments and the nuclear industry 
have been unable to convince the public that nuclear power is necessary even in the fight against climate 
change. Consequently, the growth of environmentalism, and the ideational and institutional shifts that 
have resulted from this, have contributed to the disconnection between the expectation and reality of 
the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America.  
 
118 
  
 
8 .  PU BLI C TRUS T IN  GO VERN MEN T  
In accordance with an Agents in Context Historical Institutionalist perspective, this chapter argues that 
the behaviour and decisions made by agents is heavily shaped by the social and political context in 
which they operate. More specifically, it argues that the degree to which agents trust their government 
and political institutions in general contributes to a political environment which can constrain or enable 
nuclear energy development. Public trust in government is necessary for the development and 
implementation of effective and legitimate policy decisions. This is especially the case for controversial 
policy areas such as civil nuclear energy development. Governments need to establish a relationship of 
mutual trust with the public if they wish to effectively regulate or promote nuclear energy. Therefore, 
the extent to which agents trust their governments is one factor which has influenced the changing 
trajectory of nuclear power over time. 
The chapter begins by first tracing the decline of public trust in government that has taken place 
throughout much of Western Europe and North America from 1945 through to the present day. This 
illustrates that levels of public trust in government have remained low even during the years when the 
nuclear renaissance was meant to take place. It then explains the reasons why public trust in government 
plays an important role in facilitating the development of nuclear energy, and outlines the implications 
of declining levels of public trust for nuclear energy development.  
The key argument made in this chapter is that when nuclear power experienced its initial period of 
expansion in the 1950s and 1960s, this expansion was facilitated by a particular political context 
characterised by high levels of public trust in government and political institutions. These high levels 
of public trust in government meant that there was little opposition towards the pro-nuclear policies that 
were being implemented at the time. Agents tended not to question government decisions to invest in 
nuclear energy development, and accepted government claims that nuclear energy development was 
needed for the good of the country. However, a contextual shift began to take place from the 1970s 
onwards, whereby public trust in government began to decline. This decline created a more challenging 
political environment for nuclear power. Nuclear policies and development proposals became the 
subjects of much greater media scrutiny. The desirability of specific nuclear power construction plans, 
as well as the use of nuclear power in general, was increasingly questioned by the public, community 
organisations and lobby groups. Consequently, governments had to expend larger amounts of political 
and financial capital in order to convince agents of the benefits and necessity of nuclear power. Low 
levels of public trust in government also meant that when a nuclear accident did happen, political leaders 
had to work harder to convince the public that the issue was an isolated event and that it had been 
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resolved. Consequently, low levels of public trust in government has created a more challenging 
political context for agents that support nuclear energy development. 
Low levels of public trust in government continue to challenge the success of the nuclear renaissance. 
The optimistic rhetoric of the nuclear renaissance made no mention of the ongoing challenge of low 
levels of public trust in government, either on a broad level or in regards to nuclear energy in particular. 
However, public opinion polling conducted since 2000 continues to demonstrate that public trust in 
government generally, as well as specifically in relation to nuclear energy development, remains low. 
Levels of public trust in government show no signs of returning to the heights that characterised the 
1950s and 1960s, and which facilitated the expansion of nuclear energy during this time. Consequently, 
the expectations of a nuclear renaissance were unlikely to become a reality because of a challenging 
political environment characterised by low levels of public trust in government. Promises made by 
political leaders and the nuclear industry about a widespread expansion of nuclear power were always 
unlikely to become a reality, given that agents remain sceptical of the credibility and trustworthiness of 
government and the nuclear industry to safely manage and regulate nuclear power. 
TRUST IN GOVERNMENT: A GLOBAL DECLINE 
Public trust in government appears to be under threat. There are an increasing number of claims that a 
“crisis of trust” (O'Neill, 2002), an “age of distrust” (Hardin, 2006), or a “deficit of trust” has emerged 
in modern society (Misztal, 2001). This crisis of trust appears to have affected the broad spectrum of 
society, with voters, community organisations, lobby groups, and the media all becoming increasingly 
sceptical and challenging the decisions made by governments. Denhardt (2009: xviii) asserts that “trust 
in government, trust in business and indeed trust in all major social institutions has declined 
dramatically in the past several decades”. In recent years, news headlines have warned that “Trust in 
Government Nears All-Time Low” (Dutton, 2010), “a Trust Deficit is Hurting the Economy” 
(Hilsenrath, 2013), and “Europe’s public trust in government plunges” (Silverman, 2014). In his first 
State of the Union address as President, Barack Obama warned that “we face a deficit of trust – deep 
and corrosive doubts about how Washington works that have been growing for years” (Office of the 
Press Secretary, 2010a). In 2014, the Edelman Trust Barometer recorded that trust in government across 
the globe declined to a historic low, making it the least trusted of any institution (Edelman, 2014: 3). 
Public opinion data from across the globe supports the assertion that there has been a gradual erosion 
of public trust in government and public institutions over time. More specifically, there has been a 
gradual decline in public trust in government throughout much of the world from the late 1960s and 
early 1970s until the present day. This is a marked shift from the post-war era which was characterised 
by strong levels of public faith in government and political institutions to serve the public interest. For 
example, various studies conducted in the 1950s and 1960s recorded high levels of public trust in 
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government and political authorities in the US (Feldman, 1983: 341; Lane, 1965: 895). However, by 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, these elevated levels of public trust began to decline in almost all 
advanced industrialised countries in the world (Dalton, 2005: 133; Blind, 2006: 8). Public opinion 
towards government in the US provides a clear illustration of this trend. The American National 
Election Studies is a survey of voters that is conducted before and after every presidential election, and 
has taken place from 1945 until the present day. The survey contains several questions to measure public 
trust in government, which are then used to create a ‘trust in government’ index, the results of which is 
displayed in Figure 8 below. 
Figure 8: US Trust in Government Index, 1958-2008 
 
Chart compiled using data from American National Election Studies (2010) 
As can be seen in Figure 8 above, public trust in government declined steadily from 1966 until 198021. 
Public trust increased during the first half of the Reagan administration (1980-86), and again from 1994 
to 2002, but neither of these increases have been sustained. The high levels of public trust in the US 
government that characterised the 1950s and early 1960s have not been repeated. A similar trend of 
declining public trust in government since the late 1960s and early 1970s is evident elsewhere in the 
world. Public trust in politicians and political institutions has been steadily declining in Sweden and 
Germany from the late 1960s (Listhaug and Wiberg, 1998: 306; Holmberg, 1999: 105; Dalton, 1999: 
36), and in the UK from the mid-1970s onwards (Bromley et al., 2004: 7). Falling levels of public 
confidence in government institutions have also been recorded in Norway and Belgium from the early 
1980s onwards (Listhaug and Wiberg, 1998: 306). Public trust in government has declined in New 
Zealand from the mid-1980s until the late 1990s (Barnes and Gill, 2000: 4). In South Korea, public trust 
                                                     
21 It should be noted that the point in time at which public trust in government in the US begins to decline (that is, 
in 1966) does not exactly correlate with the point in time at which this thesis argues that the fall of nuclear power 
began (the mid-1970s). Nevertheless, a broad trend in declining public trust in government over the period of the 
fall of nuclear power is still observable. 
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in government declined from 1981 through to 2001 (Kim, 2010: 802). In Japan, public trust in 
government and bureaucracy has declined from the mid-1980s onwards (Kikuchi, 2008: 208). 
More recently, public trust in government has continued to show evidence of decline during the 
renaissance period. The Gallup World Poll found that public confidence in national governments 
dropped throughout OECD member countries from an average of 45 percent of respondents in 2007 
reporting that they had confidence in their national government, to 40 percent in 2012 (OECD, 2013: 
40). The 2014 Eurobarometer on Public Opinion in the European Union found that public trust in 
national political institutions has decreased in the period from 2004 to 2013. For example, public trust 
in the European Union has decreased from 50 percent of respondents reporting that they tended to trust 
the European Union in 2004, to 37 percent of respondents in 2014 (European Commission, 2014b: 8). 
Similarly, the Eurobarometer revealed that public trust in national parliaments has decreased from 38 
percent of respondents reporting that they tended to trust their national parliament in 2004, to 30 percent 
in 2014 (European Commission, 2014b: 8). The amount of respondents reporting that they tended to 
trust their national governments also decreased from 34 percent in 2004 to 29 percent in 2014 (European 
Commission, 2014b: 8). 
A wide body of academic literature has been dedicated to examining the reasons for this ongoing decline 
in public trust in government. A range of political, economic and socio-cultural factors have been 
identified as contributing to lower levels of public trust in government. These include deteriorating 
government performance, increasing frequency of and greater public attention to political scandals, 
deteriorating economic performance, an increasingly adversarial media, and declining social capital 
(Hetherington, 1998; Bowler and Karp, 2004; Levi and Stoker, 2000: 481; Hetherington, 2005: 16). 
However, while these factors have been effective in explaining short-term fluctuations in public trust, 
they have been criticised for failing to explain why the decline in trust in government has been sustained 
for so long, and what structural factors have contributed to the decline (Hetherington and Rudolph, 
2008: 498; Bovens and Wille, 2008: 291). Hetherington and Rudolph (2008) provide an alternative 
explanation for why the decline in public trust has been sustained for so long. They argue that rather 
than the post-1960 levels of public trust being unusually low, it is the high levels of public trust in 
government in the 1950s and 1960s that present an anomaly. The 1950s and 1960s were characterised 
by a combination of factors which created anomalously high levels of public trust in government. These 
factors included heightened public perceptions of foreign security threats, exceptionally strong 
economic performance across a range of industries and indicators, and diminished public perceptions 
of domestic issues such as crime. The political environment created by this particular combination of 
factors facilitated unusually high levels of public trust in government. Moreover, this particular 
combination of factors has not been repeated since its erosion in the late 1960s, and as a result, 
Hetherington and Rudolph (2008: 510) conclude that “there is little to suggest that low to moderate 
levels of trust will not persist well into the future”. 
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The implications of low levels of public trust in government for public policy-making are significant. 
Governments need to establish a relationship of mutual trust with their citizens in order to be perceived 
as legitimate and to be able to govern effectively (Gilson, 2003). Higher levels of trust in government 
typically lead the public to voluntarily cooperate and comply with the development and implementation 
of laws, regulations and other policy decisions made by government (Levi, 1998: 88; Fard and Rostamy, 
2007: 331). Voluntary public compliance with government decisions is important because it typically 
leads to more successful policy implementation than when governments try to manipulate citizen 
behaviour through incentives or intimidation (Tyler, 1998: 271). Similarly, public trust can assist 
governments to develop long-term and binding policy decisions in the face of limited public opposition 
(Chanley et al., 2000: 240). This means that when governments are supported by high levels of public 
trust, they have greater leeway to propose and implement policy solutions, particularly solutions which 
might be controversial or unpopular (Hetherington, 2005: 8). In contrast, low levels of public trust poses 
a more difficult political climate for an activist government (Hetherington, 2005: 8). This is because 
low levels of public trust in government can cause citizens to adopt pre-determined prejudices towards 
government policy decisions (Kim, 2005: 628), become antagonistic towards government or actively 
resist policy decisions (Levi, 1998: 88). This makes it increasingly difficult for governments to assemble 
resources to push through policy proposals and implement solutions (Hetherington, 1998: 792). 
Securing public trust is therefore particularly important when the government wants to develop and 
implement policies that are controversial or pose potential risks to the public (Kim, 2005: 629), as is 
the case with nuclear energy policy. Finally, low levels of public trust are significant as “distrust breeds 
conditions for the creation of further distrust” (Gamson, 1968: 43). This suggests that governments will 
find it more and more difficult to rebuild public trust to the levels that existed in the 1950s and 1960s.  
THE IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC TRUST IN GOVERNMENT 
FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY 
The relationship between trust in government and the ability of governments to establish or expand their 
nuclear industries has been given only limited consideration in the existing academic literature on 
nuclear energy development22. However, in accordance with an Agents in Context Historical 
Institutionalist approach, this thesis argues that the context in which agents operate affects the way in 
                                                     
22 One example of academic literature which explicitly highlights the importance of public trust to ensuring the 
successful development of civil nuclear energy programmes is the work by He et al. (2013) on the role of public 
participation and trust in nuclear power development in China. They argue that “one of the key challenges around 
nuclear power in OECD countries has been (lack of) trust in the regulators, governments and industries promoting 
nuclear power” (He et al., 2013: 2). Similarly, Pidgeon et al. (2008: 7) argued that “the acceptability of nuclear 
power and radioactive waste is closely related to levels of institutional trust”. A study into the narratives of long-
term anti-nuclear activists found that “untrustworthy officials” and “lack of trust for the industry and its 
regulators” were cited by respondents as key problems associated with nuclear power (Culley and Angelique, 
2010: 238). 
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which government decision-making takes place, and the way in which these decisions are accepted or 
challenged by the public. Therefore, in order to fully understand the nuclear debate, the political 
environment in which it has taken place, and the way in which this environment has changed, needs to 
be recognised. Clearly, the context in which government actors make policy decisions on behalf of their 
citizens has fundamentally changed over time. A new political and social context has emerged that is 
characterised by much lower levels of public trust in government than was present in the aftermath of 
the Second World War. A gradual shift has taken place whereby agents are increasingly sceptical of 
governments, and are less likely to unquestioningly accept government policies, particularly when it 
comes to complex or controversial policy matters. This structural shift places important constraints on 
the agency of government actors and key decision-makers, which need to be considered in order to fully 
understand the changing nature of the nuclear energy debate. 
The broad trend of declining trust in government has implications for governments that wish to establish 
a domestic civil nuclear energy industry and for governments that wish to expand their existing nuclear 
power programmes. Governments are typically responsible for both promoting and regulating nuclear 
energy development, and establishing a relationship of mutual trust with the public is necessary for 
governments to be able to successfully carry out these functions. Governments can promote nuclear 
energy by providing incentives for investment in nuclear energy, modifying electricity market 
regulation to encourage nuclear development, providing research and development support for nuclear 
technologies and reactor designs, and encouraging public support and acceptance for nuclear power. 
Government regulation of the nuclear industry involves ensuring that nuclear power plant operators 
protect human and environmental health from the potential risks and negative effects associated with 
nuclear energy production and the management of radioactive waste (International Atomic Energy 
Agency, 2002: 56). Nuclear regulatory agencies fulfil this responsibility by creating safety policies and 
principles which provide a foundation for regulatory action and intervention (International Atomic 
Energy Agency, 2002: 56). While nuclear regulatory organisations are often established as 
‘independent’ bodies that function separately from government, it is nevertheless governments that are 
responsible for creating and, if need be, dismantling these regulatory bodies. Ineffective action by 
nuclear regulatory agencies can be perceived by the public as constituting ineffective action by 
government. 
Public trust in government to advocate and regulate nuclear energy is important, but also difficult to 
achieve and maintain, for three key reasons: Firstly, nuclear energy is a highly complex and 
technologically sophisticated policy issue. This makes it harder for governments to communicate to the 
public about nuclear energy policy matters, and, more importantly, to convince the public that nuclear 
technology is safe and beneficial to the public interest. Secondly, the time-horizons associated with 
nuclear energy development are extensive. The average construction time for a nuclear reactor is 
between five to seven years, compared with approximately four years for the construction of a large 
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coal-fired power plant or three years for a natural gas fired plant (OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, 2012). 
Consequently, the public needs to trust government promises that the far-off benefits of nuclear energy 
will be worth the long-term investment required. Finally, public trust in government is necessary due 
to the low-probability but high-consequence risks associated with nuclear power. When an incident 
occurs at a nuclear power plant, the ramifications are potentially catastrophic, as was displayed to the 
world with the nuclear disasters at Chernobyl and Fukushima. The severity of these risks is one of the 
key reasons why nuclear energy is so politically unpopular. The public therefore needs to trust their 
government to keep them safe from the potential dangers of nuclear energy production, primarily 
through effective regulation. 
These three features inherent to nuclear energy highlight the need for governments to gain their citizens’ 
trust if they are going to be able to push through pro-nuclear energy policies. This is supported by 
empirical research studies into the connection between public trust in government and public perception 
of the risks associated with nuclear energy. Several studies have found that the degree of public trust in 
the actors responsible for managing high-level radioactive wastes can influence public perceptions of 
and attitudes towards the risks associated with nuclear energy (Flynn et al., 1992; Slovic et al., 1991; 
Kunreuther et al., 1990). More specifically, lower levels of public trust in government can result in 
higher perceptions of the risks and potential negative impacts associated with nuclear energy and 
nuclear waste, and lower levels of perception of the potential benefits of nuclear power (Lee et al., 2012: 
21; Costa-Font et al., 2008: 1276, 1284). Similarly, the degree of trust in government can influence the 
public’s support for construction of nuclear energy facilities.  This is evident in a study by Hine et al. 
(1997), which found that higher levels of trust in nuclear regulators led to stronger support for the 
construction of a proposed nuclear waste repository in Canada. 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHANGING CONTEXT OF PUBLIC 
TRUST FOR NUCLEAR POWER 
High levels of public trust in government are therefore an important contributing factor to governments’ 
ability to develop pro-nuclear policies and construct nuclear energy facilities. Consequently, the 
contextual shift of declining public trust in government over time has implications for nuclear energy 
development. As previously discussed, the 1950s and 1960s was a period broadly characterised by high 
levels of public trust in government. This trust appears to have helped to facilitate the early development 
and expansion of civil nuclear energy programmes23. Agents tended not to question government 
                                                     
23 It should be noted that public opinion data on public trust in government specifically over issues of nuclear 
power is not available as early as the 1950s and 1960s. Other sources of evidence, such as news articles and 
historical texts on nuclear development during this time, make little mention or have no record of public scepticism 
or opposition towards nuclear policy-making in this early stage of nuclear development. There is, of course, a 
possible alternative explanation that public distrust towards government over nuclear power was voiced during 
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decisions to invest in nuclear energy development, and accepted government rhetoric that nuclear 
energy development was needed for the good of the country. As discussed in Chapter 5, the lack of 
public concern over the safety issues associated with nuclear energy suggests that agents believed the 
claims of nuclear scientists and government representatives that nuclear power was a safe and effective 
source of energy production. As a result, governments did not need to expend much in the way of 
political capital to convince the public of the need for nuclear energy, or to be able to implement their 
pro-nuclear policies successfully. No wide-ranging debate around the complex issues of nuclear safety 
or its associated environmental or public health impacts took place during this time (Camilleri, 1984: 
75), despite the fact that safety incidents at nuclear power plants were already taking place. The limited 
opposition that did emerge during this period was largely confined to academic journals, small-scale 
publications, and intermittent localised concerns (Herring, 2010: 46). These arguments also tended to 
focus on technological and economic considerations, rather than opposition to the utilisation of nuclear 
energy per se. For example, in the UK, debates took place over what the scale of the nuclear programme 
should be, which type of reactor technology should be utilised, who should be responsible for financing 
the nuclear programme, and the potential impact on other energy industries, such as coal (Williams, 
1980: 17). However, the safety or general desirability of nuclear power was rarely questioned by the 
public. Governments did not have to contend with widespread or highly visible opposition to nuclear 
power. As a result, the high levels of public trust in government that characterised the 1950s and 1960s 
created a political environment that facilitated the ability of governments and the nuclear industry alike 
to site and construct nuclear power facilities.  
However, the erosion of public trust in government that began to take place in the 1970s created a more 
challenging political context that constrained the ability of agents to establish and expand civil nuclear 
power programmes. As public trust in government wanes, agents (such as voters, community 
organisations, and the media) have become increasingly sceptical of the claims and promises that 
governments and political representatives make. More specifically, agents increasingly began to 
question and challenge government plans for nuclear development. Opposition to the siting of nuclear 
facilities became more prevalent, while opposition to nuclear energy in general became more 
widespread. Grass-roots activist groups began to form at the local, regional, and national level to oppose 
specific nuclear construction projects as well as the use of nuclear power in general. News articles 
increasingly reported on escalating construction costs and project delays at nuclear power plants 
(Ripley, 1972: 1; McElheny, 1973: 57; O'Toole, 1973: A1), the dangers and mismanagement of nuclear 
wastes (Los Angeles Times, 1973: A6; Anderson, 1974: B13; Gillette, 1975: E4; Hawkes, 1975: 11; 
Rodgers, 1976: 1; Hillmore, 1976: 1; Van Ness, 1976: 365; Willard, 1976: B18; Buschschluter, 1977: 
                                                     
this period but was simply not recorded. However, based on the evidence that is available, the conclusion is drawn 
here that public distrust towards nuclear policy-making did not pose a significant challenge for the development 
of nuclear power during the 1950s and 1960s. 
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10; Omang, 1977: A10), growing environmental concerns over the impact of nuclear energy (Hill, 1975: 
NES58), and severe safety incidents, including radiation leakages, at nuclear power plants (The New 
York Times, 1975a: 7; The Observer, 1975: 1; Tucker, 1976b: 4; Blau, 1977: 27). The process of 
granting permits and licenses for nuclear power development was placed under greater scrutiny and 
increasingly challenged by members of the public, affected residents, local organisations and anti-
nuclear campaigners. From 1967 to 1971, 32 percent of applications for nuclear power plant license 
applications in the US were contested, but this rose to 73 per cent of applications being challenged from 
1970-72 (Joppke, 1993: 31).  
Clearly, a shift was taking place whereby public trust in government was declining at a broad level, 
while public trust in government over matters of nuclear power more specifically was also eroding. 
However, a two-way relationship existed between public trust in government and nuclear power. As 
described in more detail in Chapter 5, the emergence of increasingly severe nuclear accidents in the 
1970s and 1980s – typified by Three Mile Island and Chernobyl – further reinforced the perception that 
governments could not be trusted to keep their citizens safe from the potential dangers of nuclear power. 
The increasing scepticism over government claims about the desirability or safety of nuclear energy – 
evidenced by the increasing negative media coverage and the growth of an anti-nuclear movement – 
meant that governments had to expend larger amounts of financial and political capital to convince 
agents that nuclear development should take place. For example, in the mid-1970s, the Danish 
government responded to the emergence of a domestic anti-nuclear movement by funding and running 
a public information campaign about energy problems (Jelsøe, 2000: 201). In Sweden, the government 
held public meetings to try and reduce opposition to nuclear power by educating citizens of its benefits 
(Jahn, 1992: 401). Such government initiatives were largely non-existent in the 1950s and 1960s. The 
need for such efforts indicates that governments could no longer facilitate the siting and construction of 
nuclear power plants with the relative ease that they had experienced in the 1950s and 1960s. 
The structural shift towards lower levels of public trust in government that began in the 1970s has 
continued throughout the following decades, even during the period of the expected nuclear renaissance. 
This thesis therefore argues that the political context of lower levels of public trust in government was 
always going to pose a challenge to the expectation of a nuclear renaissance, and meant that these 
expectations were unlikely to become a reality. Public trust in government over issues of nuclear energy 
remained low during the renaissance period – even prior to the Fukushima nuclear disaster taking place. 
The 2007 Eurobarometer study titled Europeans and Nuclear Safety investigated public opinion 
towards nuclear energy and its associated risks amongst the 27 member states of the European Union. 
The study asked respondents who they considered to be the most trustworthy source of information 
about nuclear safety. Only 17 percent of respondents indicated that they trusted their national 
governments for information (Eurobarometer, 2007b: 51). Another Eurobarometer study into Energy 
Technologies found that only 29 percent of respondents trusted their government for information about 
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energy related issues either ‘totally’ or ‘a lot’ (Eurobarometer, 2007a: 99). A 2010 Eurobarometer study 
on nuclear energy found that only 51 percent of respondents trusted their national nuclear safety 
authorities to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants (Eurobarometer, 2010: 53). These 
figures indicate that there has continued to be a dearth of public trust in government over issues of 
nuclear energy during the renaissance period. 
Consequently, the period of time that was meant to see a nuclear renaissance take place has continued 
to be characterised by low levels of public trust in government more broadly, as well as low levels of 
public trust in government specifically in regards to the issue of nuclear energy. The same problem that 
contributed to the decline of nuclear power in the 1970s continued to problematize nuclear development 
during the supposed renaissance period. However, the discourse surrounding the nuclear renaissance 
did not recognise this context of low levels of public trust in government as an issue or challenge for a 
revival of nuclear power. No mention was made in government or industry discourse of the need to 
improve public trust in government in order to ensure the nuclear renaissance became a reality. 
There are several factors which have contributed to the ongoing low levels of public trust in government 
over issues of nuclear energy during the renaissance period. One of these factors is that there have been 
numerous other reports of mismanagement, collusion and regulatory failure at nuclear facilities across 
the globe since 200024. In 2007, presidential candidate Barack Obama declared that the US Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission had “become captive of the industries that it regulates” (Elliott, 2011). These 
reports have contributed to a public image of governments and the nuclear industry as being 
untrustworthy and incapable of safely managing the risks associated with nuclear power. This image 
has been reinforced by anti-nuclear advocates, who have capitalised on events such as Fukushima to 
reinforce their message that nuclear energy is an inherently risky technology and that governments are 
incapable of protecting the public from the dangers of nuclear power. 
Public trust in government over issues of nuclear energy in particular has also continued to be 
challenged during the renaissance period by the competing discourses of government rhetoric and the 
anti-nuclear movement. While pro-nuclear governments have continued to frame nuclear power as a 
safe and cost-effective source of energy production, anti-nuclear advocates such as Greenpeace and 
Friends of the Earth challenge government reassurances over the need for nuclear energy by framing 
nuclear energy as an “unacceptable risk to the environment and to humanity” which needs to be 
                                                     
24
 In 2007, pipes at the Byron Nuclear Generating Station were found to have corroded, causing shutdowns at two 
nuclear reactors for repairs. The plant owner, Exelon Corporation, was aware that the pipes were corroding, but 
repeatedly lowered the minimum thickness that it deemed safe (eventually reducing the standards to one-tenth the 
original minimum thickness), rather than fixing the pipes. While the Nuclear Regulatory Commission had 
inspected the site, there was no record of inspection of the pipes themselves for at least eight years prior to the 
leak occurring (Zeller Jr., 2011). A study released by the Union of Concerned Scientists found that a lack of 
regulatory oversight had led to fourteen serious ‘near-miss’ safety incidents at US nuclear plants in 2010 alone 
(Clayton, 2011). 
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abandoned altogether (Greenpeace International, 2014a). The damage that these challenges can cause 
to government legitimacy when trying to encourage nuclear energy development was clearly displayed 
in the recent controversy over the UK Government’s Energy Review. In 2005, the UK government 
launched a review into the energy challenges facing the nation and to identify strategies for responding 
to these challenges. Critics claimed that the review was merely a smokescreen for the government’s 
already-made decision to support nuclear power (Lovell, 2005)25. The Energy Review Report, 
completed in 2006, gave backing to a new generation of nuclear power plants, but asserted that it would 
be up to the private sector to fund any new developments (HM Government, 2006: 17, 124-5). These 
conclusions soon became the subject of widespread controversy. In 2007, Greenpeace challenged the 
legality of the Government’s conclusion that nuclear power had a “role to play” in the UK’s energy 
future. In particular, they argued that the government had failed to fulfil its promise to conduct “the 
fullest consultation” with stakeholders before arriving at its conclusions, and had failed to present 
adequate information on ongoing issues of cost and nuclear waste disposal (Summers, 2007). 
Greenpeace was subsequently successful in winning a High Court ruling against the government that 
deemed the pro-nuclear decision to be “unlawful”, and the consultation process to be “seriously flawed” 
and “manifestly inadequate and unfair” (Greenpeace, 2007). The British government announced that it 
would launch a new consultation, however, Tony Blair declared prior to the commencement of the new 
consultation that the process “won’t affect policy at all” (Geels, 2013: 17). Moreover, as the second 
nuclear consultation process unfolded, environmental organisations criticised the process as a “nothing 
more than an expensive sham”, having many of the same flaws that were inherent to the first 
consultation, and ultimately abandoned the process (see, for example, Greenpeace, 2008; Vidal, 2007).  
The impact of this incident on public trust in government over issues of nuclear energy in the UK has 
been dire. In 2012, the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee concluded that the 
public does not trust the government to be objective and independent when developing policy on nuclear 
power. The Committee stated that “the government’s position as an advocate for nuclear power makes 
it difficult for the public to trust it as an impartial source of information” (House of Commons Science 
and Technology Committee, 2012: 17). Public trust in the independence of nuclear regulation in the 
UK was further undermined when, in 2014, The Independent revealed that the nuclear regulatory agency 
in the UK, the Office of Nuclear Regulation (ONR), was receiving technical advice from the same 
private companies that it was meant to be regulating (Leftly, 2014). The ONR Chairman, Nick Baldwin, 
                                                     
25 Prior to the 2005-06 Energy Review, there had also been a 2003 energy review entitled Our Energy Future, 
which drew upon the work of the Performance and Innovation Unit and was conducted using more transparent 
and participatory methods. This was meant to be the first time that an independent transparent energy review was 
conducted in the UK. The outcome of the Review was that nuclear power was not necessary. However, at the 
same time, Tony Blair enlisted a small team in the cabinet office that worked ‘behind closed doors’ to develop a 
secret report on the UK’s energy and environment (Taylor, 2016: 59-63). The conclusion of this report was that 
nuclear power was the only realistic solution to securing sufficient affordable, carbon-free energy. Following the 
release of this report, the decision from the 2003 Energy Review that nuclear power was not needed was then 
reversed in the 2005-06 Energy Review. 
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admitted later that there was only a “small gene pool” of companies that could provide the technical 
advice which the ONR needed to carry out its role (Leftly, 2014). These developments all contribute to 
the creation of a political environment that discourages public trust in government and the nuclear 
industry to be able to safely and effectively manage the construction and operation of nuclear power 
plants. They suggest to the public and the media alike that the government lacks independence and 
cannot be trusted to be honest and open about their dealings with the nuclear industry, and that the 
state’s relationship with the nuclear industry undermines government assurances about nuclear power 
being a safe source of energy production. 
Public protests that have taken place during the renaissance period against the development of nuclear 
power also reflect the ongoing assumption that governments and the nuclear industry cannot be trusted. 
When protesting against the construction of the Hinkley Point nuclear power station in the UK, the 
spokesman for the Stop New Nuclear alliance accused the government of having “hoodwinked the 
public into believing that we need nuclear power to keep the lights on. But this is totally untrue” (The 
Guardian, 2011). Similarly, when planning permission was granted to EDF for the construction of the 
new Hinkley Point reactor, a spokesperson for the Stop Hinkley campaign described the decision as “a 
rubber-stamping exercise”, and that “the public consultation last year was…an elaborate, undemocratic 
sham” (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 2013). Furthermore, one of the sites identified by the 
British government as a potential location for the construction of a new nuclear power station is 
Bradwell. An anti-nuclear group opposed to the construction of a nuclear reactor at the site has raised 
concerns that the government-run consultation process about the development was not being run in a 
democratic and transparent manner. The Chairman of The Blackwater Against New Nuclear Group 
stated that “there is a real concern the consultation process is being pursued in a hurry and out of public 
view, in order to reach a predetermined conclusion to develop at Bradwell” (Daily Gazette, 2009). 
The ability of government to generate and retain public trust over issues of nuclear energy has also 
continued to be hampered by revelations of regulatory failure, corruption and collusion among 
government and the nuclear industry during the renaissance period. This was most clearly displayed in 
the case of the Fukushima nuclear disaster in March 2011. An independent investigation into the cause 
of the Fukushima disaster was undertaken by the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent 
Investigation Commission (NAIIC) in 2011. The investigation found that the Nuclear and Industry 
Safety Agency (NISA) and the Japanese Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC, the regulators), the 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI, the government ministry responsible for promoting 
nuclear power) and the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO, the operator of the nuclear power 
plant) had all failed to adequately develop and implement “the most basic safety requirements” (NAIIC 
2012: 16). These revelations about the effectiveness of nuclear regulation in Japan were not entirely 
new or surprising. Since the 1980s, NISA has repeatedly failed to respond to warnings about the 
structural resilience of nuclear reactors and power plants and their inability to withstand earthquakes or 
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tsunamis (Kaufmann and Penciakova, 2011). Furthermore, the NAIIC report found that the Japanese 
government, regulators and TEPCO had not undertaken adequate preparation for responding to a 
nuclear accident like the one at Fukushima (NAIIC 2012: 18). The government organisations that were 
tasked with responding to nuclear accidents did not respond effectively or as planned (NAIIC 2012: 
33), and were slow to inform municipalities that the nuclear accident had taken place or how severe the 
accident was (NAIIC 2012: 19). The regulators did not have adequate expertise to ensure the safety of 
nuclear power, nor did they adequately monitor or supervise the nuclear industry (NAIIC 2012: 20). 
The regulators did not enforce safety requirements, instead allowing nuclear operators to implement 
safety regulations on a voluntary basis (NAIIC 2012: 20). Government and regulatory independence 
from stakeholders with a vested interest in promoting nuclear power was described in the report as a 
“mockery” (NAIIC 2012: 20). Rather, there existed a “cozy relationship between the operators, the 
regulators and academic scholars that can only be described as totally inappropriate. In essence, the 
regulators and the operators prioritized the interests of their organizations over the public’s safety, and 
decided that Japanese nuclear power plant reactor operations ‘will not be stopped’” (NAIIC 2012: 43). 
The revelations of mismanagement and regulatory failure in Japan surrounding the Fukushima nuclear 
accident have had severe implications for public trust in government over nuclear energy and public 
support for nuclear energy development in general. In August 2011, a public opinion poll conducted by 
the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research of 1,000 Japanese residents found that almost 60 percent 
of respondents had either little or no confidence in the safety of Japan’s nuclear power plants (Aldrich, 
2012: 7). A study conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2012 found that 80 percent of respondents 
in Japan disapproved of the government’s handling of the Fukushima crisis, and 70 percent of 
respondents thought that nuclear power in Japan should be reduced (Pew Research, 2012). 
Moreover, in the months following the Fukushima nuclear disaster, revelations about the actions of 
government and nuclear industry actors immediately after the disaster further served to erode public 
trust over issues of nuclear energy. A report by The Guardian revealed that a public relations campaign 
was launched in the wake of Fukushima to protect the UK civil nuclear energy programme from any 
potential fallout. Only two days after the tsunami hit, and before the extent of the radiation leak was 
known, British government officials contacted nuclear companies (such as EDF Energy, Areva and 
Westinghouse), requesting them to develop a coordinated public relations strategy that would “play 
down” the Fukushima nuclear accident and protect plans for nuclear new build in the UK (Edwards, 
2011). One official from the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, wrote that the Fukushima 
nuclear disaster “has the potential to set the nuclear industry back globally”, and that “We need to ensure 
the anti-nuclear chaps and chapesses do not gain ground on this. We need to occupy the territory and 
hold it. We really need to show the safety of nuclear” (Edwards, 2011). 
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Clearly, despite all the talk of a nuclear renaissance and an expected growth in public support for nuclear 
energy development, public trust in government over issues of nuclear energy remained low during the 
renaissance period – even prior to the Fukushima nuclear disaster taking place. This, combined with the 
broader decline in public trust in government and political institutions, makes for a challenging political 
environment for nuclear energy development to occur. Governments faced with lower levels of public 
trust are likely to find it more difficult to convince the public that the creation or expansion of a civil 
nuclear energy programme is in the national interest. Similarly, low levels of public trust in government 
are also likely to make it more difficult for governments to identify and secure sites for construction of 
nuclear power plants or nuclear waste storage and disposal facilities. However, trust in government has 
not been recognised by the nuclear industry as a problem for the nuclear renaissance. In the discourse 
purporting the benefits and inevitably of a nuclear renaissance, no mention has been made of the 
ongoing challenge of public trust in government, or the need to resolve this issue in order to facilitate 
the expansion of civil nuclear industries. This lack of recognition suggests that the nuclear renaissance 
was always going to be constrained by the political context of the time. The nuclear renaissance is 
unlikely to be successful unless public trust in government at a general level, as well as public trust in 
government specifically over issues of nuclear energy, improves. 
There are, however, some exceptions to the trend of eroding levels of public trust in government, which 
provide an interesting comparison in terms of successful nuclear power development throughout the 
renaissance period. Finland and Sweden are both countries which have continued to maintain high 
levels of public trust in government at a time when public trust has been eroding elsewhere. The 2014 
Eurobarometer on Public Opinion found that 47 percent of respondents in Finland and 54 percent of 
respondents in Sweden tended to trust their national government (European Commission, 2014c: 67). 
These figures far exceed the EU average of 29 percent of respondents tending to trust their national 
government (European Commission, 2014c: 65). Finland and Sweden have also had much greater 
success in establishing nuclear energy and nuclear waste facilities than other countries, particularly 
during the renaissance period. As described in Chapter 6, Finland is the first country to have begun 
construction on a high-level nuclear waste storage and disposal facility, in the form of a deep geological 
repository. This is a significant achievement, given that most other countries that have planned on 
creating a HLW facility have made little progress, largely as a result of public opposition to the siting 
of a facility, and public concern over the hazards associated with nuclear energy more broadly. Finland 
is also one of only two Western European countries (the other being France) to have begun construction 
on a new nuclear reactor during the renaissance period. Similarly, Sweden has managed to secure a site 
for the construction of a high-level nuclear waste facility. It is likely that the success of Sweden and 
Finland to date in developing a nuclear waste facility can be attributed, in part, to the higher levels of 
public trust in government. In a political environment where the public tends to trust their government, 
agents are more likely to accept government proposals for constructing controversial developments, 
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such as a nuclear waste facility. This suggests that public trust continues to be an important factor in 
facilitating or hindering nuclear energy development. 
CONCLUSION 
Agents in Context Historical Institutionalism argues that structure, context, institutions and ideas all 
play a key role in explaining change. Therefore, in order to understand the changing trajectory of nuclear 
energy development, the structural context in which this development takes place needs to be examined. 
The early expansion of nuclear power which took place in the 1950s and 1960s was embedded in a 
structural context characterised by high levels of trust in government. This structural context helped to 
facilitate nuclear energy development as agents are less likely to challenge government decision-making 
when they have higher levels of trust in government and political institutions. However, starting in the 
1970s, public trust in government entered a period of gradual and sustained decline. This decline has 
created a more challenging structural context for the development of nuclear energy. When agents do 
not trust their government, they are more likely to question and challenge the policy decisions being 
made, particularly when it comes to controversial policy areas such as nuclear power. Governments 
faced with lower levels of public trust are likely to find it more difficult to convince the public that the 
creation or expansion of a civil nuclear energy programme is in the national interest. Similarly, low 
levels of public trust in government also make it more difficult for governments to identify and secure 
sites for construction of nuclear power plants or nuclear waste storage and disposal facilities. 
Consequently, low levels of public trust in government makes for a challenging political environment 
for the implementation of pro-nuclear policies. 
When claims of a nuclear renaissance began to emerge in the early 2000s, opinion poll data indicates 
that public trust in government still remained low throughout Western Europe and North America. 
Public trust in government over issues relating specifically to nuclear energy also remained low. While 
advocates of the nuclear renaissance argued that the strong safety record of nuclear power had made the 
general public become more supportive of nuclear energy, media reports of collusion, mismanagement 
and regulatory failure at nuclear facilities throughout the 2000s – such as in the response to the 
Fukushima nuclear accident – suggested to the public that governments and the nuclear industry could 
not be trusted to safely manage and operate nuclear power facilities. These revelations did little to 
improve agents’ confidence in governments or the nuclear industry over issues of nuclear energy. The 
ongoing crisis of public trust in government, both in general and in relation to nuclear energy 
specifically, creates a challenging political environment for governments wishing to implement pro-
nuclear policies. This suggests that the expectations of a nuclear renaissance was always going to be 
challenged by a lack of public support and confidence in new nuclear build. As a result, the nuclear 
renaissance was never likely to become a reality. The promising signs of nuclear development in 
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Finland and Sweden also support this assertion, by suggesting that nuclear development is more likely 
to be successful in countries characterised by high levels of public trust in government. 
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9 .  RISK  P ERCEP TIO NS  
This chapter develops a further explanation for why the expectation of a nuclear renaissance has failed 
to produce widespread nuclear growth in Western Europe and North America. It argues that the 
disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance can be explained by an 
ideational shift in the way that agents perceive and respond to the idea of risk. In accordance with the 
analytical framework that guides this research project – Agents in Context Historical Institutionalism 
(AiC-HI) – a key aim of this research is demonstrate the way in which the interaction between agents 
and context is central to understanding why and how nuclear energy development changes over time. 
A core assumption of AiC-HI is that broad contextual shifts will shape the way in which agents think 
and behave. Consequently, a shift in the ideational context of risk poses significant implications for the 
way in which agents perceive and respond to the risks associated with nuclear energy. 
This chapter argues that there have been two major shifts which have contributed to an ideational shift 
in the way in which agents perceive the risks associated with nuclear power. In the 1950s and 1960s, 
the risks associated with nuclear power were largely overlooked. Public awareness or apprehension 
over the risks of nuclear power was limited – no wide-ranging debate about the risks of nuclear power 
took place during this time. However, starting in the late 1960s and continuing on from the 1970s, two 
key shifts took place that contributed to a shift in the ideational context of risk. Firstly, Beck (1992)  
argues that a ‘risk society’, or a collective ‘risk consciousness’, has emerged in Western capitalist 
societies whereby public and political decision-making processes have become dominated by 
considerations of how to identify, respond to, and prevent risks. This has led to a broad attitudinal shift 
in way in which agents are aware of and adverse to the risks posed by industrial development, such as 
the use of nuclear power. Secondly, the increasing visibility of risks associated with nuclear power from 
the mid-1970s onwards has led to a more specific attitudinal shift towards the risks associated with 
nuclear power. The combination of these two shifts is the creation of an ideational context whereby 
agents are now more concerned about the risks associated with nuclear power. Nuclear advocates now 
have to work harder to convince citizens that the risks associated with nuclear power are minimal, and 
that the use of nuclear power will not harm society or the environment. 
Consequently, when the expectation of a nuclear renaissance emerged in the early 2000s, pro-nuclear 
advocates had to convince agents of the manageability and low probability of the risks associated with 
nuclear power. One of the key arguments put forth by advocates of the nuclear renaissance was that the 
renaissance was bound to take place as the public had become more convinced of the safety of nuclear 
power, given nuclear power’s impressive safety record that had been sustained since Chernobyl and the 
development of new, safer reactor designs. This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. Nuclear 
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engineers and industry representatives presented facts and figures arguing that nuclear power was a 
virtually ‘risk free’ technology. However, public opinion polling since 2000 demonstrates that 
widespread concerns about the risks of nuclear power remain present in society. The ideational shift in 
risk has contributed to extensive opposition to nuclear energy development, even as the rhetoric of a 
nuclear renaissance gained momentum.  
This chapter contributes to knowledge by drawing upon this broad range of risk theory to better 
understand the reasons for the apparent failure of the nuclear renaissance. It expands upon existing 
debates over the failure of the nuclear renaissance by highlighting the centrality of agent-context 
interactions in determining public perceptions and acceptance of nuclear energy development. It draws 
upon various theoretical and research perspective on risk perception – such as the risk society thesis, as 
well as psychological and psychometric research on cognitive processes – to provide further insight into 
why nuclear power continues to be perceived as inherently risky, despite repeated claims by the nuclear 
industry that nuclear power is safe. In doing so, it broadens the existing debate over the reasons for why 
the expectation of a nuclear renaissance has failed to generate widespread nuclear growth in Western 
Europe and North America. 
THE RISK SOCIETY 
One of the most influential theoretical frameworks for understanding risk that has emerged from social 
science literature is Ulrich Beck’s (1992; 1999; 2006; 2009; 2008) theory of the “risk society”. Beck 
argues that there has been an ideational shift in the way that risks are perceived over time throughout 
society. Beck’s conceptualisation of risk refers to “hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by 
modernization itself” (Beck, 1992: 21). Beck’s argument of the emergence of a risk society has become 
influential in debates over social issues as diverse as environmental politics, technology and culture, 
crime, social inequality, and law and justice (Beck, 2014: xiii-xiv). The idea of a risk society has become 
closely linked to debates over the growing threats of climate change, terrorism, pesticides and food 
safety (Mythen and Walklate, 2006; Jensen and Blok, 2008; Bulkeley, 2001; Smith, 2007). Similarly, 
the multiple-disciplinary nature and appeal of Beck’s work is evident in its influence over academic 
debates in the areas of sociology, political science, cultural studies, geography and environmental 
studies (Mythen, 2004: 4-6). In short, Beck’s risk society thesis continues to retain its position as a 
highly influential framework for understanding the role of risk in contemporary society. 
The core assumption underpinning Beck’s argument is that a fundamental transformation has taken 
place in the nature and perception of risks confronting humanity since the end of the Second World 
War. This transformation has led to the emergence from the late 1960s onwards of what Beck terms the 
‘risk society’. Beck argues that Western societies were, until recently, purely industrial societies. They 
were built upon industrial class divisions, and concerned themselves with the production of wealth and 
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other material goods within broader conditions of scarcity. Within these societies, risks were understood 
as being produced through industrialisation processes, and could therefore be predicted, managed and 
insured against through scientific expertise and calculations. As these industrial societies have 
progressed and modernised, technological and scientific advancements have successfully reduced the 
basic threats to human survival, such as famine, epidemics, poverty and natural disasters. However, 
these techno-scientific developments designed to combat the problems of industrial societies have also 
produced various unexpected ‘latent’ or ‘hazardous’ side-effects (Beck, 1992: 20).  
The side-effects of industrial progress and modernisation represent a new type of “manufactured 
uncertainties” or “manufactured risk” which have emerged from the late 1960s onwards, the nature of 
which is unprecedented in human history (Beck, 2009). This is not to say that the amount of risk 
prevalent in society has increased, but rather, that the risks present in contemporary society are 
qualitatively different from those faced in previous eras (Giddens, 2006: 119). The risks are 
manufactured in that they are a result of human decisions and creation (Beck, 2009: 293). Manufactured 
risks are “global dangers” (Beck, 1992: 21), in that they are no longer constrained by boundaries of 
time, space or tradition - everyone is vulnerable to their effects (Beck, 1999: 36, 142). Manufactured 
risks can impact the lives of individuals across generations, class and social distinctions, or geographical 
locations (Beck, 2006: 334). They are unable to be detected by physical human senses and therefore 
cannot be predicted, calculated or insured against, nor can the people impacted by these risks be 
properly compensated for the damage caused (Beck, 2006: 334; Beck, 1992: 21-2; Beck, 1999: 8). No 
single government can regulate manufactured risks, nor can any one individual, group or authority be 
held responsible for the risks or their widespread impacts (Beck, 1999: 36). Consequently, the very 
nature of these manufactured risks means that they can no longer be effectively managed or controlled 
by the institutions of industrial society.  
The emergence of these manufactured risks has also resulted in a widespread transformation in the way 
that risks are perceived and understood. At first, the global dangers of the risk society are unseen and 
avoid social recognition (Beck, 1992: 34). However, as the impacts of the manufactured risks become 
increasingly visible, a ‘risk consciousness’ develops, whereby considerations of risk become an intrinsic 
part of everyday life. Decision-making processes on an individual, local, national, or global scale have 
come to be dominated by considerations of risk management and mitigation (Tulloch and Lupton, 2003: 
1; Elliott, 2010: viii; Wilkinson, 2010: 7; Beck, 2006: 332).  The growing awareness of risk throughout 
society has been influenced by the development of digital media technologies, which have made 
information and knowledge about risks increasingly accessible to the public (Mythen, 2004: 3). For 
example, the media plays a central role in the risk society by heightening public awareness of risk 
through extensive coverage of high-profile scientific and technologically induced catastrophes. This is 
evident in the cases of the pollution and health effects resulting from buried toxic waste at Love Canal 
in New York, toxic waste contamination at Times Beach in Missouri, the gas leak at Bhopal in 1984, 
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the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986, and the explosion of the Challenger space shuttle. Each of these 
events captured the attention of the global news media, and communicated to the public the dangers 
associated with technical and scientific progress. As a result of these catastrophes, the institutions of 
science and technology that were once esteemed for making the world a safer place, are now seen as 
the very source of risk itself (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982: 10; Beck, 2006: 336). 
As with any influential theory, Beck’s argument has been subject to various criticisms. Beck’s risk 
society thesis operates primarily at the level of ‘grand theory’ by attempting to provide a universal 
explanation for changes in the nature and perception of risk. Consequently, one of the primary criticisms 
of the risk society argument is that the evidence provided by Beck is anecdotal and in need of empirical 
validation (Dingwall, 1999: 476; Lupton and Tulloch, 2002: 319; Alexander, 1996: 134; Dryzek, 1995: 
237; Matten, 2004: 372; Lupton, 1999: 6). Furthermore, while Beck claims that a “world risk society” 
has emerged, several scholars have taken issue with the apparent global application of Beck’s work, 
arguing that Beck primarily draws upon examples from Western democratic and capitalist countries, 
particularly Germany, and therefore does not properly account for the evolution of risk in other cultural 
contexts and geographic locations (Dingwall, 1999: 236; Nugent, 2000; Bujra, 2000: 63). While Beck 
does discuss trends in risk transformation in South America and Africa, these examples are said to be 
insufficient evidence for the claim that a truly global risk society has emerged (Mythen, 2007: 801).  
Despite these criticisms, Beck’s theory of the risk society continues to provide a significant contribution 
to furthering contemporary understanding of the changing nature and societal response to risk. For 
example, a growing body of empirical research into risk perception appears to support the broad claims 
of Beck’s argument, such as that there has been a growth in public awareness and aversion to risk over 
time, and that this growing awareness has influenced the behaviour and thought-processes of individuals 
in society (Mythen, 2007: 802; Taylor-Gooby and Cebulla, 2010). Furthermore, such criticisms 
overlook the inherent value of ideas as grand theories. Grand theories do not attempt to predict the 
minutiae of everyday life, but seek to understand major social changes and trends (Alaszewski, 2009: 
490). Savage and Burrows (2007: 895) argue that the value of social theorists such as Beck lie in their 
ability to engage with social processes and phenomenon, and that their theoretical contributions were 
“not intended to be ‘tested’ by empirical research”. Matten (2004: 372) makes a similar claim, arguing 
that “Beck’s ideas are more of a provocative and conceptual nature rather than a minute empirical proof 
of certain social changes”. Furthermore, while Beck’s theory may overlook the localised nature and 
experience of risk, applications of his theory can overcome this limitation by recognising the importance 
of individual societal and historical contexts. Similarly, while Beck’s theory may overemphasise the 
ability of risk to cross class boundaries or affect populations in a manner never seen before, this does 
not detract from his core argument that society is increasingly preoccupied with mitigating risk, 
regardless of what the exact nature of those risks might be. Consequently, in spite of the various 
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criticisms, the risk society continues to be a useful framework for understanding agents’ increasing 
preoccupation with risk in contemporary societies. 
A core objective of this thesis is to highlight the way in which interactions between agents and context 
are central to explaining the reasons for changes in nuclear energy development.  Agents in Context 
Historical Institutionalism argues that the thought processes and behaviour of agents – such as members 
of the public, policymakers, and nuclear industry representatives – are enabled or constrained by the 
ideational, institutional, and structural contexts in which they are located. The emergence of a risk 
society, or a collective risk consciousness, is one example of a fundamental ideational shift that has 
taken place in the post-war era, and which has heavily shaped the way in which agents think about and 
respond to the idea of risk. The implications of this contextual shift for the way in which agents perceive 
and respond to the issue of nuclear power and its associated risks are discussed next. 
NUCLEAR ENERGY IN THE RISK SOCIETY 
An Agents in Context Historical Institutionalist perspective suggests that the emergence of a risk society 
poses significant implications for the way in which agents think about and respond to the issue of 
nuclear power. More specifically, the growth of a risk society has resulted in an increasing awareness 
of and opposition to the risks associated with nuclear power. Beck identifies nuclear power as one of 
the many manufactured risks that are characteristic of a risk society (Beck, 1992: 22). Nuclear power 
fulfils the criteria of a manufactured risk in that it is a man-made invention that was developed to address 
an ongoing problem facing industrial societies – the need for cheap and plentiful energy. Nuclear power 
is now also seen as a solution for addressing the problem facing industrial societies of how to tackle 
global warming and climate change. However, the utilisation of nuclear energy has also resulted in 
various latent side effects, the most notable of which are the risks associated with radiation releases 
from nuclear accidents and nuclear waste. Radiation poses potentially disastrous risks for both human 
and environmental health. These latent side effects align with Beck’s description of the nature of 
manufactured risks in several ways.  The risks associated with nuclear power can be considered to be a 
“global danger”, as they transcend boundaries of space and time. For example, the global nature of the 
risks associated with nuclear power became evident in the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster, when 
radioactive fallout caused by the explosion at the nuclear power plant in the Ukraine was subsequently 
found in the neighbouring countries of Belarus and Russia. Lighter radioactive material, also originating 
from Chernobyl, had spread even further afield throughout Europe and the UK (WNA 2014b). The 
long-term nature of the risks associated with nuclear power was also made evident by Chernobyl. 
Shortly after the Chernobyl disaster took place, the UK government implemented restrictions on 
farming practices in England and Wales to protect against radioactive fallout from Chernobyl. These 
restrictions were only completely lifted in 2012 (BBC News, 2012a). The impact of Chernobyl’s 
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radioactive fallout is expected to continue to affect individuals born several generations from now 
(Mythen, 2004: 19). Furthermore, nuclear power constitutes a manufactured risk as no single person or 
authority can be held accountable for the risks posed by nuclear energy, nor can the risks of nuclear 
energy be comprehensively calculated or insured against. This is partly because the risks posed by 
radiation are largely invisible, and cannot be easily detected by physical human senses. 
Beck’s theory of the risk society provides useful insights into understanding the way in which ideational 
contextual changes can influence the thought-processes and behaviour of actors. In particular, the 
emergence of a risk society suggests that there has been a general shift in agents’ (such as voters and 
policymakers) attitudes towards risk. People have become far more aware of and adverse to risk, both 
at an individual level and at the level of political decision-making. There is an increasing aversion to 
man-made risks, such as nuclear power, which pose potentially unpreventable, uncontrollable and 
devastating dangers to society. Consequently, the emergence of a risk society can help to explain why 
nuclear power has come to be seen as an inherently risky technology. 
However, in addition to this broad ideational shift in attitudes towards risk, there has also been a more 
specific shift in attitudes towards the risks posed by nuclear power in particular. This shift resulted from 
the increasing visibility of the risks associated with nuclear power. In the 1950s and 1960s, the risks 
associated with nuclear power were largely hidden from public view. Rather than having the risky 
connotations that are now inherent to the nuclear debate, nuclear power in the 1950s and 1960s was 
lauded as a panacea for meeting societal needs and raising the living standards of citizens throughout 
the entire world (Walker and Wellock, 2010: 3). It was widely believed that nuclear power would 
provide cheap and virtually limitless amounts of electricity, revolutionise the transportation system 
through nuclear powered planes and trains, and even fix the problem of world hunger by using nuclear 
technology to genetically modify crops to survive in extreme environmental conditions (Hillaby, 1955: 
6; Bodansky, 2004: 18). This idealistic view of nuclear power remained largely unchallenged for the 
first two decades of civil nuclear energy development.  
Meanwhile, the risks associated with nuclear power were largely overlooked. As described in Chapter 
5, prior to the 1970s, there was a distinct lack of consideration in debates over nuclear energy’s role in 
society as to the potential environmental and human health hazards associated with nuclear power 
plants. The early development of reactor designs did not include quantitative measures of risk or 
reliability (Keller and Modarres, 2005: 273). No wide-ranging debate around the complex issues of 
nuclear safety or its associated environmental or public health impacts took place during the 1950s and 
1960s (Camilleri, 1984: 75), despite the fact that safety incidents at nuclear power plants were already 
taking place. Any concerns that were raised about nuclear power and the risks involved during this time 
were largely confined to academic journals, small-scale publications, and intermittent localised 
concerns (Herring, 2010: 46). This suggests that agents perceived the risks of nuclear power as being 
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concentrated at a local level, rather than as a potential issue that could cause widespread damage across 
the boundaries of countries or regions.  
However, from the late 1960s and early 1970s onwards, several factors coalesced which served to 
increase public awareness of the risks associated with nuclear power and eroded public confidence in 
the early promises of the technology. Information and evidence about the dangers and risks associated 
with nuclear power became available to the general public during the early 1970s (Downey, 1986: 400). 
In response, anti-nuclear movements began to emerge and mobilise throughout Western Europe and 
North America. These groups publicised the dangers associated with nuclear energy in order to oppose 
both specific nuclear development projects as well as the use of nuclear energy in general (see Chapter 
5). Furthermore, the first major nuclear accident took place at Three Mile Island in 1979, which captured 
the global mass media’s attention and fuelled public fears over the safety of nuclear power and the risks 
it poses to human and environmental health. These fears were then exacerbated by the catastrophic 
disaster at Chernobyl in 1986. The result of these nuclear accidents was that public perceptions of 
nuclear energy in general became increasingly negative over the following decades (Rosa and Dunlap, 
1994).  
The combination of these two shifts has meant that from the mid-1970s onwards, nuclear power was 
increasingly viewed as posing inherent and unacceptable risks to society. The emergence of a risk 
society, whereby there has been a growing awareness of and aversion to the idea of risk, represented a 
major ideational contextual shift in which agents (members of the public and policymakers alike) paid 
more attention to the ‘side effects’ of industrial development, such as the use of nuclear power for 
electricity production. At the same time, the increasing visibility of the potential dangers posed by 
nuclear power eroded early idealistic views of nuclear power as a panacea for humanity, and instead 
contributed to and reinforced the perception that nuclear powered electricity generation was a dangerous 
and risk-prone technology. 
The emergence of a preoccupation with the risks of nuclear power is evident in government and nuclear 
industry decision-making processes. In the late 1960s, the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) 
became increasingly interested in the idea of risk and the ways in which risk could inform nuclear 
energy decision making (Perkins, 2014: 278).  Risk assessment methods began to be adopted by nuclear 
decision-makers and integrated into nuclear engineering and regulatory procedures. In 1972 and 1973, 
members of the AEC began investigating risk and safety issues at several nuclear power plants in the 
US using past incident reports that had been produced (Keller and Modarres, 2005: 274). In order to 
allay growing public fears over nuclear power, the AEC commissioned a study that would provide a 
realistic estimate of the potential risks to the public should an accident take place at a commercial 
nuclear power plant. The “Reactor Safety Study” (RSS) was completed in 1975, and concluded that 
“the risks to the public from potential accidents in nuclear power plants are comparatively small” (US 
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1975: 1). The study has since been described as “the first highly 
visible effort of the federal government in risk analysis” (Perkins, 2014: 279). Following the release of 
the RSS in 1975, there was an “explosive increase” in the number of nuclear risk and safety assessments 
conducted up until 1990 (Hayns, 1999: 139). The President of the National Academy of Sciences 
commissioned a review of the RSS, which resulted in the release of a report detailing the “Risks 
Associated with Nuclear Power” in 1979 (National Academy of Sciences, 1979). In 1983, based on a 
recommendation from the American Nuclear Society and the Institute for Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission began developing documents to provide formal 
guidance on how to conduct probabilistic risk assessments (Keller and Modarres, 2005: 281). In 1986, 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission announced that it was considering the development of its first 
qualitative safety goals to ensure that the risks associated with nuclear power could not significantly 
influence an individual’s risk of accidental death or injury (The New York Times, 1982: D15).  
Between 1983 and 1985, a public inquiry was conducted into the proposal to construct a nuclear power 
station at Sizewell, Suffolk in the UK. In 1986, the final report of the inquiry was released by the chief 
inspector, Sir Frank Layfield. The report concluded that the British Government’s Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE) should “formulate and publish guidelines on the tolerable levels of individual and 
social risk to workers and the public from nuclear power stations” (Tromans, 2010: 97). This was quite 
a novel idea at the time, given that risk analysis had typically been regarded as an issue for experts, 
rather than the general public (Health and Safety Executive, 1992: 1). In response, the HSE released a 
report on “The Tolerability of Risks From Nuclear Power Stations” in 1992, which recognised that 
“many people are bothered about nuclear power and other industrial risks and have become more so 
during the years since Sir Frank Layfield wrote his report” (Health and Safety Executive, 1992: 1). This 
document also then formed the basis for the HSE’s publication in 2001 of the overall framework by 
which the HSE makes decisions on risk more broadly (Health and Safety Executive, 2001: v). 
The discourse of risk also became increasingly evident in the rhetoric of the anti-nuclear movement. 
One of the key leaders of the anti-nuclear power movement, Ralph Nader, based his opposition to the 
use of nuclear energy on the risks involved. Nader criticised the US Congressional Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy on the grounds that its “zeal for promoting nuclear power has so overshadowed its 
responsibility to assure the public safety that it has put at risk not only this generation but a hundred 
generations to come” (The Washington Post, 1974: A2). In 1976, three high-level engineers employed 
by the nuclear power division at General Electric publicly resigned from their positions and joined the 
anti-nuclear movement. One of the engineers presented a resignation letter to General Electric, which 
justified his decision on the grounds that “nuclear power has become a technological monster and it is 
not clear who, if anyone, is in control. I am no longer convinced of the technical safety of nuclear power, 
and I fear the high risk of political and human factors that will ultimately lead to the misuse of its by-
products” (The Wall Street Journal, 1976: 11). Another of the engineers wrote in their resignation letter 
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that nuclear reactors “now present a serious danger to the future of all life on this planet” (The Wall 
Street Journal, 1976: 11). In West Germany, the Federation of Environmental Groups published a report 
in 1979 investigating the safety of nuclear power stations. The report concluded that nuclear power 
poses intolerable risks to society. The report detailed every confidential accident reports collected by 
the West German government between 1965 and 1977, and found that the average number of accidents 
taking place at nuclear power facilities in West Germany averaged one accident every three days over 
the past two years. The report describes the public as having been “hoodwinked” by the government 
over nuclear safety and the risks associated with nuclear power (Buschschluter, 1979: 6).  
By the late 1990s, the perception of nuclear power as a source of risk had become firmly entrenched in 
the nuclear debate. This perception stands in stark contrast to the far more optimistic perception of 
nuclear power which was widely purported in the 1950s and 1960s. The emergence of a risk society, as 
well as the increasing visibility of the risks associated with nuclear power in particular, resulted in a 
contextual shift whereby the behaviour of agents (members of the public and policymakers alike) were 
increasingly shaped by the belief that nuclear power posed uncontrollable and arguably unacceptable 
risks to society and the environment. This perception contributed to growing public scepticism around 
the benefits of nuclear power, and made it increasingly difficult for pro-nuclear government officials 
and the nuclear industry to gain public acceptance for new nuclear developments. The growth of public 
opposition to nuclear development from the mid-1970s onwards was influenced by this increasing 
scepticism towards the safety of nuclear power and the ability of government and industry officials to 
protect citizens from the dangers of nuclear energy. The risks of nuclear energy had now become a 
permanent feature in debates over whether nuclear power should be used. 
RISK & THE NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE 
When the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance began to gain momentum in the 2000s, advocates of nuclear 
power argued that many of the long-standing concerns around the safety or dangers posed by nuclear 
power were resolved. As described in Chapter 5, advocates of the nuclear renaissance assumed that the 
long-standing public concerns over the risks of nuclear power had been largely overcome as a result of 
the nuclear industry’s impressive safety record that had been sustained since the Chernobyl disaster in 
1986. In addition, nuclear industry representatives announced the development of new nuclear reactor 
designs and technologies that would be safer than ever before (Power, 2004: 7). Such claims were 
targeted at assuaging any remaining concerns over the use of nuclear power. The nuclear industry 
actively worked towards reassuring the public that nuclear power posed minimal, if any, risk to society 
or the environment. 
In their efforts to convince the public that there was no rational reason to fear or oppose a nuclear 
renaissance, pro-nuclear government and industry representatives advocated the high levels of safety 
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and low levels of risk associated with nuclear power. For example, the World Nuclear Association 
declares on their website that “the risk of accidents in nuclear power plants is low and declining. The 
consequences of an accident or terrorist attack are minimal compared with other commonly accepted 
risks” (WNA 2014l). The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission produced a “Fact Sheet on Nuclear 
Reactor Risk”, which states that “the risk of a nuclear power plant accident with a significant amount 
of radioactivity released offsite to the public is very small” (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2014). 
In their guide to nuclear regulation, the UK Office for Nuclear Regulation stated that “the design, 
operation and maintenance of nuclear installations makes the risk of accidents involving the release of 
radiation extremely low” (Office for Nuclear Regulation, 2014: 23). The UK’s security regulator, the 
Office for Civil Nuclear Security, stated that “new nuclear build would be unlikely to increase risks to 
the UK” (HM Government, 2006: 120). 
However, despite these efforts by nuclear advocates to frame nuclear power as a low source of risk, the 
ideational context surrounding nuclear energy and the way that agents’ perceive nuclear risks remained 
largely unchanged. From 2000 onwards, the risks inherent to the use of nuclear energy continued to 
feature strongly in debates over whether civil nuclear energy programmes should be established, 
expanded or abolished. For example, agents who opposed the use of nuclear power continued to justify 
their opposition by arguing that nuclear power posed unacceptable societal and environmental dangers. 
Greenpeace stated that the organisation opposes nuclear energy because its use results in “an increased 
risk from terrorism, radioactive accident and nuclear proliferation” (Greenpeace, 2006). A report 
commissioned by Greenpeace on the practice of granting lifetime extensions to ageing nuclear power 
plants described nuclear power as “entering a new era of risk” in terms of nuclear safety, largely as a 
result of nuclear reactors receiving extended license permits, far beyond their original design lifetimes 
(Greenpeace, 2014a: 124). These concerns became apparent when, in December 2015, the Belgian 
government announce that license extensions would be granted to two of its 40-year-old nuclear 
reactors. Communities surrounding the reactors expressed concerns about this decision and about the 
safety of the reactors, given that cracks had been discovered in several of Belgium’s nuclear reactor 
casings (Neslen, 2016). Similarly, in 2014, the Fessenheim nuclear reactors (the oldest nuclear reactors 
in France) were found to be leaking in several places and had to be shut down. It was not until 2016, 
however, that the severity of the accident became revealed to the public (Goebel, 2016). 
Jim Riccio, Greenpeace’s nuclear policy analyst, highlighted the risks of nuclear power by stating that 
“every single reactor has the potential to be a Fukushima or Chernobyl…I fail to see why we continue 
to put our public at risk for the benefit of these corporations” (Hackman, 2015).  Friends of the Earth 
opposes nuclear energy on the grounds that nuclear plants “carry high technical and regulatory risks” 
(Friends of the Earth, 2013b: 4), and as such, the use of nuclear power “is a risk not worth taking” 
(Friends of the Earth, 2013b: 8). Friends of the Earth actively campaigned against the Diablo Canyon 
nuclear reactors in the US on the grounds that “the tremendous and unnecessary risk these reactors pose 
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to public health and the environment necessitates that they be shut down” (Friends of the Earth, 2015). 
The organisation of Nuclear Free Local Authorities in the UK opposed nuclear power because it is 
“risky”, and described the use of probabilistic risk assessments as being based on “flawed logic” 
(Nuclear Free Local Authorities, 2012: 4). The Union of Concerned Scientists, while not describing 
themselves as either pro or anti-nuclear, do warn that nuclear power creates “added risks to human 
health, the environment, and global security” (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2015). 
When the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance emerged in the early 2000s, the centrality of risk to 
considerations of nuclear energy development was evident in reports produced by industry agencies 
into the risks associated with nuclear power. In 2001, the International Atomic Energy Agency produced 
a report on risk management and its ability to improve the performance of nuclear power plants (IAEA 
2001). The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency produced a report in 2010 which compared the accident 
risks at nuclear power plants with the risks posed by other energy sources (OECD Nuclear Energy 
Agency, 2010a). 
Public opinion polling from 2000 onwards demonstrates that, in spite of the claims made by nuclear 
advocates about the high levels of safety and low levels of risk associated with nuclear power, there 
continued to be a widespread belief that nuclear power is a significant source of risk. The 2010 
Eurobarometer study titled Europeans and Nuclear Safety investigated public opinion towards nuclear 
energy and its associated risks amongst the twenty-seven member states of the European Union. The 
study found that 51 percent of respondents answered that “the risks of nuclear power as an energy source 
outweigh its advantages” (Eurobarometer, 2010: 40). In comparison, only 35 percent of respondents 
answered that “the advantages of nuclear power as an energy source outweigh the risks it poses” 
(Eurobarometer, 2010: 40). Almost half of the respondents (47 percent) believed that the risks 
associated with nuclear energy are underestimated, compared with 38 percent of respondents who 
believed that the risks are exaggerated (Eurobarometer, 2010: 45). 
Clearly, a disconnection continued to exist between the way in which advocates and opponents of 
nuclear energy perceived the risks of nuclear power during the renaissance period. What was consistent 
amongst both these groups, however, was that the idea of risk continued to underpin the arguments 
being made. This indicates that the ideational context which informed agents’ perceptions of nuclear 
power during the renaissance period was fundamentally different from the ideational context which 
informed agents’ perceptions of nuclear power during the 1950s and 1960s. As described earlier in this 
chapter, the early development and expansion of civil nuclear energy programmes in the 1950s and 
1960s was characterised by a distinct absence of consideration or discussion of nuclear risks. However, 
from the 1970s onwards, and sustained from 2000 onwards when the expectation of a nuclear 
renaissance gained momentum, the idea of risk has become a dominant influence in the way that agents 
understand and form opinions on nuclear energy. This is evident in the discourses used by agents 
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advocating for nuclear energy development, as well as the discourses used by agents opposing nuclear 
power. Moreover, the growing dominance of the idea of risk in nuclear energy debates supports Beck’s 
argument that Western societies have, from the late 1960s onwards, evolved into risk societies, whereby 
considerations of risk have become a central feature in public and political decision-making processes. 
Beck’s theory of the risk society also offers insights into the reason why this disconnection continues 
to exist between different agents’ understandings of the level of risk associated with nuclear power. 
While Beck argues that all agents in a risk society have adopted a greater preoccupation with risk 
considerations, Beck also argues that the way in which scientific and technical experts and the general 
public perceive risks is different. Beck argues that, within a risk society, there emerges a disconnection 
between how ‘risk technicians’ (scientists and technical experts) and the general public perceive and 
understand risk. As Beck states, 
“what becomes clear in risk discussions are the fissures and gaps between scientific and social 
rationality in dealing with the hazardous potential of civilization. The two sides talk past each 
other. Social movements raise questions that are not answered by the risk technicians at all, and 
the technicians answer questions which miss the point of what was really asked and what feeds 
public anxiety” (Beck, 1992: 30). 
The heightened awareness of risk is exacerbated by the ‘politics of knowledge’ – the inability to 
overcome the divide between those with the knowledge about risk, and those who the risks are being 
inflicted upon them. The general public feels threatened by the “projected dangers of the future” (Beck, 
1992: 34), whereas scientific experts and authorities justify their endeavours by emphasising the 
infrequency of risk events so far. Technological industries that continue to flourish in a risk society are 
those that can best convince the public that they are capable of managing and preventing the risks 
associated with their activities (Beck, 1992: 32). 
This feature of the risk society – the disconnection between the way in which risk technicians and 
members of the public perceive risk – offers one potential explanation for the reason why members of 
the public can continue to perceive nuclear power as risky, despite claims made by the nuclear industry 
stating otherwise. Within a risk society, there is a tendency for scientists, technicians or engineers to 
speak a different language of risk and have a different understanding of risk than that which is shared 
by members of the general public, or those that do not have the same scientific or technical training. 
Nuclear advocates and industry representatives tend to be ‘risk technicians’ in that they tend to support 
their arguments that nuclear energy is a low-risk technology by presenting scientific and technical data 
about the safety of nuclear power and the low probability of any serious nuclear incident occurring. For 
example, by highlighting new reactor designs and engineering advancements as a reason why nuclear 
power is safe and low-risk. Even former US President George W. Bush supported civil nuclear energy 
development on the grounds that “Nuclear power is safe. It is safe because of advances in science and 
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engineering and plant design” (Gerstenzang, 2006). However, this emphasis on a scientific or 
technological understanding of risk is not always shared by individuals who do not have the same 
technical education. For example, the OECD’s Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) recognises the 
limitations of the risk and safety assessments that are conducted by the nuclear industry in convincing 
the general public that nuclear power generation is a low-risk activity. The NEA states that while the 
results of these risk assessments are “generally accepted by experts in the field, they have been found 
to be incomprehensible to the public due to the mathematical expressions of risk used and to the 
extremely long time horizon involved”, and as a result “the reliance on the technical approach to risk 
has been generally unsuccessful” (OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, 2002: 48). 
This disconnection between different agents’ understandings of risk was evident when the expectation 
of a nuclear renaissance emerged. A key argument presented by advocates of the nuclear renaissance 
was that many of the risks that had long been associated with nuclear development would no longer 
pose a problem. This argument was based on a ‘scientific’ understanding of risk associated with nuclear 
power. As described in Chapter 5, in the early 2000s, nuclear industry representatives announced the 
development of new nuclear reactor designs that would be safer than ever before. The nuclear industry 
also highlighted its improved safety and operating performance record as evidence that a nuclear 
renaissance would not suffer from the same safety problems of the past. The assumption underpinning 
these arguments is that if the public is made more aware of the scientific facts of nuclear power, they 
are less likely to perceive nuclear energy as ‘risky’, and are more likely to support nuclear new build. 
However, as Beck suggests, the provision of scientific information is not sufficient evidence to convince 
all agents that nuclear power is safe and low-risk. These scientific arguments presented by risk 
technicians – nuclear industry representatives and advocates of nuclear energy – have failed to prevent 
nuclear energy from continuing to be perceived by many agents as a risky technology, even during the 
period of the expected nuclear renaissance. Despite the many claims put forward during the renaissance 
period by government and industry representatives as to the safety of nuclear power, public scepticism 
and fear over the risks associated with nuclear energy continues. 
Psychological research into cognitive processes, such as the way in which people interpret and perceive 
the frequency and likelihood of risk, provides further insights into the disconnection between risk 
technicians’ and other agents’ understanding of the risks of nuclear power. In particular, this body of 
research offers explanations for why individuals associate particular activities or phenomena as having 
a high or a low risk. Much of the psychological research on judgement and decision-making stems from 
the assumption that individual rationality is limited or ‘bounded’. This is because individuals have 
limited access to information, and limited cognitive abilities for information processing. Consequently, 
individuals tend to rely on various heuristics which reduce the complexity associated with calculating 
the nature and probability of risks (Kahneman et al., 1982). While these heuristics are useful for 
individual decision-making, they can also lead to biased and erroneous judgements (Tversky and 
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Kahneman, 1974: 1124). The availability heuristic, for example, refers to the tendency for individuals 
to overestimate the occurrence of events that are readily available and accessible in their minds (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1973). As individuals have bounded rationality, they do not have access to complete 
information, nor do they pay equal attention to all the possible risks. Rather, they tend to overestimate 
the probability of risks which they are either frequently exposed to, or, the risks which are especially 
dramatic, vivid and therefore memorable. Cognitive awareness of particular risk events is often 
amplified by the media, which tend to award disproportionate coverage to dramatic but infrequent 
events, such as natural disasters or terrorist attacks. For example, studies by Lichtenstein et al. (1978) 
and Mazur (2006) found that individuals tended to have heightened estimations of frequency for risks 
which received more extensive media coverage. This cognitive emphasis upon rare but dramatic 
incidents (such as a disaster at a nuclear power plant) can distort perceptions and judgements about risk. 
Consequently, people will tend to overestimate risks that are potentially catastrophic but are extremely 
unlikely to occur. 
Psychometric research has also identified a range of other factors which appear to influence individual 
beliefs and attitudes about risk. In particular, public perceptions of risk are likely to be heightened when 
exposure to the risk is involuntary rather than voluntary; when the impact of the risk is irreversible; 
when the harm is concentrated into a single catastrophic event, rather than dispersed across multiple 
smaller events; when known victims are involved or affected; when the risks are unfamiliar or cannot 
be controlled by those potentially affected; when there is disagreement over the risk and its potential 
impacts; when the social distribution of the risk is not equitable; and when the risks impact future 
generations (OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, 2002: 49; Tanaka, 2004: 1151; Schmidt, 2004). When 
events take place that correlate with any number of these factors, it is likely that the public perception 
of the risks will be overestimated (Kubota, 2012: 445). Nuclear power fits many of these criteria. The 
risks associated with a nuclear incident are typically irreversible. For example, the radiation released 
by a nuclear accident can irreversibly damage human and environmental health. High-profile nuclear 
disasters such as Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima have demonstrated that the harm 
associated with nuclear power can be concentrated into a single catastrophic event, and that the risks 
associated with nuclear power can continue to affect future generations. The risks associated with 
nuclear power – primarily radiation – are unfamiliar to the general public and cannot be controlled by 
the individuals that are potentially affected.  The constant debate between nuclear opponents and nuclear 
advocates as to the actual level of danger associated with the use of nuclear power demonstrates to the 
public that there is disagreement over nuclear risks and its potential impact. Consequently, 
psychometric research suggests that it is likely that agents will overestimate the risks associated with 
nuclear power. This offers one potential explanation for why members of the public have continued to 
view nuclear power as ‘risky’ during the renaissance period, despite claims by government and nuclear 
industry representatives stating otherwise. 
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CONCLUSION 
In accordance with an Agents in Context Historical Institutionalist perspective, this research recognises 
that changes in nuclear energy development are influenced by the ideational and contextual setting in 
which these changes take place. This chapter has argued that the disconnection between the expectation 
and reality of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America can be explained, in part, 
by a shift in the ideational context of risk. From the late 1960s onwards, there has been a broad 
contextual shift whereby agents have become increasing aware of and averse to the idea of ‘risk’. This 
broad contextual shift has significant implications for the development of civil nuclear energy. The 
initial period of nuclear energy development (the 1950s and 1960s) was characterised by low levels of 
public and political awareness and apprehension towards risk, which facilitated a more favourable 
political environment for nuclear energy development. However, from the late 1960s onwards, the 
emergence of the risk society and increased awareness and opposition to risk has created a more difficult 
ideational context for the development and expansion of civil nuclear power. The increased public and 
political awareness and aversion to risk has made it more difficult for governments to convince the 
general public that nuclear power plants can be operated safely, and to secure new locations for the 
construction of nuclear power plants. 
When the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance emerged in the early 2000s, the idea of risk continued to 
feature prominently in the discourse used by both opponents and advocates of nuclear energy 
development. Advocates of the renaissance argued that public opposition to nuclear power had 
diminished as agents had become convinced that the operation of nuclear power plants was safe and 
relatively low risk. However, public opinion polling conducted during the renaissance period 
contradicts these claims by suggesting that large segments of the public continue to perceive nuclear 
power as inherently risky. The disconnection between different agents’ understandings of risk is 
problematic for nuclear energy development. Pro-nuclear policies are likely to be opposed if nuclear 
power is perceived as presenting significant societal risks. Consequently, the failure of nuclear 
advocates to convince the public that nuclear power is relatively risk-free suggests that the nuclear 
renaissance was never likely to succeed. A nuclear renaissance is unlikely to take place in an ideational 
context where agents are preoccupied with the idea of risk, and where agents continue to perceive 
nuclear power as being inherently risky. 
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10 .  NEO LIBERA LIS M  
This chapter argues that the disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance 
can be explained by the rise of neoliberalism. The rise of neoliberalism is widely regarded as one of the 
most significant ideological and institutional shifts in the post-war era. In accordance with an Agents in 
Context Historical Institutionalist approach, this thesis recognises that institutions (the rules and norms 
that shape human behaviour), ideas and agents have a mutually-shaping relationship. Ideas and 
institutions shape the behaviour of agents, and are also themselves shaped by the very actions that agents 
take. The core assumption of neoliberalism – that the market is the most efficient allocator of scarce 
resources – has heavily influenced government decision-making processes across almost all areas of 
policy. This chapter argues that the rise of neoliberalism has created an ideational and institutional 
context in which it is more difficult for nuclear power to succeed. In particular, the rise of neoliberal 
ideas has meant that state actors have become less willing to directly intervene to support and fund the 
development of nuclear power. Instead, there is a growing belief amongst policymakers that nuclear 
energy development should be left to the free market as much as possible. This is problematic given 
that nuclear industry has historically been dependent on extensive state support in order to construct 
new nuclear reactors. Even though the nuclear renaissance was meant to be driven by technological 
advancements and simpler, cheaper reactor designs, the construction of new nuclear power plants is 
still an immensely expensive and financially risky undertaking that could not be undertaken without the 
provision of state funds. 
This argument is developed through a detailed examination of the British nuclear energy industry, and, 
to a lesser extent, the history of nuclear energy development in the US. The UK and the US are the 
‘heartlands’ of neoliberalism – the countries where neoliberal ideas have been most influential (Peck 
and Tickell, 2002). Therefore, the argument that the rise of neoliberalism has contributed to the failure 
of the nuclear renaissance is most likely to apply to these two countries. In doing so, this chapter differs 
from the rest of this thesis in that it adopts a narrower, country-based (rather than regional) focus. It 
does not make any claims about the influence of the rise of neoliberalism on the changing trajectory of 
nuclear development in any other country within Western Europe or North America beyond the UK or 
the US.  
The privatisation of the British nuclear industry is examined in detail in this chapter in order to 
demonstrate the ongoing inability of nuclear power to compete in a competitive market system, and the 
problems caused by the state’s growing reluctance to directly and overtly intervene in nuclear energy 
development. When the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance gained momentum in the 2000s, the British 
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government agreed in-principle to support a revival of nuclear energy, but remained committed to the 
neoliberal philosophy that this should be a market-driven process. The state would provide no direct 
funding for a nuclear renaissance – it would be entirely up to the private sector to finance nuclear new 
build. While the British government has recently reneged on this promise, an examination of 
government expenditure on nuclear research and development reveals that the state is unwilling to 
provide anywhere near the level of direct financial support for nuclear new build that was necessary to 
facilitate the early establishment and expansion of civil nuclear power in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Therefore, the nuclear renaissance appears to have failed partly because of the state’s commitment to 
neoliberalism, and the concomitant absence of direct state support for nuclear new build. The US 
government has similarly demonstrated a commitment to give in-principle support for a nuclear 
renaissance, but has refused to provide anywhere near the same extent of direct subsidisation that 
nuclear development has historically depended upon. Therefore, it is the very absence of state support 
that has contributed to the failure of the nuclear renaissance. Had the US and the UK governments been 
willing to provide the same levels of financial support that was required to establish and expand the 
civil nuclear industry in the 1950s and 1960s, a nuclear renaissance would have been more likely to 
occur in these countries. 
THE RISE OF NEOLIBERALISM 
In the 1950s and 1960s, a broad consensus emerged throughout much of Western Europe and North 
America that states should exercise a highly interventionist role in planning and governance. This 
consensus emerged largely as a result of the Second World War, during which governments had been 
compelled to adopt a highly interventionist role, controlling or directing large segments of society and 
the economy. When the war ended, state intervention was once again seen as necessary to keep the 
nation united and rebuild economies and societies decimated by war. The role of the state was 
reconceptualised in the post-war era to encapsulate a specific set of values and assumptions, which 
included:  
“a commitment to social and economic reform; an overriding respect for the constitutional state 
and representative government; and a desire to encourage individuals’ pursuit of their interests 
while maintaining policies in the national or public interest. Underpinning these concerns was 
a conception of the state as the most suitable means for the promotion of ‘the good’ of both the 
individual and the collective” (Held, 1987: 221).  
These assumptions were adopted by politicians at both ends of the political spectrum throughout the 
1950s and 1960s, legitimising the idea of “big government”. The belief that government intervention 
was necessary for ensuring the well-being of society was also widely accepted by the general public 
(Thomas, 1992: 33). States became increasingly active in the areas of taxation, regulation, welfare 
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provision, public infrastructure, labour markets and public expenditure (Laffan et al., 2000: 23). 
Politicians became committed to the idea of full employment for all citizens, and numerous industries 
and services that were privately-owned became nationalised. From 1950 to 1980, public employment, 
taxation and government spending increased throughout all Western European countries .(Kavanagh 
and Morris, 1994: 8). The importance of an activist state was reinforced by the dominant economic 
management strategy of the post-war period – Keynesian economics. The core idea put forth by the 
economist John Maynard Keynes was that governments should actively manage the economy, primarily 
by using government spending to influence the level of demand, in order to achieve the ultimate goal 
of full employment (Heywood, 2003: 63).  
However, in the early 1970s, many of the world’s leading economies experienced a period of 
stagflation. Government attempts at central planning were criticised as being ineffective and 
problematic. This was based, in part, on Hayek’s (1994) critique of government planning as being 
counter-productive because it stifles competition and hinders the efforts of entrepreneurs. The idea that 
governments should be the primary actor in developing and implementing policy began to become 
contested. Extensive government expenditure on social welfare policies was adding to already 
significant levels of public debt. Growing levels of unemployment indicated that government promises 
of achieving full employment were no longer realistic. It appeared that the logic of Keynesian 
economics – that it was possible to sustain both low levels of unemployment and low levels of inflation 
– was no longer useful. Concerns about market failure began to be overshadowed by a growing 
awareness of the potential for government failure. 
The apparent failure of state interventionism and the assumptions of Keynesian economics paved the 
way for the rise of neoliberal thinking. While neoliberal ideas had been developed since the 1940s, they 
gained new momentum in the 1970s. Critics argued that market mechanisms, rather than state 
intervention, was the solution to reinvigorating economic growth. The core idea upon which 
neoliberalism is based is that the market is the most efficient allocator of scarce resources, and that the 
market is therefore “morally and practically superior to government and any form of political control” 
(Heywood, 2003: 55). Neoliberals argue that there will be a market-based solution to almost all 
economic and societal problems (Howard and King, 2008: 1). Therefore, the role of the state should be 
restricted to creating the conditions and institutional frameworks necessary for markets to flourish 
(Harvey, 2005: 2). If a market does not currently exist for a resource, it is the role of the state to create 
that market, but then to step back and exercise only minimal intervention once the market has been 
created and begun operating (Harvey, 2005: 2). While advocates of neoliberalism recognise that 
markets are imperfect and that market failure will still occur, they argue that the failures that will 
inevitably result from state intervention are far worse (Howard and King, 2008: 1). Neoliberals view 
governments as fundamentally flawed because policymakers and bureaucrats are unable to effectively 
process the quantity and complexity of information that they are presented with (Heywood, 2003: 55). 
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Furthermore, as humans are rationally-minded, self-interested beings, bureaucrats will use their 
positions in government to better their own self-interest, rather than acting in the interests of the general 
public (Heywood, 2003: 55).  Therefore, any kind of state societal or economic planning is likely to be 
defective in some way. On the other hand, neoliberals believe that markets avoid these limitations as 
they are self-regulating, efficient, democratic, and will typically deliver fairness and economic justice 
(Heywood, 2003: 56). Advocates of neoliberalism argued that the high levels of debt, inflation and 
unemployment that spread in the 1970s were ultimately caused by failed government intervention. 
Neoliberals pointed to excessive government regulation, high levels of public spending, and 
unnecessary tariffs and constraints on international trade as the key reasons for the economic downturn 
of the 1970s (Steger and Roy, 2010: 10). Consequently, the state was viewed as both the “chief factor 
behind the downturn, and the primary obstacle to recovery” (Tonkiss, 2001: 253). 
Neoliberalism advocates three key public policies, all of which became increasingly prevalent in 
Western Europe and North America – the “heartlands” of neoliberalism (Peck and Tickell, 2002) – from 
the 1970s onwards: privatisation of state-owned enterprises, deregulation of the economy, and 
liberalisation of trade and industry (Steger and Roy, 2010: 14). However, it was within the UK and the 
US that the ideas of neoliberalism had their greatest impact (Heywood, 2003: 55). In the UK, Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher actively worked to reduce the power and control held by the state. This was 
primarily achieved by instituting a widespread program of privatisation of state-owned industries, 
including the privatisation of telecommunications, transportation, mining and electricity companies. 
Similar developments took place in the US. In 1978, President Jimmy Carter delivered a State of the 
Union address that highlighted the limitations of state intervention in trying to solve economic and 
societal problems, declaring that “there is a limit to the role and the function of government. 
Government cannot solve our problems” (Carter, 1978). The election of President Ronald Reagan in 
1981 ushered in a similar suite of neoliberal policies. In his Inaugural Address, Reagan stated that 
“government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem” (Reagan, 1981). Reagan 
argued that the problems plaguing the US were “proportionate to the intervention and intrusion in our 
lives that result from unnecessary and excessive growth of government,” and as a result, he would “curb 
the size and influence of the Federal establishment” (Reagan, 1981). Reagan’s faith in neoliberal 
principles was evident with his introduction of sizable and widespread tax cuts, for example by reducing 
the top rate of taxation from 70 percent in 1981, to 28 percent in 1986 (Jones, 2012: 265). 
Neoliberal ideas have spread beyond the US and the UK, but not necessarily with the same degree of 
influence. Neoliberalism has become central to the policies adopted by global institutions such as the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organisation. Various forms 
of neoliberalism, often under the guise of ‘economic rationalism’, were implemented in Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand from the 1980s onwards. Many of the post-communist states of Eastern 
Europe and Latin America underwent major market-orientated restructuring of their economies in the 
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1990s (Heywood, 2003: 56). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, neoliberalism was championed by the 
IMF and the World Bank to become the dominant developmental agenda throughout Africa (Konings, 
2011). Neoliberal policies were installed throughout Europe under the guidance of the European 
Monetary Union, which compelled Eurozone members to adopt policies of free trade, flexible labour 
markets, monetary restraint and budget austerity (Hermann, 2007). 
An extensive body of academic literature has argued that the growth of neoliberalism and market 
ideologies has fundamentally transformed the way in which governments think about social and 
economic problems (see, for example, Crouch, 2011; Jones, 2012; Peck, 2010; Brown, 2015). 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, neoliberal thinking became “common sense” across capitalist 
societies (Evans and Sewell Jr., 2013: 47), and was widely believed to be “the new hegemonic ideology” 
(Gamble, 2001: 127). Even after the global financial crisis of 2007-08, neoliberal thinking has continued 
to remain the dominant political orthodoxy across most of the world’s advanced economies (Crouch, 
2011). However, debate still continues as to exactly what extent the principles and rhetoric of 
neoliberalism has actually been implemented in practice. For example, Cahill (2014: 14) examines 
changes in the size of the state and the nature of state regulation of the economy over four decades in 
order to differentiate between the “utopian visions of neoliberal theorists and the realities of 
neoliberalism in practice”. Cahill argues that there is a clear difference between the normative agenda 
advocated by neoliberal fundamentalists and “actual existing neoliberalism”. While there has been a 
broad shift towards the implementation of neoliberal theories in practices, there are clear disparities in 
the degree to which neoliberal ideas have been realised across countries and time. Moreover, the 
widespread programme of deregulation, privatisation and marketization has resulted in a fundamental 
transformation in the role of the state, but not necessarily a retreat of state power. A similar conclusion 
is made by Peck and Tickell (2002: 383) who argue that while the “metalogic” of neoliberalism has 
become increasingly pervasive, neoliberalism itself should be conceptualised as a complex and often 
contradictory “process” rather than an idealistic “end-state”. The difficulty in ‘measuring’ the difference 
between the rhetoric and reality of neoliberalism is also attributed to the malleability of the concept, 
with various different neoliberal ‘schools’ advocating various interpretations of the neoliberal doctrine. 
One the one hand, this malleability makes it difficult to assess the extent to which neoliberal ideas have 
influenced policy change. However, it is also this very malleability which has been argued to have made 
neoliberalism so resilient over decades of political and social change. For example, Schmidt and 
Thatcher (2013) argue that the gap between the rhetoric and reality of neoliberalism does not indicate 
the weakness of neoliberal ideas, but rather, is evidence of the way in which the malleability of 
neoliberalism has aided its resilience. 
The difference between the rhetoric and reality of neoliberalism speaks to another debate that has taken 
place about the role of the state and the way in which governments undertake the process of governing. 
Several scholars have argued that governments in recent decades have reconceptualised what their role 
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in society should be and what practices and processes should be utilised in order to best achieve their 
goals. This transformation has been described as a shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ (Jordan et 
al., 2005; Kennett, 2008: 4; Newman, 2005; Rhodes, 1996). The concept of ‘government’ typically 
refers to the formal institutions of the state and their ability to make and impose decisions upon members 
of society through laws, taxes and regulations (Stoker, 1998: 17). Governance, on the other hand, 
signifies the emergence of a new technique in the process and system of governing (Rhodes, 1996: 652-
3). More specifically, it refers to the ways in which governing styles are moving away from the formal 
powers of the state, towards new partnerships, interactions and interdependencies between the state and 
a plethora of non-state actors (Héritier, 2002: 185; Rhodes, 1996; Rhodes, 1997; Rhodes, 2007; Stoker, 
1998). These arrangements often take place through markets or networks, rather than simply through 
hierarchical models of governance (Bevir, 2009: 3). The rise of neoliberal ideas has contributed to this 
shift, with governments becoming less willing to directly intervene in the economy. As the power of 
the state has gradually been eroded, the two distinct spheres of ‘public’ and ‘private’ are becoming 
increasingly blurred (Stoker, 1998: 17), and the ability of the state to directly influence society has been 
reduced. The involvement of a wider range of actors also means that government decision-making 
processes have become more decentralised and democratic. An institutional context has emerged 
whereby government decision-making is now subject to the input of a much wider range of agents, 
whom policymakers must now collaborate with in order to achieve their policy goals.  
However, despite the widespread recognition that a shift from government to governance has occurred, 
the implications of this transition for the power and influence of the state remains contested. The 
involvement of a larger range of actors in the process of governing has led several scholars to claim that 
there has been a “retreat” (Strange, 1996) , “eclipse” (Evans, 1997: 63), “shrinking” (Sbragia, 2000: 
243), or “hollowing out” (Rhodes, 2007: 1248) of state power. Bell and Hindmoor (2009), however, 
reject the notion that the involvement of a wider range of actors in the governing process has caused 
governments to lose their capacity to govern. They challenge the argument that the power of the state 
has been eroded over time, as well as reviewing and challenging the work of others who argue that 
arguments about governance instead of government are overdone. While recognising that governments 
are now more likely to forge relationships with a larger range of non-state actors, they argue that 
governments continue to remain the central players in establishing, operating and monitoring 
governance arrangements. Bell and Hindmoor (2009) present an alternate, ‘state-centric relational’ view 
of governance, whereby states have actually enhanced their capacity to govern by strengthening their 
own institutional and legal capacities, and by developing closer relations with non-state actors. 
Governments seek to develop partnership relationships because non-state actors possess valuable 
resources (such as expertise, legitimacy and contacts) which the government can then utilise to further 
their own policy goals. In order to acquire these resources, governments must be prepared to make 
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policy concessions. Thus, the importance of both the state and state-society relations in governance is 
emphasised.  
The growth of neoliberalism represents one of the most significant ideational and institutional shifts in 
the post-war era. While debates continue over the definition of neoliberalism, the difference between 
neoliberal principles and practice, or the impact that neoliberalism has had on transforming the role of 
state, there has nevertheless been a fundamental shift in the ideational and institutional context in which 
government actors undertake the process of governing. In spite of ongoing debate about the degree of 
influence that neoliberalism has had, there is clear evidence of a shift in thinking which places more 
emphasis on markets, and more scepticism about the role, efficiency and effectiveness of government 
action. 
NEOLIBERALISM & NUCLEAR POWER 
The widespread adoption of neoliberal principles by governments throughout Western Europe and 
North America has contributed to a shift in the way that governments address social, economic and 
political problems. It is therefore reasonable to expect that the growth of neoliberalism would have also 
produced a shift in the way in which state actors perceive and manage their energy sectors, including 
the policy area of civil nuclear power. Nuclear power has historically been dependent upon large 
amounts of state intervention and financial support in order to succeed. It is reasonable to assume that, 
as neoliberal principles and the market doctrine have become increasingly influential, governments 
would become less willing to directly intervene in, support and fund civil nuclear energy development. 
Instead, policymakers would be more likely to expose nuclear energy to the power of market forces. In 
a purely neoliberal world, nuclear power plants would only be constructed if private industry thought it 
would be profitable to do so. However, as described in greater detail in Chapter 4, the high costs and 
financial risks associated with nuclear power means that it still struggles as a purely profit-making 
venture.  
This section explores the extent to which the rise of neoliberalism has influenced the way in which 
nuclear power is governed, and argues that the dominance of neoliberal thinking appears to have  
contributed to the disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance in the 
UK and the US. It does so by first describing the way in which the early expansion of civil nuclear 
energy industries was facilitated by a particular ideational and institutional context characterised by 
high levels of faith in state-based planning and intervention. It then outlines the way in which the rising 
influence of neoliberal ideas gradually produced a new ideational and institutional context, 
characterised by a shift towards market mechanisms and a more minimalist role for the state. It argues 
that this shift has proved problematic for nuclear energy development, as governments have become 
less willing to provide direct financial support for nuclear new build. It examines the privatisation of 
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the British nuclear industry to demonstrate the ongoing difficulties faced by nuclear power to compete 
in a market-based system. It argues that the inability of nuclear power to successfully compete in a 
political environment where governments are unwilling to provide direct financial support has 
contributed to the failure of the nuclear renaissance. 
The early development of civil nuclear energy was facilitated, in part, by the particular ideational and 
institutional context within which policy decisions about nuclear energy were made. As described 
above, government decision-making in the post-war era was characterised by high levels of faith in the 
effectiveness of state-based planning and intervention. This belief was reflected in Keynesian 
economics, the mainstream economic orthodoxy of the time, which argued that a highly interventionist 
state was necessary in order to stimulate economic growth. Keynesian economics was one expression 
of the dominant orthodoxy of the post-war period, whereby a highly activist state was widely believed 
to be beneficial for the well-being of both society and the economy. The belief in a highly activist role 
for government helped to facilitate the early development of civil nuclear power programmes. State 
support for nuclear development in the post-war period included the provision of large subsidies to 
encourage private industry investment, funds being set aside for research and development 
expenditures, and protections being implemented to ensure that private companies would only face 
limited liabilities in the event of a nuclear accident. In some instances, governments facilitated the 
establishment of nuclear reactor sites by providing direct payoffs to communities in the affected region. 
Governments also worked to limit public participation which may hinder the development of the nuclear 
industry by prohibiting judicial review of the licensing procedures. Given the high capital costs and 
financial risks involved in the construction of nuclear power facilities, civil nuclear energy programmes 
could not have been established without this support. 
The extensive level of state intervention that was undertaken to support the early development of nuclear 
energy is evident in the cases of the UK and the US. Quantifying levels of state intervention is a 
problematic task. Many state functions cannot be quantified in a robust or simple manner. For the state 
functions that are quantifiable – such as the degree of government spending on certain policy areas – 
comparative historical datasets that stretch from the end of World War II through the present day are 
often difficult to find, or simply do not exist. The absence of inaccessibility of these kinds of 
comparative datasets may be indicative of a broader story around the culture of secrecy and lack of 
transparency that has surrounded government operations, particularly in the post-war decades. 
Nevertheless, from the document analysis conducted as part of this thesis, a broad overview has been 
constructed of the high levels of state interventionism in the UK and the US in the 1950s and 1960s. 
The development of the British civil nuclear industry was primarily a state directed and controlled 
process. The UK Government established the UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) in 1954 as the 
government’s principal advisor on civil nuclear energy policy. Government-planned nuclear power 
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stations were ordered from and built by the private sector, with technical assistance provided by the 
UKAEA, but remained owned and operated by the nationalised British Electricity Authority (The 
Economist, 1955: 645). This was undertaken through a process of competitive tendering via ‘turnkey’ 
contracting, whereby the entire design and construction of a nuclear power station was carried out by a 
single contractor (Pocock, 1977: 50). The British government provided extensive financial support for 
the initial expansion of nuclear power in the form of large-scale subsidisation (Carr, 1997: 393), while 
also providing state-owned land for nuclear power plants to be constructed on (Hall, 1986: 131). 
Moreover, the development of the British nuclear power programme began with a distinct absence of 
scrutiny from Parliament, Cabinet, the media or the public (Hall, 1986: 9). The sites for the construction 
of the first nuclear reactors in the UK were chosen by the state largely in secret, with little requirements 
for public accountability. The public were typically not informed of what was going to be constructed 
at the sites, and there was minimal opportunity for negotiation with affected stakeholders (Openshaw, 
1986: 90). The UKAEA was also exempt from complying with regular planning procedures and 
legislation (Openshaw, 1986: 90). In 1947, 1949 and 1950, the issue of nuclear energy did not receive 
any mention in Cabinet discussions, despite considerable advancements in domestic nuclear research 
and planning occurring during these years (Hall, 1986: 26). Instead, decisions were made by a “charmed 
circle” consisting of the Prime Minister and a select group of ministers, while the House of Commons 
was “kept in a state of almost total ignorance” about the country’s nuclear energy programme (Hall, 
1986: 26-8). The first time that any public announcement was made about plans for the development of 
civil nuclear power was in 1955, when the white paper A Programme of Nuclear Power was submitted 
to Parliament (Openshaw, 1986: 89). However, it was not until the late 1960s that wider public debate 
on nuclear energy emerged in the UK (Williams, 1980: 31). 
Civil nuclear energy development in the US was also a state-led process. Non-state actors, such as the 
media, the public, and members of academia, were largely excluded from any kind of policy discussions 
(Rosenbaum, 1999: 81). As a result, public consultation and public debate on nuclear development was 
almost non-existent during this time (Morone and Woodhouse, 1989: 120). The US government 
provided direct financial support for nuclear energy development by funding research and development 
activities, sharing patents with nuclear reactor manufacturers at no cost, funding the development of 
technology for nuclear waste management, and taking responsibility for establishing nuclear waste 
disposal sites (Rosenbaum, 1999: 76). By the end of the 1970s, over $12bn in subsidies had been 
provided by the US government to the nuclear industry (Rosenbaum, 1999: 76). The US government 
also supported nuclear energy development by implementing the Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries 
Indemnity Act in 1957, which limited the amount that a nuclear plant operator would have to pay in 
damages in the event of a nuclear accident to $560m. Any costs exceeding this figure would be paid by 
the government. 
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However, from the 1970s onwards, the ideational and institutional context within which government 
actors operated began to transform. Neoliberal ideas became increasingly influential in debates over the 
role of the state in society and the economy. The election of political leaders who supported and 
implemented the ideas of neoliberal economists has contributed to a shift in the extent to which 
governments were willing to intervene in the economy. Policymakers increasingly sought out market-
based solutions as an alternative to the high levels of state intervention that had characterised the post-
war era. Governments sought to privatise, either partially or in full, many of their state-owned 
enterprises. Energy industries, which had typically involved a high degree of state-ownership in the 
post-war period, appeared to be an ideal target for market-based reform. 
At the same time, civil nuclear energy industries throughout Western Europe and North America had 
begun to stagnate. The number of nuclear reactor construction starts in these regions had declined 
rapidly from the late 1970s onwards. The cost and construction time for new nuclear reactors was rising, 
far exceeding their original cost estimates. Public opposition towards nuclear power was becoming 
more widespread. The nuclear power industry appeared to be in need of reform. Neoliberalism provided 
a clear critique for why these problems were taking place. Policymakers, increasingly influenced by the 
ideas of neoliberalism, blamed the high degree of state ownership and intervention in nuclear energy as 
a key reason for why these industries were failing to succeed. Advocates of neoliberalism criticised 
government regulation of the nuclear industry for being excessive, inefficient and ineffective. They 
argued that the only way to remedy the situation was to abandon state ownership and turn instead to 
liberalised arrangements that would introduce competition into the nuclear sector. 
The governance of the British electricity sector, including its civil nuclear energy industry, provides a 
clear example of the growing influence of neoliberalism. As previously discussed, the early 
development of civil nuclear power in the UK was heavily supported by the activist British state. Direct 
support for the construction of the first nuclear power plants in the UK was provided by the government 
in the form of extensive subsidisation, the provision of state-owned land for the construction of new 
nuclear reactors, a closed governance and decision-making process which insulated the nuclear industry 
from any potential public opposition, exemption from potentially problematic planning procedures or 
legislation, and so on. The establishment and growth of the civil nuclear industry in these decades was 
facilitated by the highly interventionist role adopted by the state at the time. 
However, an ideational and institutional shift towards the ideas and practices advocated by 
neoliberalism began to emerge in the UK in the 1970s. In 1976, the British Labour government formally 
abandoned their use of Keynesian policies (Crouch, 2011: 16). The election of Prime Minister Thatcher 
in 1979 brought with it a wave of neoliberal and market-based reforms. Since then, successive British 
governments have continued to invoke the language and ideas of neoliberalism, albeit to slightly 
differing degrees. The dominance of neoliberal ideology has changed the way in which policymakers 
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think about and manage the energy sector as a whole. In 1982, the British Energy Secretary Nigel 
Lawson made it clear that the country’s energy sector was going to be significantly reformed in line 
with neoliberal ideas, stating that “our task is rather to set a framework which will ensure that the market 
operates in the energy sector” (Helm, 2003: 44). 
The privatisation and liberalisation of the UK’s energy sector began in the early 1980s as part of the 
Conservative government’s push to expose nationalised industries to market forces. In 1983, the Energy 
Act was introduced which removed the requirement that only twelve regional bodies (or Area Boards) 
were able to supply electricity. While the impact of the Electricity Act was limited, it was one of the 
first clear steps towards the gradual privatisation of the electricity industry in the UK. The Electricity 
Act 1989 outlined the new structure for Britain’s electricity generation and supply industry, which came 
into force in 199026. The assets of the Central Electricity Generating Board were transferred into 
multiple different companies, while the state retained responsibility for regulation. 
As Britain’s electricity industry has been privatised, so too has its nuclear industry shifted from being 
a state owned and directed entity, to being exposed to competitive market forces. The British nuclear 
industry has been restructured in line with the core principles of neoliberalism, although this has not 
always been a straightforward process. Nuclear power was initially excluded from the government’s 
process of privatisation as the high operating and decommissioning costs involved meant that it could 
not successfully compete in a free market system (Taylor, 2007: 36). However, the British government 
reversed its position only a few years later. Two state-owned organisations, Nuclear Electric and 
Scottish Nuclear Limited, had managed to achieve dramatic cost and efficiency improvements in the 
nuclear reactors they oversaw (Taylor, 2007: 52). A review of the commercial viability of the nuclear 
industry had also been launched in 1994, which subsequently concluded that privatisation of the 
industry should proceed, and that public funds should no longer be used for the construction and 
operation of new nuclear power stations (Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, 
2007). 
The first concrete steps towards reducing state control over nuclear power were made in 1996, when 
the eight most modern nuclear power plants in the UK were privatised under the holding company 
British Energy, while the remaining nuclear power plants continued as part of the state-owned British 
Nuclear Fuels. The privatisation meant that the state would no longer be able to directly influence or 
determine the commercial decisions of British Energy (Yahaya, 2013: 12). However, the government’s 
intended distance from the company did not last. British Energy began facing financial difficulties from 
                                                     
26 At around the same time that the Electricity Act was being introduced, the British government was also 
attempting to build a new nuclear reactor at Hinkley Point (‘Hinkley C’). Nuclear power development in the UK 
had historically been dependent upon government subsidy, but the Electricity Act and the shift towards 
privatisation meant that such subsidisation was no longer possible. Hinkley C which was ultimately was 
abandoned due to its lack of economic viability. 
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2002, which resulted in the state reclaiming a financial interest in the company while providing a £650m 
loan to prevent the company from failing (National Audit Office, 2010: 4; Conway, 2003). Yet even 
after these financial difficulties and the need for government assistance, policymakers and nuclear 
industry representatives alike continued to retain a rhetorical commitment to the primacy of market 
mechanisms, reaffirming their belief that the British nuclear industry could be expanded and 
reinvigorated without state funds. 
NEOLIBERALISM & THE NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE 
The rise of neoliberalism and the influence of neoliberal principles over the state’s management of civil 
nuclear energy was also going to pose a challenge to the success of the nuclear renaissance in the UK. 
When the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance began to gain momentum, the British government appeared 
to remain firmly committed to the principles of neoliberalism. Political leaders remained adamant that 
a nuclear renaissance could take place in the UK in a competitive market environment.  This was made 
clear in a White Paper on nuclear power which was published in January 2008. The paper confirmed 
the government’s support for nuclear new build, but asserted that this expansion would be entirely 
funded by the private sector – that “it will be for energy companies to fund, develop and build new 
nuclear power stations in the UK, including meeting the full costs of decommissioning and their full 
share of waste management costs” (Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, 2008: 
10). Consequently, while the state supported the idea of an expansion of nuclear power, the rhetoric put 
forward by policymakers in the 2000s made clear that the state would not be directly intervening in or 
funding such an expansion. The Business Secretary, John Hutton, stated that the British government 
would not provide any subsidies to encourage the development of nuclear power or to assist with the 
decommissioning of nuclear reactors (BBC News, 2008). The Minister for Energy, Malcolm Wicks, 
promised that “no cheques will be written, there will be no sweetheart deals” for the construction of 
nuclear power plants, and that “there will not be any special fiscal arrangements for nuclear” (Select 
Committee on Trade and Industry, 2006).  The UK Energy Secretary, Ed Miliband, stated that “we are 
right not to subsidise new nuclear power stations because we have an obligation to get to a low-carbon 
future at the lowest cost to the billpayer” (Crooks, 2009b: 13). The influence of neoliberal ideas on 
nuclear power policymakers was evident. There was a clear rhetorical commitment that the state was 
no longer willing to directly fund nuclear development. Instead, it would be up to the private sector to 
construct new nuclear plants, and to make the claims of a nuclear renaissance into a reality. 
It would be reasonable to expect that the British government’s commitment to neoliberal principles, 
and its refusal to adopt an active, interventionist role in supporting a nuclear renaissance, would pose 
significant challenges for the success of the nuclear renaissance.  The construction of nuclear power 
plants in the UK – as well as throughout Western Europe and North America more broadly – had always 
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been heavily dependent on the provision of state funds, as well as the state’s willingness to support 
nuclear development in regards to legislation and regulation. Consequently, the British government’s 
decision to no longer provide this level of support would mean that a nuclear renaissance would only 
succeed if it was able to successfully compete in a free market environment. 
At first, nuclear industry representatives made it clear that they supported the state’s decision not to 
fund new nuclear development. The nuclear industry appeared confident that the economics of nuclear 
power were so favourable that a nuclear renaissance was possible even in the absence of government 
financial support. As early as 2005, Vincent de Rivaz, CEO of EDF Energy, argued that nuclear power 
plants could be built without public funds, stating that “the idea that nuclear requires special subsidies, 
special state financial aid, is, with respect, an old-fashioned view of the nuclear industry” and that “the 
market will deliver the diversity which we all need on nuclear as on other energies” (House of Commons 
Environmental Audit Committee, 2006: 110).  In 2006, the CEO of British Energy declared that new 
nuclear power stations could be constructed in the UK without the provision of public subsidies 
(Harrison, 2006). The electric utility company E.ON stated in a press release that “there is no 
requirement for either government subsidies or for a guaranteed long-term cost of carbon to make new 
nuclear power stations economic” (E.ON UK, 2008). 
However, despite this optimistic rhetoric from industry figures, it quickly became clear that nuclear 
power was struggling to compete in a free market environment. In May 2009, de Rivaz reversed his 
position on government financing of a nuclear renaissance, stating that the government needed to 
provide financial support in order to create a “level playing field” so that nuclear could compete with 
other low-carbon technologies (Crooks, 2009b: 13). The comments were made after the British 
Government had promised subsidies for offshore wind and ‘clean coal’ power stations, but had 
continued to remain adamant that subsidies would not be provided to support nuclear power. De Rivaz 
argued that in order for nuclear development to take place in the UK, there needed to be “a robust carbon 
price with a realistic floor” (Crooks, 2009a: 2). Despite this demand, however, de Rivaz continued to 
assert that “we don’t ask for taxpayers’ money. We don’t ask for government subsidy” (Greenpeace 
International, 2009). 
Under increasing pressure from the private sector, the British government began to show signs of 
reneging on their commitment to a private-financed nuclear renaissance. In a statement to Parliament 
in 2010, the Energy and Climate Change Secretary, Chris Huhne, reconfirmed that “there will be no 
public subsidy for new nuclear power” (Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2010). However, 
Huhne then specified exactly what was meant by this. Huhne admitted that “few economic activities 
can be absolutely free of subsidy in some respect” (Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2010). 
Huhne revealed that subsidies for nuclear power could be offered if “similar support is also made 
available more widely to other types of generation” and that he was “not ruling out action by the 
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Government to take on financial risks or liabilities for which it is appropriately compensated or for 
which there are corresponding benefits”. In 2011, the British government released a White Paper on 
electricity market reform which acknowledged that “the current market arrangements will not deliver 
investment at the scale and the pace that we need” (Department of Energy & Climate Change [DECC], 
2011: 3). The paper introduced a Carbon Price Floor and Contracts for Difference to encourage 
investment in low-carbon energy technologies. Huhne denied that these initiatives constituted the 
subsidisation of nuclear power, stating that “there is no public sector [support] for nuclear…Nuclear is 
getting no special treatment” (Harvey et al., 2010: 2). The White Paper reforms were welcomed by the 
nuclear industry. De Rivaz described the initiatives as providing the “framework we were expecting to 
see” before investment in nuclear power could continue (Blair and Clark, 2011: 4), while the CEO of 
Horizon Nuclear Power described the bill as “critical” for developers to progress their nuclear energy 
projects (Hickman, 2012). 
However, even after the introduction of these initiatives, the expansion of the British nuclear industry 
continued to encounter problems. In March 2012, German utilities RWE and E.ON announced that they 
would withdraw plans for two new nuclear power plants in the UK for financial reasons (Milmo and 
Harvey, 2012). In October 2012, de Rivaz warned the House of Commons Energy Committee that EDF 
would be unable to build new nuclear plants in the UK unless there was a “compelling business case” 
to do so (Pfeifer and Pickard, 2012: 2). In 2013, Centrica abandoned its plans to invest in a partnership 
with EDF to construct four nuclear reactors in the UK, citing rising construction costs and delays (BBC 
News, 2013b).  
In October 2013, the British Government approved construction of the Hinkley Point C nuclear reactor. 
The Secretary of State for Energy, Edward Davey, stated that the approval was significant because “for 
the first time, a nuclear station in this country will not have been built with money from the British 
taxpayer” (BBC News, 2013g). However, in order for the reactor to be built, the British government 
had to approve a guaranteed fixed price (“strike price”) for the electricity produced by the reactor. While 
the wholesale electricity price in the UK in 2013 was approximately £48/MWh, the strike price for 
Hinkley Point C was almost twice this market rate at £92.50/MWh (in 2012 prices, but then indexed to 
inflation) for thirty-five years (World Nuclear News, 2014). In December 2013, the European 
Commission began an investigation into the legality of the UK government’s subsidisation of Hinkley 
Point C (Macalister, 2013a). The Commission calculated the estimated cost of Hinkley Point C to be 
£25bn – well above EDF’s estimate of £16bn. The Commission questioned the legality of the subsidies 
given that the project was likely to be profitable without subsidisation. After the British government 
agreed to certain amendments, the Commission approved the contract for Hinkley Point C with an 
overwhelming majority (Barker and Clark, 2014). Meanwhile, government representatives continued 
to deny that their actions constitute the subsidisation of nuclear power (The Telegraph, 2013b). This 
continued until October 2015 when the Department of Energy and Climate Change announced that a 
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deal was reached between EDF and China General Nuclear Corporation to build the Hinkley Point 
reactor. At the end of the official announcement released on the Department’s website, contained within 
the fine print on ‘Notes to editors’, is a small bullet-point which states that “The Government confirms 
that it is not continuing the ‘no public subsidy policy’ of the previous administration” (Department of 
Energy & Climate Change, 2015). 
Even with the state’s recent announcement that it is now willing to provide some level of subsidy to 
nuclear, there is little indication as to what level of subsidy would be provided. This further 
problematizes the economics of nuclear power by creating financial uncertainty for potential investors 
in the UK nuclear market. An examination of the British government’s expenditure on nuclear research 
and development indicates that on a broad level, funding for nuclear during the renaissance period 
remains far lower than when the rise of neoliberal ideas first took place in the 1970s. Even though the 
British government has reneged on its commitment to a neoliberal philosophy of no state support, the 
level of financial support being offered during the renaissance period is nothing like the levels of 
financial support that were being offered in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Gaining access to comparative historical data on government expenditure on civil nuclear energy 
development is no easy task. One of the most comprehensive comparative historical datasets available 
on government expenditure on nuclear energy is the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) dataset on 
energy research, development and demonstration (RD&D) expenditure. However, these records only 
begin in 1974. Comparative historical data on government spending on energy RD&D in general, or on 
nuclear RD&D specifically, prior to this date are exceedingly difficult to find. This may be as a result 
of several possible factors, including a lack of consistent record keeping at the time, or the secrecy 
surrounding nuclear energy development particularly in the decades following the end of the Second 
World War when the technology was also being advanced for military purposes. An examination of 
Cabinet papers discussing nuclear development in the 1950s and 1960s, for example, gives little 
indication of the amount of money that would be allocated to support nuclear development. Despite 
these limitations, data provided by the IEA from 1974 onwards still illustrates noticeable changes in the 
willingness of government to directly support nuclear RD&D, as well as RD&D on energy technologies 
more broadly. 
Figure 9 below charts the British government’s expenditure on research, development and 
demonstration (RD&D) of energy technologies from 1974 to 2013 (in million USD, 2014 prices and 
exchange rates). It illustrates the exceedingly high levels of government spending being invested in 
nuclear RD&D in the mid-1970s. In 1974 (the earliest data point available), $1175m was spent on 
RD&D for nuclear power alone – almost twenty times as much money as was invested in RD&D for 
fossil fuels that same year ($54m). Government spending on nuclear RD&D in 1974 was so high that 
it accounted for 91 percent of the British Government’s total RD&D spending on energy technologies. 
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This demonstrates that there was a clear commitment by the British government at this point in time to 
directly support and fund nuclear energy development. 
Figure 9: UK Government RD&D Expenditure by Energy Technology, 1974-2013 
 
Chart compiled using data from International Energy Agency (2015) 
However, government spending on nuclear RD&D declined steadily from 1974 until the mid-1990s. 
Nuclear RD&D expenditure has remained at low levels ever since, although a slight increase in 
spending has occurred from roughly 2006 onwards. Nevertheless, nuclear RD&D expenditure in 2013 
was only $85.4m – only a fraction of the spending that was being invested in 1974. The decline in 
nuclear RD&D spending in the UK over this time period was reflective of a trend that was taking place 
across much of Western Europe and North America. For example, the US, Italy and Germany all 
reduced their support for nuclear energy RD&D by more than 90 percent from 1985-1995 (Dooley, 
1998: 548). 
The decline in government expenditure on nuclear RD&D from the mid-1970s onwards is a clear 
indication of the state’s withdrawal from directly funding nuclear energy development. This is 
consistent with the increasingly pervasive spread of neoliberalism over this time period, which has 
heavily shaped the way that policymakers think about the relationship between the state and the market. 
In particular, this decline is consistent with the growing belief that the expansion of civil energy 
industries should be a market-driven, rather than a state-driven, process. 
The rise of neoliberalism appears to have contributed to policymakers’ increasing reluctance to directly 
fund and support nuclear energy development. When representatives of the UK government first spoke 
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in favour of a nuclear renaissance, they remained adamant that no public monies would be provided in 
order for such a revival of nuclear power to take place. This stance was, at first, supported by nuclear 
industry representatives, who were confident that nuclear power could compete in a free market 
environment. However, the failure of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America to 
date indicates that nuclear power is less likely to succeed in non-state driven systems. The backflip 
performed by industry representatives, who are now demanding government subsidies for nuclear new 
build, further reinforces the conclusion that nuclear power is unable to compete in a market-based 
system. Consequently, the rise of neoliberalism appears to have contributed to the failure of the nuclear 
renaissance – at least in the UK – by removing the large degree of state intervention and subsidy that 
the nuclear industry has historically depended on in order to build new nuclear reactors. 
That said, the rise of neoliberalism cannot, in isolation, explain the failure of the nuclear renaissance. 
Given that the rise of neoliberalism is a broad contextual shift, it would be expected that government 
expenditure on all sources of energy generation would be reduced from the 1970s onwards – not just 
nuclear power. However, as Figure 9 illustrates, this is not the case. While British government spending 
on nuclear RD&D has never again come close to the level of expenditure in 1974, there has been a 
sudden increase since 2003 on government RD&D energy expenditure driven mainly by investment in 
renewables and energy efficiency technologies. In 2010, government RD&D expenditure for 
renewables was $297m – far higher than the levels of renewable RD&D expenditure in the 1970s and 
1980s. This indicates that the rise of neoliberalism is only one factor which has contributed to the 
decline in government spending on nuclear power. It may be that a combination of factors – such as 
increasing public opposition to nuclear power, growing safety concerns, ongoing financial problems, as 
well as the growing influence of neoliberal ideas – has contributed to the state’s reluctance to subsidise 
nuclear energy.  
Even so, UK Government expenditure on nuclear RD&D remains low. Figure 10 below illustrates the 
decline in nuclear RD&D as a proportion of total energy RD&D expenditure from 1974-2013. Whereas 
nuclear RD&D expenditure constituted 91 percent of total government energy RD&D expenditure in 
1974, nuclear RD&D expenditure counted for only 14 percent of total energy RD&D expenditure in 
2013. So while the decline of government spending on nuclear RD&D can be explained partly by a 
broader decline in energy RD&D expenditure more generally, there has also been a clear trend whereby 
the British government has spent less and less money on nuclear RD&D expenditure in comparison to 
investment in other energy technologies. 
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Figure 10: UK Government RD&D Expenditure on Nuclear Power as a Percentage of Total R&D 
Expenditure, 1974-2013 
 
Chart compiled using data from International Energy Agency (2015) 
This chapter has focused primarily on examining the influence of neoliberalism on civil nuclear energy 
development in the UK. However, given that both the UK and the US are the very “heartlands” of 
neoliberalism, it is reasonable to assume that a similar trend would be occurring in the US. The US 
government has consistently provided rhetorical support for a nuclear renaissance (see Chapter 2 for 
examples of the statements made supporting a nuclear renaissance). Unlike the UK government, 
however, the US government has agreed to provide financial support for the revival of nuclear power. 
However, nuclear industry representatives have criticised the financial support being offered as being 
insufficient for nuclear new build to take place. For example, when the US Department of Energy 
released proposals for the assistance that would be provided to help finance nuclear construction, the 
head of policy development described the proposals as “unworkable” (Lee, 2007). The vice president 
of congressional affairs at Exelon warned that the amount of government financial assistance provided 
“changes the equation on whether to build at all” (Lee, 2007). To date, the financial assistance provided 
by the US government has not been sufficient to kick-start a nuclear renaissance. The ongoing financial 
challenges faced by nuclear new build in the US (described in more detail in Chapter 4), an inability to 
compete in a free market environment, and insufficient government financial support has meant that 
many of the proposals for nuclear reactors that were meant to be constructed during the renaissance 
period have since been suspended or abandoned. 
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A similar story of the rise of neoliberalism and a concomitant withdrawal of state support for nuclear 
development is evident in the US (albeit to a lesser extent than the UK). An examination of the US 
government’s expenditure on RD&D of energy technologies from 1974-2014 reveals a similar trend to 
that experienced in the UK. As displayed in Figure 11 below, US government spending on energy 
RD&D declined steadily from 1974 until the late 1990s. Since then, there has been a gradual increase 
in energy RD&D spending, driven mainly by investment in fossil fuels, renewables, energy efficiency, 
and other cross-cutting technologies and research. However, expenditure on nuclear RD&D has 
declined from a peak of $4621m in 1979, to $874m in 2014. 
Figure 11: US Government RD&D Expenditure by Energy Technology, 1974-2014 
 
Chart compiled using data from International Energy Agency (2015) 
Moreover, as is the case with the UK, US government spending on nuclear R&D as a proportion of 
total energy R&D spending has also declined steadily from the mid-1970s until the present day. As 
displayed in Figure 12, government spending on nuclear RD&D in 1974 accounted for 75 percent of 
the US government’s total RD&D spending on energy technologies. This demonstrates that there was 
a clear commitment by the US government at this point in time to directly support and fund nuclear 
energy development. However, since then, government spending on nuclear RD&D has declined to the 
extent that in 2014, nuclear RD&D accounted for only 14 percent of total energy RD&D funding. This 
demonstrates that a similar trend has taken place in both of the heartlands of neoliberalism, the US and 
the UK. Government spending on nuclear RD&D in both countries has declined from 1974 until the 
present day, indicating a steady withdrawal of state financial support for nuclear energy development 
over this time period. 
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Figure 12: US Government RD&D Expenditure on Nuclear Power as a Percentage of Total 
RD&D Expenditure, 1974-2014 
 
Chart compiled using data from International Energy Agency (2015) 
CONCLUSION 
Two conclusions can be drawn from an examination of the development of the UK and the US nuclear 
energy industries. Firstly, the rise of neoliberal ideas has created a new institutional and ideational 
environment that has heavily shaped the behaviour of policymakers and their approach to civil nuclear 
energy development. From the 1970s onwards, the British government has in rhetoric and, to a lesser 
but still significant extent, in practice, gradually removed itself from directly intervening in and 
supporting nuclear new build in the UK. This has taken place within a broader context of the UK 
government seeking to liberalise its electricity market. The decline of state interventionism and 
preference for market mechanisms in the governance of nuclear energy is most evident with the 
privatisation of the British nuclear industry, and the British government’s promise that it would not 
directly finance a nuclear renaissance in the UK. While supporting the idea of a nuclear renaissance, 
the British government declared that it would be entirely up to the private nuclear industry to finance 
the revival of nuclear power. This is in stark contrast to the policy position of the British government 
in the 1950s and 1960s, when it adopted a highly interventionist role in supporting the establishment 
and expansion of a civil nuclear energy industry. Clearly, the British government’s approach to nuclear 
policymaking has been influenced by a broader contextual shift whereby neoliberalism has achieved 
ideational dominance. 
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Secondly, this broad institutional and ideational shift away from state interventionism and towards 
neoliberalism has contributed to the disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear 
renaissance. The construction of new nuclear reactors in the UK and the US has historically been heavily 
dependent on high levels of state subsidisation and legislative and regulatory support. This has been 
necessary to overcome the immense political and economic challenges associated with nuclear new 
build (see Chapter 4 for a detailed analysis of the financial problems hindering nuclear development). 
The highly activist role that the UK and US governments adopted in the post-war period helped to 
overcome these political and financial challenges. However, as neoliberal principles have become 
increasingly influential over time, the state-market relationship has been reconfigured. Governments 
have gradually taken on much less of an interventionist role, instead outsourcing many of their functions 
to market and network based arrangements. An ideational and institutional context has developed where 
governments are less willing to directly fund large-scale projects such as the construction of nuclear 
power plants. This very absence of state support appears to be a causal factor contributing to the failure 
of the nuclear renaissance. 
When the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance gained momentum in the 2000s, the UK government gave 
in-principle support for a nuclear renaissance, but remained committed to the belief that this should be 
a market-driven process. It soon became clear – from nuclear industry representatives themselves – that 
a privately financed renaissance would not be possible. Despite promises of technological 
advancements and new reactor designs, the construction of new nuclear power plants was still an 
immensely expensive and financially risky undertaking, and could not take place without the provision 
of state funds. Similarly, while the US government did agree to provide financial support for a nuclear 
renaissance, the amount of funding provided has been far less than what the nuclear industry perceives 
as necessary for a renaissance to succeed. The counter-factual argument therefore holds: had the UK 
and US governments been willing to provide the same levels of subsidisation and support that had 
helped to establish and expand the civil nuclear industry in the 1950s and 1960s, a nuclear renaissance 
would have been much more likely to succeed in these countries.  
Nevertheless, despite this broad contextual shift, there has recently been some slippage in the UK 
government’s commitment to neoliberal principles. The UK government’s announcement in October 
2015 that it was abandoning its ‘no subsidy’ policy for nuclear development is evidence of this. 
However, even with this announcement, the support that the British government is willing to provide 
to nuclear new build is likely to still be far less than it was in the 1950s and 1960s. So while there is 
some slippage between the UK government’s commitment to neoliberalism in principle and in practice, 
policymakers are still operating within a dramatically different institutional and ideational context to 
that which facilitated the early expansion of nuclear energy in the post-war period. Even with the 
government’s announcement that it may provide some level of subsidisation to the nuclear industry, it 
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is highly unlikely that the British government will be willing to adopt the same degree of state activism 
which nuclear power has historically relied upon in order to succeed. 
While this chapter has focused on the influence of neoliberalism on the UK nuclear industry, and to a 
lesser extent the US nuclear industry, it is expected that the rise of neoliberalism has also hindered the 
success of the nuclear renaissance throughout Western Europe and North America more broadly. 
Western Europe and North America have been described as the “heartlands” of neoliberalism (Peck and 
Tickell, 2002). It is therefore unsurprising that neoliberal principles have become increasingly 
influential in the management of nuclear industries throughout many OECD countries (OECD Nuclear 
Energy Agency, 2004). The UK has played a crucial role in this process by acting as a pioneer of 
liberalisation with the privatisation of its energy system, including its civil nuclear industry. The 
privatisation of the British electricity market has since been used as a role model for electricity market 
liberalisation policies implemented in the European Union (Heddenhausen, 2007: 21). As more 
countries follow the UK’s example of taking steps to liberalise their nuclear industries, it is likely that 
the construction of nuclear plants will continue to be impeded by governments becoming increasingly 
unwilling to provide the extensive level of subsidisation that has historically supported the construction 
of new nuclear power plants. Unless the economic challenges facing nuclear power are resolved, or 
governments choose to re-adopt the highly interventionist role of the 1950s and 1960s, a nuclear 
renaissance is unlikely to occur.  
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11 .  CO N CLU SION  
This chapter concludes the thesis by returning to the core research questions. A summary is provided 
for the way in which each research question has been answered in this thesis. The contribution to 
knowledge that this thesis provides is then revisited. The limitations of the research project are 
discussed, and recommendations for future research are proposed. 
ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The core aim of this thesis was to develop a more comprehensive understanding of why there is a 
disjuncture between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North 
America. In order to fulfil this aim, this thesis answered two core research questions: 
1. What factors have influenced the changing trajectory of civil nuclear energy development in 
the past? 
2. Can the factors which explain the changing fortunes of nuclear energy in the past explain the 
disconnection between the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance and the reality of civil nuclear 
energy development in Western Europe and North America since 2000? 
This chapter concludes the thesis by illustrating the way in which this research project has answered 
both of the research questions.  
What factors have influenced the changing trajectory of civil nuclear energy development in the 
past? 
This thesis has identified several factors which have influenced the changing trajectory of civil nuclear 
energy development over time. These factors have been classified into two groups. Firstly, the changing 
trajectory of civil nuclear energy development over time can be explained by factors relating specifically 
to the construction and operation of civil nuclear power facilities (‘nuclear-specific factors’). These are 
the factors that are frequently cited in academic literature as having an influence on nuclear energy 
development, and which have also emerged from the expert interviews conducted for this research 
project. 
The nuclear-specific factors identified in this thesis as influencing the changing trajectory of civil 
nuclear energy development are the economics of nuclear power, the safety of nuclear power, and the 
storage and disposal of nuclear waste. Each of these factors have influenced the trajectory of nuclear 
energy development in terms of an ideational shift in the way in which the issue is perceived and 
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prioritised as a policy problem. The economics of nuclear power, the safety of nuclear power, and the 
radioactive waste produced by nuclear power plants were broadly overlooked, or considered as a ‘non-
issue’, by policymakers during the early development and expansion of civil nuclear energy 
programmes in Western Europe and North America. However, from the mid-1970s onwards, each of 
these issues have become increasingly problematic for policymakers and industry representatives 
attempting to undertake nuclear new build. 
In addition to these nuclear-specific factors, the changing trajectory of civil nuclear energy development 
can also be explained by a broader range of factors that do not relate specifically to the construction and 
operation of civil nuclear power plants. The changing trajectory of civil nuclear energy development 
has also been influenced by broader structural, ideational, and institutional changes in context (termed 
‘contextual factors’). The analytical framework underpinning this thesis, Agents in Context Historical 
Institutionalism, is based on the core argument that the thoughts and behaviours of individual agents 
are shaped and constrained by the context in which agents operate. This suggests that the thoughts and 
behaviour of agents who directly or indirectly influence nuclear energy development (such as 
policymakers, political leaders, nuclear industry representatives, voters, lobby groups, and activists) 
will be shaped or constrained by the context in which they are located. As the institutional, ideational, 
structural and political context changes, this can shape the way in which individual agents perceive and 
respond to the use of nuclear power. Consequently, the trajectory of civil nuclear energy development 
has changed over time because of factors specific to the use of nuclear power, as well as because of 
broader changes in institutions, ideas, structures, politics, economics, society, and culture that have 
taken place from 1945 until the present day. 
Four contextual factors were identified in this thesis as having influenced the changing trajectory of 
civil nuclear energy development over time. Each of these four contextual shifts had been identified in 
the political science literature as some of the major and most influential contextual changes in the post-
war era. The contextual shifts discussed included the rise of environmentalism, the declining levels of 
public trust in government, the emergence of a risk society, and the rise of neoliberalism. Each of these 
contextual shifts gained momentum in the 1970s – roughly the same time period at which a turning 
point took place in the development of civil nuclear energy in Western Europe and North America. 
Since then, each of these contextual shifts have helped to shape the way in which agents think about 
and behave towards the issue of nuclear power. Each of these contextual shifts have influenced the 
changing trajectory of civil nuclear power by making it more difficult for political leaders and industry 
representatives to gain public acceptance and support for nuclear new build.  
All of the factors discussed in this thesis – both the nuclear-specific and the contextual factors – are 
interactive and dynamic. In some instances, a broader contextual shift may have contributed to a shift 
in the way in which agents perceive and respond to issues specific to the use of nuclear power. For 
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example, there is a mutually-interactive relationship between the rise of environmentalism, and the way 
in which nuclear waste is perceived and prioritised as a policy problem. As described in Chapters 6 and 
7, the rise of environmentalism (a contextual shift) has contributed to the growth in public awareness 
of the dangers of nuclear waste (a nuclear-specific factor). Meanwhile, the potential for environmental 
damage resulting from nuclear accidents such as Chernobyl has helped to further legitimise the 
environmental movement by highlighting to the public the environmental damage that is being caused 
by industrial development. A two-directional relationship is present here between the broader 
contextual shift, and the issue relating specifically to the use of nuclear power. Other broad contextual 
shifts such as the growth of a risk society and declining levels of public trust in government have 
hindered nuclear energy development by contributing to heightened public concerns about the safety of 
nuclear power and the dangers associated with nuclear waste. The rise of neoliberalism has made the 
economics of nuclear power more problematic as a result of state’s increasing reluctance to directly 
fund nuclear energy development. The nuclear-specific factors are also capable of influencing one 
another. For example, the growth in public and political concern over the safety of nuclear power has 
influenced the economics of nuclear power through the implementation of more stringent, and therefore 
more expensive, safety and regulatory requirements. This was evident in the political and regulatory 
response to the Fukushima nuclear disaster, whereby governments have imposed more rigorous (and 
costly) safety standards on nuclear power plants. 
Can the factors which explain the changing fortunes of nuclear energy in the past explain the 
disconnection between the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance and the reality of civil nuclear energy 
development in Western Europe and North America since 2000? 
This thesis has argued that the factors which explain the changing fortunes of nuclear energy in the past 
can also explain the disjuncture between the rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance and the reality of civil 
nuclear energy development in Western Europe and North America since 2000. Both the nuclear-
specific factors and the contextual shifts that this thesis identified as having influenced the changing 
trajectory of nuclear development in the past have continued to affect nuclear development from 2000 
onwards, the period when a ‘nuclear renaissance’ was meant to take place. The nuclear-specific factors 
that have posed challenges for the construction and operation of nuclear facilities from the mid-1970s 
onwards have not been resolved. The economics, safety and waste issues that have challenged nuclear 
development in the past continue to pose a problem today. Even though the rhetoric of a nuclear 
renaissance suggested that these problems had been overcome, there is little evidence which supports 
these claims. Moreover, an ideational shift has taken place whereby each of these nuclear-specific 
factors are now perceived and prioritised as a far more salient policy problem than they were in the 
1950s and 1960s. Consequently, any attempt at engaging in nuclear new build in Western Europe and 
North America continues to be challenged by the problems of nuclear economics, safety and waste. The 
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failure of the nuclear renaissance in these regions can be explained, in part, by the ongoing public and 
political challenges posed by the economics, safety and waste issues of nuclear power. 
Moreover, the contextual shifts that contributed to the stagnation and decline of nuclear energy in the 
1970s have not been undone. The contextual shifts that have taken place throughout Western Europe 
and North America from the 1970s onwards have meant that any attempt to undertake nuclear new build 
must now contend with a much more problematic institutional, ideational, structural, and political 
context than there has been in the past. The rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance suggested that a revival of 
nuclear power was imminent in Western Europe and North America that would be akin to the levels of 
growth and expansion that had taken place in these regions in the 1950s and 1960s. However, these 
claims failed to recognise that there have been significant contextual shifts that have changed the way 
in which agents think and act towards the issue of nuclear power. These contextual shifts have created 
new challenges for nuclear development that did not exist in the 1950s and 1960s, making it far more 
difficult for nuclear new build to take place. Consequently, the same factors (nuclear-specific and 
contextual) that contributed to the decline of nuclear power from the 1970s can also help to explain the 
disjuncture between the rhetoric and reality of the nuclear renaissance from 2000 onwards. 
This thesis does not attempt to claim that any one of these nuclear-specific or contextual factors can, in 
isolation, explain the failure of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe or North America. Nor does 
this thesis attempt to weight the factors by determining which individual factor is more or less important 
in explaining the failure of the nuclear renaissance, or whether it is the nuclear-specific factors or the 
contextual factors that are more or less important in explaining the failure of the nuclear renaissance. 
Instead, this thesis argues the simple premise that the disjuncture between the rhetoric and reality of the 
nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America cannot be explained by any one factor. 
Rather, there are a broad range of interactive and dynamic factors that have contributed to the failure of 
the nuclear renaissance in these regions. There is a clear continuity between the factors that contributed 
to the decline of civil nuclear power in the 1970s, and the factors that have contributed to the apparent 
failure of the nuclear renaissance. Certain factors may be more influential in explaining the failure of 
the nuclear renaissance in some countries than in others. However, determining this kind of degree of 
influence to a robust and empirical level is beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, a brief 
comment is made below highlighting some preliminary reflections on the comparative value of the 
explanatory factors. The comparative value of the explanatory factors is clearly an area that lends itself 
to future research into the failure of the nuclear renaissance or the changing trajectory of civil nuclear 
energy more broadly. 
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REFLECTIONS ON THE COMPARATIVE VALUE OF THE 
EXPLANATORY FACTORS 
The nuclear specific and contextual explanatory factors identified in this thesis are dynamic and 
interactive. These factors mutually support and influence one another. The intertwined nature of these 
factors means that it is difficult to identify and weight the importance of any one nuclear-specific or 
contextual factor against another in shaping civil nuclear energy development. As the research aims and 
research questions have defined the scope of the study to investigate civil nuclear energy development 
and the outcome of the nuclear renaissance at a regional level, this study has not had scope to investigate 
the factors that have been more or less influential in determining the outcome of the nuclear renaissance 
in individual countries within these regions. Moreover, the framing of the research project has been 
designed to facilitate a holistic approach to allow for the identification of a wide range of explanatory 
factors, without prioritising any one factor over the other. In order to make methodologically-robust 
claims about the comparative value of the explanatory factors identified in this thesis, further research 
is required. 
However, some limited comment can still be made about the apparent importance of particular 
explanatory factors identified in this thesis. Of the nuclear-specific factors identified, the issue of the 
economics of nuclear power appears to be a particularly important explanatory variable. While public 
opinion continues to remain divided over the safety of nuclear power, and the implementation of a long-
term storage and disposal solution for high-level nuclear waste continues to elude almost all nuclear 
countries, neither of these factors appear to have greatly impeded the success of the nuclear renaissance 
in countries such as the US, the UK and France. Instead, the issue that appears to have been particularly 
influential in hindering the success of the nuclear renaissance in these countries, as well as throughout 
Western Europe and North America more broadly, is the economics of nuclear power. 
The unfolding story of the nuclear renaissance in the UK is clear evidence of this. In spite of a lack of 
a high-level waste solution, and a divided public opinion on nuclear power, the UK government 
continues to persevere with its expectation of a nuclear renaissance. Neither cost, waste or safety 
considerations have yet stopped the British government from politically supporting the emergence of a 
British nuclear renaissance. Yet in practice, it appears to be the issue of cost that has ultimately caused 
the British nuclear renaissance to be unsuccessful. The construction of the Hinkley Point C reactor was 
meant to be the gateway project to the nuclear renaissance in the UK. However, Hinkley Point C has 
suffered from years of delays and extensive cost overruns primarily to financing issues (rather than as 
a result of public opposition over nuclear waste or nuclear safety). Despite all of the other nuclear-
specific and explanatory factors that could hinder the development of civil nuclear energy in the UK, it 
appears that in the case of the Hinkley Point C reactor, it is ultimately the economics of nuclear power 
176 
  
that has been its undoing to date. This suggests that the cost of nuclear power may be more influential 
than the other nuclear-specific factors identified in this thesis. Moreover, the story of Hinkley Point C 
is not an anomaly – the other ‘renaissance’ reactors in Finland and France, while being further 
progressed than Hinkley Point, have experienced similar extensive cost and construction overruns. In 
Finland, the cost overruns experienced at the Olkiluoto Nuclear Power Plant have already caused plans 
for an additional nuclear reactor (Olkiluoto 4) to be cancelled. This evidence therefore suggests that in 
explaining the apparent failure of the nuclear renaissance, the cost of nuclear power (as opposed to 
nuclear safety or nuclear waste) is a particularly important explanatory variable. However, in order to 
substantiate this claim, further research is needed to empirically evaluate the relative influence of the 
economics of nuclear power compared to the other explanatory factors. This research would, ideally, 
be conducted at a country-specific, rather than at a regional, level of investigation. 
Of the contextual factors identified in this thesis, changing perceptions of risk and the rise of 
neoliberalism appear to be particularly influential in shaping the changing trajectory of civil nuclear 
power. While the rise of environmentalism has created new challenges for civil nuclear energy 
development, it has also created new opportunities for nuclear power to be embraced on the grounds of 
its low carbon emissions and its contribution to mitigating climate change. Nuclear advocates have 
capitalised on the salience of environmental issues by reframing nuclear power as a low-carbon energy 
solution that is necessary for combating global warming. This strategy appears to have had some 
success, with a growing ‘reluctant acceptance’ among the public for nuclear power as a result of its 
low-carbon credentials. Thus, environmentalism has posed both a challenge and an opportunity for 
nuclear power. Moreover, while changes in public trust in government appears to have contributed to 
the difficulty in government’s convincing citizens of the need for nuclear power, the timeframe with 
which levels of public trust in government began to decline does not align exactly with the timeframe 
identified in this thesis as the point at which the fall of nuclear power began. Therefore, the influence 
of both environmentalism and public trust in government on hindering the success of the nuclear 
renaissance may be somewhat limited compared to the other contextual factors identified in this thesis. 
However, changing public and political perceptions of risk, as well as the rise of neoliberalism, appear 
to be more influential in shaping the outcome of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North 
America. The dominance with which considerations of risk now permeate all aspects of public and 
political decision-making mean that public and political perceptions of nuclear power have 
fundamentally changed. Considerations of risk are now intrinsic to the nuclear debate, and the 
perception of nuclear power as a risky technology has been reinforced by the nuclear disasters at Three 
Mile Island, Chernobyl, and more recently, Fukushima. Government and industry efforts appear to have 
had little success in convincing large segments of the public that the risks associated with nuclear power 
can be effectively contained by technical and regulatory solutions. The ongoing disconnect between the 
way in which nuclear advocates and those opposed to (or even uncertain about) nuclear power view the 
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risks involved has contributed to a stagnation in the nuclear debate, and ultimately, a lack of widespread 
public support for the nuclear renaissance. 
Moreover, the rise of neoliberalism appears to be a particularly influential contextual factor in 
explaining the changing trajectory of nuclear power and the outcome of the nuclear renaissance, as it 
means that states are now far less willing to provide the extensive levels of intervention and financial 
support that have historically been necessary for nuclear new build to succeed. Amongst countries in 
Western Europe and North America, there remains a political commitment to the principles of 
neoliberalism and market forces, which has shaped government policy for nuclear power. For example, 
the UK government’s commitment to neoliberal principles was highlighted by the government’s 
announcement that the nuclear renaissance could succeed in the UK by being entirely funded by the 
private sector. While the British government has since wavered on this commitment, it is still highly 
unlikely that the extensive levels of financial support that have historically been provided to the nuclear 
industry will be reinstated. The ongoing problem of the economics of nuclear power highlights that high 
levels of state intervention and financial support are still necessary for nuclear new build to succeed.  
Put simply, there is little evidence to suggest that nuclear new build can successfully take place in a 
truly liberalised and competitive energy market. Given that countries in Western Europe and North 
America are unlikely to abandon their commitment to neoliberal principles, this suggests that a nuclear 
renaissance will struggle to succeed in these regions. Meanwhile, the countries which have witnessed 
the greatest levels of nuclear new build since 2000 (namely China and Russia) are countries 
characterised by high levels of state intervention and aid in nuclear energy development. This suggests 
that the failure of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America can be explained, in 
part, by the lessening of state intervention and financial aid as a result of the rise of neoliberalism. Given 
that much of Western Europe and North America remains committed to neoliberal market principles, 
this suggests that nuclear power is unlikely to again receive the same levels of state aid that it has 
historically depended upon in order to succeed – and which recent developments indicate is still 
necessary for nuclear new build to take place. These are, however, limited reflections on the 
comparative value of the explanatory factors identified in this thesis. In order to make more robust, 
empirically-grounded claims about the extent to which any one of these nuclear-specific or contextual 
factors has been more influential than the other, further research which is aimed at a country-specific, 
rather than a regional level of investigation, is needed. 
CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
This thesis addresses the existing dearth of academic research into the reasons for the disjuncture 
between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America. 
It has developed a rigorously detailed, empirical account of changes in nuclear energy policy and 
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development in these regions from 1945 until the present day. In doing so, it documents the disjuncture 
that exists between the rhetoric and reality of the nuclear renaissance. It challenges popular explanations 
for the failure of the nuclear renaissance (such as the Fukushima disaster and the economics of nuclear 
power) as being simplistic and taking a ‘snapshot’ perspective of nuclear development. It contrast, this 
thesis develops a more holistic understanding for this disjuncture than popular explanations suggest. It 
broadens the debate on nuclear power by identifying the importance of a wide range of factors – both 
nuclear specific factors and broader contextual shifts – in explaining the changing trajectory of civil 
nuclear energy development and the outcome of the nuclear renaissance.  
As this thesis has been underpinned by a problem-based research approach, the emphasis of this study 
has been on developing an empirical, rather than a theoretical, contribution to knowledge. As a result, 
the literature contribution made by this thesis is limited. Nevertheless, despite this empirical focus, this 
thesis has still made a theoretical contribution to knowledge by broadening the disciplinary and 
theoretical approach that has typically been adopted in the field of energy studies, as well as by 
advancing the literature on Agents in Context Historical Institutionalism. The theoretical contribution 
to knowledge made by this thesis is described in more detail in the next paragraphs. 
This thesis made a theoretical contribution to the field of energy studies, as well as to the specific 
research area of comparative nuclear history and the outcome of the nuclear renaissance, through its 
adoption of a social science based research approach. As described in more detail in Chapter 1, the field 
of energy studies has been dominated by a technical and scientific research approach. This thesis 
challenges this dominance and extends the literature on energy studies by instead adopting a social 
science based approach to the research topic. By adopting a different disciplinary approach to the topic 
of comparative nuclear history, this thesis develops a theoretical understanding of civil nuclear energy 
development that highlights the importance of a broader range of social, political, institutional and 
ideational factors in determining how and why nuclear energy development changes over time, but 
which have received little to no consideration in previous literature on energy studies and nuclear power. 
It argues that a purely techno-scientific approach to understanding nuclear energy development provides 
a narrow interpretation of comparative nuclear history, and fails to explain the reasons for regional 
variation in the outcome of the civil nuclear renaissance. 
This thesis makes a further theoretical contribution to knowledge through its use of historical 
institutionalism as an analytical framework to investigate the topic of civil nuclear power. More 
specifically, this thesis makes a theoretical contribution to the historical institutionalism literature by 
lending support for two of the core claims of historical institutionalism (these core claims are discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 3). Historical institutionalism is premised upon the central idea that “history 
matters” when analysing processes and outcomes of institutional change. This thesis has demonstrated 
the importance of this core claim of historical institutionalism by placing “politics in time”. That is, by 
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highlighting the way in which many of the issues which contributed to the initial decline in nuclear new 
build in the 1970s still remain unresolved today, and as a result, have continued to hinder the prospects 
of a revival of civil nuclear power. Moreover, historical institutionalism highlights the importance of 
contextual conditions in creating and shaping institutional arrangements. This thesis lends support for 
the core assumption of historical institutionalism that “context matters”, and that policy change cannot 
be understood by examining a single institution or process. Throughout the four contextual explanatory 
factor chapters (Chapters 7-10), this thesis has illustrated the way in which political, social, economic, 
cultural, structural, institutional and ideational context has shaped the trajectory of civil nuclear energy 
development throughout history, and continues to shape contemporary policy developments and the 
outcome of the nuclear renaissance. 
In addition to lending support to the core claims of historical institutionalism, this thesis makes a further 
theoretical contribution to knowledge by expanding the application of a newly developed, more 
expansive version of historical institutionalism. As described in more detail in Chapter 3, Agents in 
Context Historical Institutionalism (AiC-HI) was developed by as a more flexible version of historical 
institutionalism that integrates a broader range of causal variables, including formal and informal 
agents, institutions, ideas, context and structure, but which does not privilege any one of these variables 
over another. To date, AiC-HI has primarily been applied as an analytical framework to better 
understand the subject area of banking and financial systems (see Bell and Hindmoor, 2014; Bell and 
Feng, 2014; Bell, 2012). This thesis therefore makes a theoretical contribution to knowledge by 
extending the application of AiC-HI to a new subject area. Specifically, this thesis represents the first 
instance of AiC-HI being applied to the field of energy studies, and to the subject area of civil nuclear 
energy development and the nuclear renaissance in particular. In doing so, it has demonstrated the 
ability of AiC-HI to facilitate the creation of a more holistic and comprehensive understanding of 
subject areas beyond which it has previously been limited to. 
Moreover, this thesis makes a theoretical contribution to knowledge by lending support for the core 
argument of AiC-HI: that both agents and context are central to understanding how and why policy 
development changes over time. Specifically, this thesis demonstrates the way in which a broad range 
of factors (relating to both individual agency and the broader context) operate in a mutually dynamic 
and interactive manner to influence the changing trajectory of civil nuclear energy policy and 
development. The mutually shaping nature of these interactions means that neither structure, nor 
agency, can be identified as more influential than the other. In doing so, this research highlights the 
limits of the structure-agency debate. It privileges neither structure nor agency as being more important 
in influencing policy change, but instead highlights the way in which both of these types of factors 
mutually shape and reinforce one another. 
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As the problem-centred research approach underpinning this study has meant that the focus of this thesis 
has been on developing its empirical, rather than theoretical, contribution to knowledge, further research 
is needed to develop the limited theoretical contribution made in this paper. This thesis has 
demonstrated the strength of AiC-HI in explaining changes in civil nuclear energy development at a 
regional level for Western Europe and North America. However, in doing so, it has made an inevitable 
trade-off between the breadth and depth of the data collected and the explanation developed. Further 
research is needed to investigate the ability of AiC-HI to explain variations in nuclear energy policy 
and development at a country-specific level. Such research would help to develop a more nuanced 
approach to understanding the reasons for changes in nuclear policy, and would also help to better 
identify the strengths and weaknesses of AiC-HI as an analytical framework. Moreover, while this thesis 
lends support for the core claim of AiC-HI that agents, context, ideas and structure are all factors that 
are mutually influential for policy change, using AiC-HI to examine nuclear energy development at a 
country-specific level would help to develop a greater depth of understanding and identify whether 
some of these factors are more or less influential in shaping nuclear policy. 
LIMITATIONS & FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
There are several limitations associated with the present research. Firstly, while this thesis focuses upon 
the rhetoric and reality of the nuclear renaissance in the Western Europe and North America, adopting 
a regional approach means that many of the more nuanced, country-specific experiences of nuclear 
energy development have not been explored in detail. Instead, this thesis has discussed the experience 
of nuclear development in the UK and the US to a greater extent than in other countries. There are 
several reasons for this emphasis. The political rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance was strongest in these 
two countries, where political leaders at the highest level of government across multiple administrations 
and competing political parties made public statements in support of a nuclear renaissance. 
Furthermore, the existing body of literature discussing nuclear energy development focuses largely on 
the experiences of the US and the UK – and as such, the greatest amount of information for analysis 
was available for these two countries, particularly for historical information on nuclear development in 
the 1950s and 1960s. The dearth of available data is a common problem facing comparative historical 
research (Green, 2004: 47). Care has been taken to ensure that qualifications are included throughout 
this study in any instance where the availability of historical data is limited. Future research is needed 
that focuses more heavily on investigating the experiences of nuclear development and the nuclear 
renaissance in Western Europe and North America beyond the US and the UK. Adopting a country-
specific approach to future research into nuclear energy would help to capture more of the nuanced 
differences in how and why civil nuclear energy development changes over time, which have not been 
able to be captured at a regional level of investigation.  
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Another limitation of this study was the limited diversity of experts interviewed. The majority of experts 
interviewed were academics, with only a small number of government and industry representatives 
interviewed. This was because academic researchers tended to be far more willing to participate in an 
interview than government or nuclear industry representatives. Many of the interview invitations sent 
to government organisations and private companies working in the nuclear industry were declined or 
received no response. The difficulty in finding government or industry representatives who would agree 
to an interview was somewhat unsurprising given the highly controversial nature of nuclear power. 
Moreover, several of the interviewees mentioned during their interviews that the controversy 
surrounding nuclear power, and the highly secretive culture surrounding nuclear development, meant 
that it would be difficult to gain access to government and industry representatives working in the area 
of nuclear power. However, even though the majority of the interviews were conducted with academic 
researchers, many of these academics had previously worked for government departments or nuclear 
energy companies, and were willing to comment on their experiences when working in those capacities. 
Future research is needed to incorporate the perspectives of a wider cohort of stakeholders on nuclear 
energy development and the factors that have influenced the outcome of the nuclear renaissance.  
Interview data was not available to support or substantiate the findings of the broader contextual 
explanatory factor chapters (Chapters 7-10). The purpose of conducting expert interviews for this study 
was to develop an understanding of the factors that experts currently working or researching in the field 
of nuclear power identified as being influential for civil nuclear energy development and the outcome 
of the nuclear renaissance. Interviewees were questioned broadly about what factors they thought were 
influencing the trajectory of civil nuclear energy development and the nuclear renaissance, as well as 
contemporary challenges and opportunities for the nuclear industry. Interviewees were not ‘encouraged’ 
to identify particular factors, nor were they directly asked about whether they thought particular factors 
(such as nuclear-specific or broader contextual) were influential in civil nuclear energy development. 
Through this process, it became clear that interviewees were identifying almost exclusively nuclear-
specific factors when answering these interview questions. While a small number of interview 
participants did note the importance of the broader political and social context in determining the 
trajectory of civil nuclear energy development, they did not discuss the specific contextual factors 
identified in this thesis. For this reason, interview data is not available to support the findings of the 
broader contextual explanatory factor chapters (i.e. Chapters 7-10). 
Moreover, the lack of discussion of broader contextual factors within the expert interviews is 
unsurprising given that a core claim of this thesis is that existing explanations for the failure of the 
nuclear renaissance have been dominated by nuclear-specific factors (such as the cost of nuclear power 
and concerns about nuclear safety). This same dominance of nuclear-specific explanatory factors was 
mirrored in the expert interviews conducted for this thesis. Therefore, the lack of interview data 
discussing the influence of broader contextual factors on civil nuclear energy development lends further 
182 
  
support for one of the core justifications of this thesis – to broaden the debate on nuclear power away 
from the nuclear-specific factors which have dominated thinking on how and why nuclear policy and 
development changes over time. 
Due to time and resource constraints, this research project has only investigated the impact of four post-
war contextual shifts on civil nuclear energy development and the outcome of the nuclear renaissance 
in Western Europe and North America. In accordance with a problem-centred approach to research, 
these four contextual shifts were chosen as they were expected to be most relevant to the research 
questions under investigation. However, there are many other contextual shifts that occurred in the post-
war period that could have been investigated to determine whether, or to what extent, they have 
contributed to the disconnection between the expectation and reality of the nuclear renaissance. It is 
recommended that future research into nuclear power and the failure of the nuclear renaissance is 
conducted to explore the influence of other contextual shifts not addressed in this thesis. Are there other 
broad contextual shifts, beyond the four examined in this thesis, that can help to explain the disjuncture 
between the rhetoric and reality of the nuclear renaissance? For example, the rise of monitory 
democracy or changes in the military-industrial complex could be explored to investigate whether each 
of these post-war shifts have contributed to changes in the trajectory of civil nuclear energy 
development, or the failure of the nuclear renaissance more specifically. 
As this research has focused primarily on the changing trajectory of nuclear energy development in 
Western Europe and North America, further research is needed to investigate whether the research 
findings are relevant in shaping nuclear development in other regions of the globe. For example, future 
research questions could include: are the factors which explain the disjuncture between the rhetoric and 
reality of the nuclear renaissance in Western Europe and North America present in other regions where 
there is more evidence of a nuclear renaissance taking place? Can the absence of the nuclear-specific 
or contextual factors help to explain the success of nuclear energy development in other regions or 
countries? For example, can the absence of a commitment to neoliberal principles help to explain why 
nuclear new build has been more successful in countries such as China and Russia? Has the rise of 
environmentalism been less pronounced in these countries, and has this therefore meant less barriers to 
the construction of new nuclear reactors? Are there differences in public and political perceptions of 
risk in countries such as China and Russia, as opposed to the US and the UK, and does this have an 
impact on nuclear energy policy and development?  
Moreover, further research is needed to investigate whether certain nuclear-specific or contextual 
factors identified in this thesis are more or less influential in shaping nuclear energy policy and 
development in particular regions or countries. For example, are the economics of nuclear power more 
important in shaping nuclear development than considerations of nuclear safety or nuclear waste? Are 
changing risk perceptions more influential than declining levels of public trust in government? There is 
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also need for further research to investigate the extent of the interaction between the nuclear-specific 
and the broader contextual factors identified in this thesis. For example, to what extent has the rise of 
neoliberalism and environmentalism influenced the economics of nuclear power? This is a question that 
has been addressed to a brief extent in this thesis, but which further research could explore to a much 
greater level of detail. In order to determine whether certain nuclear-specific or contextual factors 
identified in this thesis are more or less influential in shaping civil nuclear energy development, further 
research should be conducted at a country-specific, rather than at a regional, level of investigation. This 
would allow for a more nuanced explanation to be developed as to the reasons for how and why nuclear 
energy development changes over time (as some of these nuances have been overlooked as an inevitable 
result of the regional focus that this thesis has adopted). Investigating changes in nuclear energy policy 
and development at a country-specific level would also provide further opportunity to expand the 
theoretical contribution that Agents in Context Historical Institutionalism can make to the field of 
energy studies, and help to further establish AiC-HI’s value in explaining policy and institutional 
change over time. 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
This thesis has investigated why there is a disjuncture between the expectation and reality of the nuclear 
renaissance in Western Europe and North America. It has challenged existing explanations for the 
nuclear renaissance – such as the rise of safety concerns after the Fukushima nuclear disaster, or the 
ongoing financial problems plaguing nuclear power – as being unable to, in isolation, explain why there 
is little evidence of a nuclear renaissance taking place in these regions. Both the nuclear-specific and 
the contextual factors which this thesis has identified as explaining the changing fortune of nuclear 
energy in the past suggest that a nuclear renaissance is unlikely to take place in Western Europe or 
North America in the near future. The rhetoric of a nuclear renaissance suggested that the nuclear-
specific factors which continue to hinder nuclear new build (the economics of nuclear power, nuclear 
safety and nuclear waste) were going to be resolved, primarily through technological advancements and 
new reactor designs that would be cheaper, safer and produce less radioactive waste than ever before. 
However, despite these promises, civil nuclear energy development continues to be hindered by the 
economics of nuclear power, the safety of nuclear power, and the radioactive waste that nuclear power 
produces. While there is little evidence to suggest that these problems will be overcome any time soon, 
the nuclear industry continues to place their faith in small modular reactors as the way forward for 
nuclear power, by overcoming the historical failures of large conventional reactors and adapt to the 
gradual decentralisation of energy systems. However, even if small modular reactors are able to 
overcome some of the nuclear-specific factors that have historically impeded nuclear new build, the 
success of the nuclear industry will continue to be challenged by the broader contextual shifts that 
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contributed to the decline of nuclear power from the 1970s onwards. Until these ongoing issues are 
resolved, it is unlikely that a nuclear renaissance will succeed in Western Europe or North America. 
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